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ABSTRACT 
In the past few years, we have seen the rise of a new model of 
production and consumption of goods and services, often referred to as 
the “sharing economy.” Fueled by startups such as Uber and Airbnb, 
sharing enables individuals to obtain rides, accommodations, and other 
goods and services from peers via personal computer or mobile 
application in exchange for payment. The rise of sharing has raised 
questions about how it should be regulated, including whether existing 
laws and regulations can and should be enforced in this new sector or 
whether new ones are needed.  
In this Article, we explore those questions in the context of taxation. We 
argue that, contrary to the claims of some commentators, the application 
of substantive tax law to sharing is mostly (though not completely) clear, 
because current law generally contains the concepts and categories 
necessary to tax sharing. However, tax enforcement and compliance may 
present challenges, as a result of two distinctive features of sharing. First, 
some sharing businesses opportunistically pick the more favorable 
regulatory interpretation if there is ambiguity regarding which rule 
applies or whether a rule applies. The existence of these ambiguities has 
been exacerbated by the structures of the new sharing economy and this 
has led to compliance and enforcement gaps. Second, the “microbusiness” 
nature of sharing raises unique compliance and enforcement concerns. We 
suggest strategies for addressing these dual challenges, including lower 
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information reporting thresholds, safe harbors and advance rulings to 
simplify tax reporting, and targeted enforcement efforts. 
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INTRODUCTION  
In the past few years, we have seen the rise of a new model of 
production and consumption of goods and services. In this so-called 
“sharing economy,” startups such as Uber, Airbnb, and TaskRabbit enable 
consumers to summon rides, rent accommodations, or hire services from 
peers via personal computer or a mobile app, in exchange for payment.
1
 
On the supply side, these models enable owners of homes, apartments, or 
vehicles, or those who possess certain skills (such as house painting, home 
 
 
 1. See generally AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com (last visited Jan. 3, 2016); TASKRABBIT, 
https://www.taskrabbit.com (last visited Jan. 3, 2016); UBER, https://www.uber.com (last visited Jan. 
3, 2016). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss4/7
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organization, or dogsitting), to monetize those assets or skills.
2
 The 
technological platforms employed by these startups enable individual 
producers and consumers to transact with each other with unprecedented 
ease.
3
  
Also known as “collaborative consumption,” the “peer-to-peer 
economy,” or “peer-to-peer consumption,” a broad range of commentators 
suggest that the sharing economy is transforming the way people consume 
and supply goods and services, such as transportation, accommodations, 
and task help.
4
 Commentators note that sharing arrangements have the 
potential to significantly affect traditional industries such as taxicabs, 
limousine services, and the hotel industry.
5
 As such, the sharing economy 
raises important legal and regulatory issues, including questions of 
whether and how the new startups should be regulated and questions about 
the appropriate relationship between regulation and innovation.
6
  
 
 
 2. See The Rise of the Sharing Economy, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 9, 2013), http://www.econ 
omist.com/news/leaders/21573104-internet-everything-hire-rise-sharing-economy; Benita Matofska, 
What Is the Sharing Economy?, PEOPLE WHO SHARE (Apr. 25, 2016), http://www.thepeoplewho 
share.com/blog/what-is-the-sharing-economy/ (describing the sharing economy as “the shared 
creation, production, distribution, trade and consumption of goods and services by different people and 
organisations”).  
 3. See sources cited supra note 2. 
 4. See, e.g., Dina Bass, Microsoft Said to Invest About $100 Million in Startup Uber, 
BLOOMBERG TECH. (July 31, 2015, 8:06 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-07-
31/microsoft-said-to-consider-funding-uber-at-50-billion-valuation (noting that Uber, which has 
“disrupted established taxi and limousine companies,” has a valuation of $50 billion based on the 
reported Microsoft investment); The Sharing Economy: A Shift Away From Ownership?, NPR, 
http://www.npr.org/series/244583579/the-sharing-economy-a-shift-away-from-ownership (last visited 
Jan. 3, 2016) (exploring different aspects of the sharing economy); 2015 1099 Economy Workforce 
Report, REQUESTS FOR STARTUPS, https://web.archive.org/web/20160331171108/http://www.req 
uestsforstartups.com/survey (last visited June 27, 2016) (“The 1099 Economy . . . is rapidly redefining 
how we experience many fundamental parts of our lives and . . . . [is] reshaping the way we think 
about work.”); Pricewaterhouse Coopers, The Sharing Economy: How Will It Disrupt Your Business?, 
PWC UK BLOGS (Aug. 2014), http://pwc.blogs.com/files/sharing-economy-final_0814.pdf (estimating 
that “[f]ive key sharing sectors (P2P finance, online staffing, P2P accommodation, car sharing and 
music/video streaming) have the potential to increase global revenues from around $15 billion now to 
around $335 billion by 2025” and warning that “[i]ncumbents need to see disruption coming from an 
expansion of sharing and develop effective strategies to respond, whether by acquisition, partnership 
or launching their own sharing services”). We note that the popular press has, in some sense, been 
ahead of scholars in examining the sharing economy, interviewing its participants, and commenting on 
its development. 
 5. See, e.g., Georgios Zervas et al., The Rise of the Sharing Economy: Estimating the Impact of 
Airbnb on the Hotel Industry 30–33 (Bos. Univ. Sch. of Mgmt. Research Paper Series, No. 2013-16, 
2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2366898. 
 6. See, e.g., Jennifer S. Fan, Regulating Unicorns: Disclosure and the New Private Economy, 
57 B.C. L. REV. 583, 598–605 (2016); Christopher Koopman et al., The Sharing Economy and 
Consumer Protection Regulation: The Case for Policy Change, 8 J. BUS., ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 
529, 538–39, 544 (2015); Orly Lobel, The Law of the Platform, MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2742380; Stephen R. Miller, First 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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One set of emerging questions concerns whether existing laws and 
regulations are adequate and should be enforced in the sharing sector, or 
whether new laws and regulations are needed.
7
 These questions have taken 
on particular urgency because of the perception that sharing economy 
businesses often ignore the law, choosing to lobby and negotiate with 
regulators only after the fact.
8
 Such questions have permeated the tax field 
 
 
Principles for Regulating the Sharing Economy, 53 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 147, 151–53 (2016); Bronwen 
Morgan & Declan Kuch, Radical Transactionalism: Legal Consciousness, Diverse Economies, and the 
Sharing Economy, 42 J.L. & SOC’Y 556, 583–84 (2015); Sofia Ranchordás, Does Sharing Mean 
Caring? Regulating Innovation in the Sharing Economy, 16 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 413, 422–24 
(2015) [hereinafter Ranchordás, Does Sharing Mean Caring]; Sofia Ranchordás, Innovation-Friendly 
Regulation: The Sunset of Regulation, the Sunrise of Innovation, 55 JURIMETRICS 201, 202–08 (2015); 
Kellen Zale, Sharing Property, 87 U. COLO. L. REV. 501, 541–47 (2016); Stephen R. Miller, 
Transferable Sharing Rights: A Theoretical Model for Regulating Airbnb and the Short-Term Rental 
Market 1–2 (Oct. 24, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pap 
ers.cfm?abstract_id=2514178. 
 7. See, e.g., Fan, supra note 6, at 584–86; Morgan & Kuch, supra note 6, at 563–65; 1099.IS, 
http://1099.is (last visited Jan. 4, 2016); All Eyes on the Sharing Economy, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 7, 
2013), http://www.economist.com/news/technology-quarterly/21572914-collaborative-consumption-
technology-makes-it-easier-people-rent-items; Joyce E. Cutler, Cities Grappling with Challenges of 
How to Tax, Regulate Short-Term Rentals, BLOOMBERG BNA (Oct. 21, 2014), http://www.bna. 
com/cities-grappling-challenges-n17179897258/; Mike LaBossiere, The Sharing Economy II: Taxes, 
TALKING PHIL. (July 25, 2014), http://blog.talkingphilosophy.com/?p=8067; Kathleen Pender, If You 
Make Money in the Sharing Economy, the IRS Will Know, S.F. CHRON. (Feb. 22, 2014, 2:43 PM), 
http://www.sfgate.com/business/networth/article/If-you-make-money-in-the-sharing-economy-the-IRS 
-5258941.php; Brad Tuttle, The Other Complication for Airbnb and the Sharing Economy: Taxes, 
TIME (June 15, 2013), http://business.time.com/2013/06/15/the-other-complication-for-airbnb-and-the-
sharing-economy-taxes/. Some commentators suggest that new legal and regulatory regimes or 
categories may be required to address the challenges raised by sharing. See, e.g., Benjamin G. 
Edelman & Damien Geradin, Efficiencies and Regulatory Shortcuts: How Should We Regulate 
Companies Like Airbnb and Uber?, STAN. TECH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 12–15), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2658603; Nancy Leong & Aaron 
Belzer, The New Public Accommodations, 105 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 6–8), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2687486; Daniel E. Rauch & David Schleicher, Like Uber, but 
for Local Governmental Law: The Future of Local Regulation of the “Sharing Economy,” 76 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 901, 905–09 (2015); Alex Rosenblat & Luke Stark, Uber’s Drivers: Information Asymmetries and 
Control in Dynamic Work 14 (Oct. 15, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract =2686227; Abbey Stemler, Betwixt and Between: Regulating the Shared 
Economy, 43 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 9–12), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2535656. 
 8. See, e.g., Jason Clampet, Sharing Homes, Cars—and Lawsuits, BBC (May 1, 2014), 
http://www.bbc.com/travel/feature/20140501-sharing-homes-cars-and-lawsuits (describing the sharing 
economy’s “sin-first, ask-forgiveness-later” strategy); Sam Shead, ‘Arrogant’ Uber Needs to Mature 
Before Going Public, Says VC, TECHWORLD (Dec. 9, 2014), http://www.techworld.com/news/ 
startups/arrogant-uber-needs-mature-before-going-public-says-vc-3590290/. This more aggressive 
strategy, though, may have backfired in Austin, Texas, in May 2016. Richard Parker, How Austin Beat 
Uber, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/12/opinion/how-austin-beat-
uber.html?_r=0 (noting Uber’s withdrawal from the Austin market on May 9, 2016, after losing a 
referendum on the local regulation of ride-sharing companies). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss4/7
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as well.
9
 Some commentators claim that new sharing economy earners
10
 
do not know what tax rules apply, do not comply with the tax law, and 
may believe that sharing should not be taxed.
11
 Others argue that existing 
tax laws and regulations may need to be reconsidered, expanded, or 
modified in light of sharing’s rise.12 Prompted by such perceived 
uncertainty, websites, online commentaries, and tax advising services have 
popped up, advising sharing economy earners on the tax issues raised by 
sharing and how to comply with their tax obligations.
13
  
Given the growth of sharing arrangements, we think it is important to 
be clear at the outset about whether these claims are accurate, so as to 
 
 
 9. See Cutler, supra note 7; Tuttle, supra note 7; see also Emily Badger & Zachary A. Goldfarb, 
Uber Hired David Plouffe When It Realized ‘Techies’ Can’t Do Politics, WASH. POST (Aug. 19, 
2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/08/19/uber-hired-david-plouffe-whe 
n-it-realized-techies-cant-do-politics. 
 10. This Article refers to the individuals offering goods and services in the sharing economy as 
“sharing economy earners” or “sharing earners.” It refers to the startups that facilitate such 
collaborative consumption as “sharing economy businesses” or “sharing businesses.” This Article 
refers to sharing economy earners and sharing economy businesses, collectively, as “sharing economy 
actors” or “sharing actors.” 
 11. See Tuttle, supra note 7 (“[I]t seems as if almost no one involved in the sharing economy 
knows exactly what taxes they’re supposed to pay, nor when or how to pay them. And for several 
reasons—the rules are unclear, enforcement is almost nonexistent, and many feel that ‘sharing’ 
shouldn’t be taxed at all—very few people pay them.”). These sentiments may stem in part from the 
difficulty many cities and localities have faced in collecting city and local hotel and occupancy taxes 
from businesses like Airbnb. See, e.g., Carolyn Said, S.F. Could Get $11 Million a Year When Airbnb 
Collects Hotel Tax, S.F. CHRON. (Sept. 18, 2014, 7:42 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/business/article/S-
F-could-get-11-million-a-year-when-Airbnb-5762838.php; Dara Kerr, Airbnb Begins Collecting 14% 
Hotel Tax in San Francisco, CNET (Sept. 17, 2014, 12:23 PM), http://www.cnet.com/news/airbnb-
begins-collecting-14-hotel-tax-in-san-francisco/. 
 12. See, e.g., Jordan M. Barry & Paul L. Caron, Tax Regulation, Transportation Innovation, and 
the Sharing Economy, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 69, 82–84 (2015) (examining the sharing 
economy under the fringe benefit rules of I.R.C. § 132); Christopher T. Lutz, Legitimizing the Sharing 
Economy: Reconciling the Tension Between State and Local Policy Concerns and Innovation, 
BLOOMBERG BNA (Dec. 5, 2014), http://www.bna.com/uploadedFiles/Content/PDFs/WSTR. 
December.5.2014.pdf (considering the potential for cooperative responses by state and local 
government to foster innovation and enhance revenues). 
 13. See, e.g., Press Release, Intuit, Intuit and Uber Partner to Simplify Filing Taxes for On-
Demand Economy Workers (Jan. 28, 2015), available at http://www.intuit.com/company/press-
room/press-releases/2015/Intuit-Uber-partner-QBO-Self-Employed/; About 1099.is, 1099.IS, http://109 
9.is (last visited Jan. 10, 2016); Cutler, supra note 7; Charles R. Goulding et al., Fast Growth of 
Sharing Economy Impacts Tax Reporting, AICPA (Oct. 16, 2014), http://www.cpa2biz.com/Content/ 
media/PRODUCER_CONTENT/Newsletters/Articles_2014/Tax/Sharing-Economy-Impact.jsp; Dan 
Johnson, Lyft Driver: Tax Questions, LYFT DRIVER TAX FAQ’S (Oct. 15, 2013), 
http://lyfttaxfaqs.wordpress.com; Mitch Lipka, How the Sharing Economy Makes Tax Filing Tougher, 
TIME MONEY (Apr. 15, 2015), http://time.com/money/3822148/sharing-economy-taxes-uber-lyft/ 
(offering tax tips for sharing economy workers); $HARED ECONOMY CPA, http://www.sharedecono 
mycpa.com (last visited Jan. 4, 2016); ZEN99, https://web.archive.org/web/20150809094012/ 
https://tryzen99.com/ (last visited Aug. 9, 2015). In August 2015, Zen99.com announced that it was 
closing down. Kia Kokalitcheva, Startup That Helped Freelance Workers Do Their Taxes Goes Bust, 
FORTUNE (Aug. 12, 2015, 4:43 PM), http://fortune.com/2015/08/12/zen99-contract-workers/. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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avoid making ungrounded and poorly considered policy and regulatory 
decisions for this new industry. Thus, in this Article, we examine the 
broad question of whether the tax law is adequate to the task of taxing 
sharing economy earners, or whether new tax rules and regulations are 
required.
14
 We argue that the application of substantive and doctrinal tax 
laws to sharing is generally (though not completely) clear and not 
particularly novel.
15
 This is the case even though the rules themselves may 
be complex and the application of the law to the facts may sometimes 
produce a measure of uncertainty. In most respects, what is required is 
clarification of the tax law’s application, rather than new legal or 
regulatory categories.  
On the other hand, tax compliance and enforcement in the sharing 
sector may present challenges, due largely to two distinctive features of 
sharing. First, in determining how and whether to comply with existing 
laws and regulations, sharing economy businesses have displayed the 
propensity (and distinct capacity) to pick the more favorable legal or 
regulatory regime if there is ambiguity as to which regime applies. For 
example, in light of slight ambiguity regarding the applicable Form 1099-
K information reporting rules, some sharing businesses have taken the 
position that they are subject to the same information reporting rules as 
“third party settlement organizations” such as Amazon and PayPal, and 
thus must comply with less onerous reporting thresholds.
16
 We refer to this 
set of behaviors as “tax opportunism.” We emphasize that this term is not 
meant to be pejorative; rather, it simply denotes the fact that the sharing 
businesses may be willing and able to take advantage of the opportunities 
presented by legal ambiguity. Tax opportunism more accurately describes 
some behaviors of certain sharing economy businesses than the claim that 
they are simply flouting the law. Furthermore, as we discuss, tax 
opportunism may be related to regulatory arbitrage (defined as parties 
incurring transactional costs to achieve a regulatory benefit), but the 
nuanced differences between the two categories may suggest different 
regulatory responses.  
Second, the sharing sector involves many individual earners who may 
earn relatively small income amounts, may use otherwise personal 
property for business purposes, and may be filing and reporting 
independent contractor income for the first time. These “microbusiness” 
 
 
 14. This Article does not address the taxation of sharing economy businesses and platforms, 
focusing its attention instead on the individuals who earn income in the sharing economy. 
 15. But see Barry & Caron, supra note 12, at 82–83. 
 16. See infra Part III.A.2. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss4/7
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characteristics may make compliance challenging for taxpayers and 
enforcement difficult for the IRS. These characteristics are not themselves 
unprecedented; in fact, the tax compliance issues that they entail are 
reasonably well understood.
17
 However, the rise of sharing has propelled 
large numbers of earners who are engaged in sharing on a sporadic or part-
time basis into the microbusiness world. Such earners may have less 
incentive than full-time businesses to take steps to ensure accuracy (for 
example, by hiring a tax preparer). Moreover, the fact that sharing may be 
a sector of first impression for many tax preparers may make tax 
compliance and enforcement even more challenging.  
We argue that the confluence of these two realities—tax opportunism 
paired with the microbusiness nature of sharing—may make it particularly 
difficult to ensure that the new sharing earners are complying with the tax 
laws. Yet the precise impacts are difficult to predict with certainty.  
In Part I, we describe in brief the “sharing economy” phenomenon. In 
Part II, we discuss the substantive tax rules and doctrines that apply to 
sharing. We argue that in many (though not all) respects, existing tax laws 
and doctrines can be adequately applied to sharing, although such 
application may depend on factual interpretation and classification of the 
new transactions. In Part III, we define the term “tax opportunism” and 
describe four examples of it: (1) the decision by certain sharing businesses 
to take the position that they are “third party settlement organizations” for 
information reporting purposes; (2) the decision to embrace independent 
contractor classification for sharing earners; (3) the initial decision by 
Airbnb to take the position that it is not responsible for collecting local 
occupancy taxes; and (4) the decision of ridesharing businesses to operate 
outside taxicab medallion and permitting systems. Next, we discuss the 
potential problems raised by the microbusiness nature of sharing economy 
work.  
Finally, in Part IV, we address some of the tax policy issues raised by 
sharing and suggest possible strategies for addressing sharing’s challenges. 
In Part IV.A, we discuss the broader policy issues that are raised and the 
takeaways that can be gleaned from the rise of sharing. In Part IV.B, we 
consider relatively simple strategies that may help improve compliance 
 
 
 17. See, e.g., Susan Cleary Morse et al., Cash Businesses and Tax Evasion, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 37, 49–56 (2009) (using field interviews of 275 cash business owners to identify patterns in 
taxpayer behavior and circumstances under which evasion was most likely to occur); see also 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., TAX GAP FOR TAX YEAR 2006, at 2–3 (2012), available at 
www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/overview_tax_gap_2006.pdf; Joel Slemrod et al., Does Credit-Card 
Information Reporting Improve Small-Business Tax Compliance? 1–3 (NBER Working Paper No. 
21412, 2015), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2515630. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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with and enforcement of federal tax laws. These include lower information 
reporting thresholds, use of safe harbors and advance rulings to simplify 
expense taking, targeted enforcement efforts, and taxpayer education. In 
Part IV.C, we review longer-term solutions that may be employed by 
federal, state, and local taxing authorities in confronting the sharing 
economy.  
This Article is the first in the tax literature to comprehensively examine 
the doctrinal and compliance issues raised by sharing. While its focus is on 
taxation, this Article is part of a broader conversation about the adequacy 
of existing legal structures and regimes in regulating the emerging sharing 
economy. This conversation implicates issues such as how the law might 
have to develop in light of changing economic arrangements, creative uses 
of technology, and innovation. While these are broad conceptual issues, 
they do demand careful examination of existing laws and their application. 
This Article’s contribution is just such a close examination in the context 
of taxation. 
Some initial caveats must be noted. First, we have focused largely on 
ridesharing and home sharing. While sharing has emerged as an 
overarching concept in the press and in scholarly literature,
18
 our detailed 
tax study confirms that generalizations regarding the sharing economy, 
while possible, should be made carefully. This is likely to be true in other 
regulatory fields as well. The tax law example highlights this point rather 
well, because all types of sharing must confront the tax law, and yet we 
observe variation in the specific tax rules and issues that arise in each sub-
area of sharing. 
Second, because the sharing sector has emerged relatively recently, the 
actual tax return filing and compliance behaviors of sharing earners have 
been subject to scant empirical analysis. In fact, the 2015 tax filing season 
may be the first time that many sharing earners will be reporting sharing 
income. While existing tax compliance studies focusing on self-employed 
workers and independent contractors may be informative, they cannot 
provide precise answers. Further empirical study is required to accurately 
assess the tax compliance behaviors of sharing economy earners. Our 
analysis in this Article lays a roadmap for the conduct of such study.
19
  
 
 
 18. See, e.g., Ranchordás, Does Sharing Mean Caring, supra note 6, at 416–21; Rauch & 
Schleicher, supra note 7, at 910–13. 
 19. We undertake a qualitative analysis of the types of tax issues confronting ridesharing drivers 
in subsequent work. See Shu-Yi Oei & Diane Ring, The Tax Lives of Uber Drivers: Evidence from 
Internet Discussion Forums, 8 COLUM. J. TAX L. (forthcoming 2016), available at http://papers. 
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2730893 (studying online discussion forums frequented by 
Uber drivers to better understand how drivers experience and interact with the tax system). For an 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss4/7
  
 
 
 
 
2016] CAN SHARING BE TAXED? 997 
 
 
 
 
Finally, our inquiry takes place in a dynamic economic climate in 
which business models, practices, industries, and technologies are 
changing and evolving.
20
 Given this dynamism, it is likely that the tax 
strategies employed by the sharing businesses will change over time.
21
 
Moreover, it is possible that as sharing economy earners become more 
familiar with tax compliance and tax reporting, their behaviors may 
change as well. Thus, the insights we develop in this Article are 
necessarily preliminary and will require ongoing attention and 
investigation. 
I. THE SHARING ECONOMY 
While there is no universal definition of the term “sharing economy,” 
commentators have described it as a model of production, consumption, 
and distribution of goods and services whereby people “share” their assets 
or other resources on an excess capacity basis via peer-to-peer 
arrangements.
22
 For example, a homeowner or car owner might rent out a 
room or car, respectively, that she is not using.
23
 A car owner might offer 
rides in her personal vehicle in her free time.
24
 Or a person with a certain 
skill (such as computer repair or dogsitting) might provide that service to 
peers in their free time for a fee.
25
  
Such peer-to-peer sharing is facilitated by a number of companies, 
including platforms such as Uber, Airbnb, and TaskRabbit. A distinctive 
feature of these sharing economy businesses is the use of technology 
 
 
interview and survey-based study released as this Article was going to press, see CAROLINE 
BRUCKNER, KOGOD TAX POL’Y CTR., AMERICAN UNIV., SHORTCHANGED: THE TAX COMPLIANCE 
CHALLENGES OF SMALL BUSINESS OPERATORS DRIVING THE ON-DEMAND PLATFORM ECONOMY 
(2016), available at http://www.american.edu/kogod/news/upload/shortchanged-caroline-bruckner-
kogod-au.pdf.  
 20. See, e.g., Deven R. Desai, The New Steam: On Digitization, Decentralization, and 
Disruption, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 1469, 1477–82 (2014) (hypothesizing that established players will 
eventually adapt to the new, decentralized sharing marketplace). 
 21. In fact, sharing businesses have already changed some of their reporting positions. See infra 
Part III.A.2. 
 22. See, e.g., Matofska, supra note 2 (“The Sharing Economy is a socio-economic system built 
around the sharing of human and physical assets.”). 
 23. See AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/ (last visited Jan. 4, 2016); GETAROUND, 
https://www.getaround.com/ (last visited Jan. 4, 2016); TURO, https://turo.com/ (last visited Jan. 4, 
2016). 
 24. See LYFT, https://www.lyft.com/ (last visited Jan. 4, 2016); UBER, https://www.uber.com/ 
(last visited Jan. 4, 2016). 
 25. See DOGVACAY, http://dogvacay.com/ (last visited Jan. 4, 2016); TASKRABBIT, 
https://www.taskrabbit.com/ (last visited Jan. 4, 2016); ZAARLY, https://www.zaarly.com/ (last visited 
Jan. 4, 2016). 
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platforms (mobile phone applications and the Internet) to bring producers, 
providers, and consumers of goods and services together, in exchange for 
a fee for using the platform.
26
 With the ease provided by such technology, 
almost anything—bicycles, wifi, clothing, and even kittens and toilets—
can be shared.
27
  
While informal pooling, renting, and borrowing arrangements are not 
new, access to the Internet and mobile technology means that the scale, 
scope, frequency, and transformative potential of such sharing transactions 
have reached an unprecedented degree.
28
 The global sharing market is 
valued in the billions, and the valuation of sharing businesses like Airbnb 
and Uber has surpassed that of some hotel and traditional car-rental 
competitors.
29
 The impact of sharing has been so significant that 
 
 
 26. See The Rise of the Sharing Economy, supra note 2. 
 27. See, e.g., FON, https://corp.fon.com/en (last visited Jan. 4, 2016) (wifi); NEIGHBORGOODS, 
http://neighborgoods.net/ (last visited Jan. 4, 2016) (household and related goods); POSHMARK, 
https://poshmark.com/ (last visited Jan. 4, 2016) (fashion); SPINLISTER, https://www.spinlister.com/ 
(last visited Jan. 4, 2016) (bicycles); see also Dana Hedgpeth, Need a Snuggle? Uber Delivers Kittens 
on Demand, WASH. POST (Oct. 29, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/local/wp/2014/ 
10/29/need-a-snuggle-uber-delivers-kittens-on-demand/ (Uber delivery of kittens); LEFTOVERSWAP, 
http://leftoverswap.com/index.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2015) (sharing of leftover food). 
 28. See Pricewaterhouse Coopers, supra note 4 (estimating that revenue from five sharing sectors 
could potentially reach $335 billion by 2025); see also Bass, supra note 4 (suggesting value of Uber at 
$50 billion in July 2015); Sarah Cannon & Lawrence H. Summers, How Uber and the Sharing 
Economy Can Win over Regulators, HARV. BUS. REV., Oct. 13, 2014, available at https://hbr. 
org/2014/10/how-uber-and-the-sharing-economy-can-win-over-regulators/ (“Sharing economy firms 
are disrupting traditional industries across the globe. For proof, look no further than Airbnb which, at 
$10 billion, can boast a higher valuation than the Hyatt hotel chain. Uber is currently valued at $18.2 
billion relative to Hertz at $12.5 billion and Avis at $5.2 billion. Beyond individual firms, there are 
now more than 1,000 cities across four continents where people can share cars. The global sharing 
economy market was valued at $26 billion in 2013 and some predict it will grow to become a $110 
billion revenue market in the coming years, making it larger than the U.S. chain restaurant industry. 
The revenue flowing through the sharing economy directly into people’s wallets will surpass $3.5 
billion this year, with growth exceeding 25%, according to Forbes.”); Kathleen Kusek, The Sharing 
Economy Goes Five Star, FORBES (July 15, 2014, 2:09 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
kathleenkusek/2014/07/15/the-sharing-economy-goes-five-star/ (also noting Forbes’ estimate). Fund 
raising efforts at Airbnb in 2015 have suggested a valuation of $20-25 billion. See Sara Ashley 
O’Brien, ‘Crazy Money’ - Airbnb Valued at over $25 Billion, CNN MONEY (June 27, 2015, 6:59 PM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2015/06/27/technology/airbnb-funding-valuation-update/; Serena Saitto, Airbnb 
Said to Be Raising Funding at $20 Billion Valuation, BLOOMBERG TECH. (Feb. 28, 2015, 7:20 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-01/airbnb-said-to-be-raising-funding-at-20-billion-
valuation. 
 29. See supra note 28; see also Telis Demos, Airbnb Raises $1.5 Billion in One of Largest 
Private Placements, WALL ST. J. (June 26, 2015, 9:01 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/airbnb-raises-
1-5-billion-in-one-of-largest-private-placements-1435363506; Natasha Lomas, Uber Refueling Its 
Warchest Yet Again, at a Valuation of Up to $70BN, TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 24, 2015), 
http://techcrunch.com/2015/10/24/one-more-billion/; Dan Primack, Uber Now Worth More Than 
Hertz, FORTUNE (June 6, 2014, 1:47 PM), http://fortune.com/2014/06/06/uber-is-now-worth-more-
than-hertz/. But see Aswath Damodaran, A Disruptive Cab Ride to Riches: The Uber Payoff, MUSINGS 
ON MARKETS (June 9, 2014, 3:23 PM), http://aswathdamodaran.blogspot.com/2014/06/a-disruptive-
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commentators frequently refer to sharing-based consumption and 
production as “disruptive” of traditional industries, such as hotels and 
taxicabs.
30
  
In the remainder of this Part, we describe key characteristics and recent 
developments in ridesharing, home sharing, and other types of sharing.  
A. Vehicle Ridesharing 
1. Uber 
Uber is regarded by many as the market leader in the peer-to-peer ride 
service sector.
31
 The service is available in about 186 US cities and sixty-
seven foreign countries.
32
 Uber uses a smartphone application to connect 
customers with drivers of vehicles for hire. Uber’s basic business model 
involves partnering with local owners of licensed private car companies 
and also with ordinary citizens driving their personal vehicles. Uber itself 
does not own cars.
33
 The drivers themselves decide whether and when to 
open up the Uber mobile application and accept ride requests from 
customers. Thus, Uber regards itself as a marketplace for the provision of 
services by these individual drivers, and treats the drivers as independent 
contractors.
34
  
On the other hand, Uber itself sets the fares charged for rides, and fares 
depend in part on the “level” of service provided. UberX is Uber’s best-
known division and allows drivers to use their own vehicles to offer rides 
 
 
cab-ride-to-riches-uber.html (disputing Uber’s $17 billion valuation as of June 2014); Aswath 
Damodaran, Up, Up and Away! A Crowd-Valuation of Uber!, MUSINGS ON MARKETS (Dec. 2, 2014, 
8:15 PM), http://aswathdamodaran.blogspot.com/2014/12/up-up-and-away-crowd-valuation-of-uber. 
html.  
 30. See, e.g., Bass, supra note 4 (citing disruptive impact of Uber on “established taxi and 
limousine companies”); Andrew J. Hawkins, Why News of a Taxi Comeback Against Uber Was 
Wrong, CRAIN’S N.Y. BUS. (Feb. 22, 2015), http://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20150222 
/TRANSPORTATION/150229973/more-evidence-uber-is-wiping-out-city-taxi-industrys-value; Ryan 
Smith, Sharing Economy Fuels Spirit of Disruption, WALL ST. J. (May 5, 2014, 2:44 PM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/accelerators/2014/05/05/ryan-smith-sharing-economy-fuels-spirit-of-disruption/ 
(referring to the sharing economy’s “spirit of disruption”).  
 31. See, e.g., Erin Griffith, Uber v. Lyft: The Credit Cards Don’t Lie, FORTUNE (Sept. 11, 2014, 
9:00 AM), http://fortune.com/2014/09/11/uber-vs-lyft-the-credit-cards-dont-lie/; UBER, https://www.uber. 
com/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2016). 
 32. Find a City, UBER, https://www.uber.com/cities (last visited Jan. 5, 2016). 
 33.  Uber recently partnered with Enterprise Rent-A-Car in a pilot program to allow drivers to 
rent a car at discounted rates to drive for Uber. Kirsten Korosec, Uber and Enterprise-Rent-a-Car 
Partner to Add More Drivers to Denver, FORTUNE (Dec. 2, 2015, 11:56 AM), http://fortune. 
com/2015/12/02/uber-and-enterprise-denver/.  
 34. UBER, https://get.uber.com/drive/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2016); Legal: Terms and Conditions, 
UBER, https://www.uber.com/legal/usa/terms (last updated Jan. 2, 2016). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1000 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 93:989 
 
 
 
 
to customers at fares often significantly lower than taxi fares for 
comparable trips.
35
 To become an UberX driver, applicants must meet an 
age requirement and have a driver’s license, a car (2005 or newer, in most 
cities), proper insurance, and a clean driving record.
36
 Applicants must 
also clear a background check.
37
 
Uber offers other services in certain markets. UberBlack is a traditional 
“Black-Car” service that resembles typical limousine services. In many 
US cities, Uber riders also have the options of UberLUX,
38
 a luxury car 
service; UberSUV,
39
 a full-sized luxury SUV; UberTAXI,
40
 a licensed 
taxicab; UberXL,
41
 a non-luxury SUV; and UberPool, a reduced-fare 
pooled ride service.
42
 Although the scope and increasing variety of Uber’s 
services offer interesting insights into market development, for purposes 
of this Article our focus is on the basic car-sharing model, UberX, which 
we will generally refer to as “Uber.” 
A distinctive characteristic of Uber’s fare structure is its use of varying 
levels of pricing, depending on demand.
43
 Under such dynamic or “surge” 
pricing, changes in fare price are driven algorithmically when wait times 
increase and unfulfilled requests start to rise. Sometimes these fare 
increases occur because of a demand surge during high traffic times like 
 
 
 35. Leena Rao, Uber Brings Its Disruptive Car Service to Chicago, TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 22, 
2011), http://techcrunch.com/2011/09/22/uber-brings-its-disruptive-car-service-to-chicago/; Alex 
Wilhelm & Ryan Lawler, In Another Strike Against the Competition, Uber Lowers UberX Prices in 
San Diego, LA, and DC, TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 3, 2013), http://techcrunch.com/2013/10/03/in-another-
strike-against-the-competition-uber-lowers-uberx-prices-in-san-diego-la-and-dc/. Additionally, Uber 
charges a “safe rides fee,” which it now calls a “booking fee.” See Olivia Nuzzi, Uber’s “Safe Rides 
Fee” Is Too Little, Too Late, DAILY BEAST (Apr. 22, 2014, 12:45 PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/ 
articles/2014/04/22/uber-s-safe-rides-fee-is-too-little-too-late.html; I Was Charged a Safe Rides Fee 
(US + Canada Only), UBER, https://help.uber.com/h/4fa83c50-ab30-434c-b911-f63ad11cd4d9 (last 
visited Jan. 10, 2016); infra note 51. Although Uber’s safe ride charge was originally $1 when 
introduced in April 2014, the booking fee now varies depending on the city. See Biz Carson, Here’s 
How Much Uber Charges for a ‘Safe Ride’ in Different US Cities, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 16, 2015, 12:11 
PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/us-cities-with-highest-uber-safe-rides-fees-2015-10.  
 36. Brian, Drive with Uber—Earn Cash with Your Car! (Full-Time), UBER (Mar. 28, 2014), 
http://blog.uber.com/partnersfulltime. 
 37. Safe Rides, Safer Cities, UBER, https://www.uber.com/safety (last visited Jan. 5, 2016). 
 38. Michael Carney, Uber Launches UberLUX Service in LA, Offers High-Priced Rides in 
Teslas, Mercedes, and BMWs, PANDO (Dec. 19, 2014), http://pando.com/2014/12/19/uber-launches-
uberlux-service-in-la-offers-high-priced-rides-in-teslas-mercedes-and-bmws/. 
 39. Vehicle Requirements, UBER N.Y.C., http://www.driveubernyc.com/cars/ (last visited Jan. 9, 
2016). 
 40. UBER, https://www.uber.com/cities/boston (last visited Feb. 5, 2016). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Alex, Announcing UberPool, UBER (Aug. 5, 2014), https://blog.uber.com/uberpool 
(describing UberPool as “a bold social experiment”). 
 43. See What is Surge Pricing?, UBER, https://help.uber.com/h/6c8065cf-5535-4a8b-9940-
d292ffdce119 (last visited Feb. 5, 2016). 
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Friday or Saturday night. Other times, they can occur because of special 
conditions,
44
 such as a holiday or inclement weather.
45
 Uber’s “surge 
pricing” has triggered significant public reaction46 and has even given rise 
to competing applications such as Gett, which offers rides at prices that 
never surge.
47
 Until May 2016, Uber claimed that its fare included tips and 
told customers that there was no need to give drivers an additional tip.
48
 
This tip policy created dissatisfaction among some drivers, leading to 
litigation over the collection and disbursement of tips.
49
 As part of an 
April 2016 settlement agreement in class actions in California and 
Massachusetts regarding Uber’s classification of drivers as independent 
contractors, Uber agreed to let drivers seek tips.
50
 That settlement 
agreement is pending court approval and is not final. Uber also charges a 
“booking fee,” previously known as the “safe rides” fee.51  
 
 
 44. See David Streitfeld, As It Shakes Up the Taxi Business, Uber’s a Target, BOS. GLOBE (Jan. 
27, 2014), http://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2014/01/27/uber-hits-rough-patch/2zON2vyXha5AV 
hs5N15csI/story.html. 
 45. See id.; Douglas Macmillan, Uber CEO: Surge Pricing Is Here to Stay, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 7, 
2014, 3:05 PM), http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304887104579306622013546350. 
 46. See Uber Rage: Bostonians Irate over Price Surge in Snow Rides, METRO (Dec. 15, 2013), 
http://www.metro.us/local/uber-rage-bostonians-irate-over-price-surge-in-snow-rides-metro-us/tmWm 
lo---21bnYkB3zwpZk/. 
 47. See Seth Porges, Tired of Uber’s Unpredictable Surge Pricing? This Car-Hailing App Hopes 
You’ll Switch, FORBES (Mar. 30, 2014, 8:41 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/sethporges/ 
2014/03/30/tired-of-ubers-unpredictable-surge-pricing-this-car-hailing-app-hopes-youll-switch/; see 
also GETT, http://www.gett.com (last visited Jan. 5, 2016) (“Always pay a flat rate, even when there is 
heavy rain, traffic, or demand.”). 
 48. See Do I Need to Tip My Driver, UBER, https://help.uber.com/h/1be144ab-609a-43c5-82b5-
b9c7de5ec073 (last visited Feb. 5, 2016). But see Jay Barmann, Now Uber Drivers Want You to Tip, 
SFIST (Feb. 17, 2015, 10:30 AM), http://sfist.com/2015/02/17/now_uber_drivers_want_you_to_tip. 
php. 
 49. See Bob Egelko, Uber Drivers’ Suit over Tips Clears Hurdle, S.F. CHRON. (Dec. 7, 2013, 
4:16 PM), http://www.sfgate.com/business/article/Uber-drivers-suit-over-tips-clears-hurdle-5044858. 
php; Maya Kosoff, Uber's Drivers Say They Don't Get Any Tip Money from All-Inclusive Fares—and 
They're Furious, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 17, 2014, 3:09 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/ubers-
drivers-say-they-dont-get-any-tip-money-from-all-inclusive-fares-2014-9; cf. Luz Lazo, Some Uber 
Drivers Say Company’s Promise of Big Pay Day Doesn’t Match Reality, WASH. POST (Sept. 6, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/trafficandcommuting/some-uber-drivers-say-companys-promise 
-of-big-pay-day-doesnt-match-reality/2014/09/06/17f5d82c-224a-11e4-958c-268a320a60ce_story .html. 
 50. Declaration of Shannon Liss-Riordan in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary 
Approval of Class Action Settlement, O’Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc., No. CV 13-3826 EMC 
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 2016), available at http://hr.cch.com/ELD/OConnorDeclaration.pdf; see also 
Denise Lee Yohn, Uber Allows Tips and Botches Stakeholder Engagement, FORBES (May 11, 2016, 
5:31 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/deniselyohn/2016/05/11/uber-allows-tips-and-botches-stake 
holder-engagement/#126ba5146b63. However, as of May 12, 2016, the Uber website still says “No 
cash, no tip, no hassle.” Ride, UBER, https://www.uber.com/ride/ (last visited May 12, 2016). 
 51. See I Was Charged a Booking Fee, UBER, https://help.uber.com/h/334e6e9e-9b15-45ba-
bb94-e21d2877fa0e (last visited June 6, 2016) (explaining that the “booking fee” was previously 
known as the “safe rides fee” and is intended to support driver and passenger safety initiatives and 
cover “other operational costs”); I Was Charged a Safe Rides Fee (US + Canada Only), UBER, 
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In exchange for creating and providing the app-based marketplace for 
rides, Uber takes a portion of the gross fares (usually 20%, though this 
varies by market) generated by drivers.
52
 Despite its claim prior to May 
2016 that tips were included in the fare, Uber apparently took its 
percentage cut off the entire base fare, a practice that resulted in 
litigation.
53
 Uber also charges drivers a weekly fee for the drivers’ use of 
an Uber-ready smartphone, although drivers are encouraged to use their 
own phones and download the Uber smart phone application.
54
 Drivers are 
responsible for their own expenses, including gas, equipment maintenance, 
and repairs.
55
 
Uber offers drivers a commercial insurance policy that covers accidents 
occurring from the time the driver accepts a customer until the end of the 
trip.
56
 The policy covers both driver liability as well as uninsured motorists 
and also includes contingent comprehensive and collision insurance.
57
 
Uber has also instituted a “gap” insurance policy to cover accidents that 
happen when UberX drivers are not ferrying customers but are logged 
onto the Uber application and accepting customers.
58
 This policy, which 
 
 
https://web.archive.org/web/20151209012513/https://help.uber.com/h/4fa83c50-ab30-434c-b911-f63a 
d11cd4d9 (last visited June 22, 2016) (describing the safe rides fee, when that term was used, and 
noting that the fee supported local background checks and related safety measures); see also sources 
cited supra note 35. But see Ellen Huet, Uber Faces Class-Action Lawsuit over $1 ‘Safe Rides Fee,’ 
FORBES (Dec. 27, 2014, 2:14 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenhuet/2014/12/27/uber-class-
action-lawsuit-safe-rides-fee/. Uber apparently changed the name for this flat fee as part of the 
settlement of litigation regarding the safe rides fee and Uber’s claim that it was an industry leader in its 
background checks. See, e.g., Mike Isaac, Uber Agrees to Settle Class-Action Suit Over Safety Claims, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/12/technology/uber-settles-class-
action-suit-over-safety-background-checks.html. 
 52. David Fagin, Life as an Uber Driver: It’s Just Not Fare, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 5, 2014, 
5:59 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-fagin/life-as-an-uber-driver_b_4698299.html. 
According to Uber’s website, Uber’s cut may be as low as 5% in certain circumstances, and it can be 
as high as 35%, though the 20% rate seems more prevalent. See Ellen Huet, Uber Tests Taking Even 
More from Its Drivers with 30% Commission, FORBES (May 18, 2015, 6:32 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenhuet/2015/05/18/uber-new-uberx-tiered-commission-30-percent; see 
also Drive with Uber, UBER, https://www.uber.com/driver-referral (last visited Jan. 5, 2016). 
 53. See Egelko, supra note 49; Maya Kosoff, Here’s How Uber’s Tipping Policy Puts Drivers at 
a Disadvantage, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 29, 2014, 2:26 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/uber-
tipping-policy-2014-10. 
 54. See Luz Lazo, Uber Gives Its Drivers Choice to Avoid $10 Weekly Fee for App Use, WASH. 
POST (Sept. 9, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/dr-gridlock/wp/2014/09/09/uber-gives-
its-drivers-choice-to-avoid-10-weekly-fee-for-app-use/; About Device Subscription Fees, UBER, 
https://help.uber.com/h/1eaa91f9-be2e-463d-809a-df7e4cdeb593 (last visited Jan. 5, 2016). 
 55. See Lazo, supra note 49. 
 56. Nairi, Insurance for UberX with Ridesharing, UBER (Feb. 10, 2014), https://blog.uber.com/ 
uberXridesharinginsurance. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id.  
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used to be contingent, is now primary to personal automobile insurance.
59
 
However, that policy does not cover damage to the Uber driver’s own car 
during the gap period.
60
 
2. Lyft and Sidecar 
In addition to Uber, other peer-to-peer ride services have also arisen in 
various markets. Lyft is Uber’s foremost competitor in the ridesharing 
market.
61
 Uber and Lyft are similar services
62
 and have nearly identical 
business models.
63
 Like Uber, Lyft connects passengers and drivers 
through Lyft’s smartphone application.64 Like Uber, Lyft offers a basic 
service (Lyft), a shared ride service (Lyft Line), and a six-passenger ride 
service (Lyft Plus).
65
 Like Uber, Lyft also elevates fares during periods 
when demand is high.
66
 And like Uber, Lyft provides a liability insurance 
policy for periods when a Lyft driver is ferrying a customer.
67
 There are 
some differences, however. For example, Lyft customers are prompted to 
pay within the app after the ride and are able to tip the driver using the 
Lyft application, though a tip is not required.
68
 Prior to the 2016 California 
 
 
 59. Id. This primary coverage was spurred by state law insurance changes, including California’s 
new insurance law requiring transportation network companies such as Uber to provide primary 
liability insurance coverage during the gap period. Assemb. B. 2293, 2014 Leg. (Cal. 2014). 
 60. Ellen Huet, New Laws Push Uber and Lyft to Bump Up Insurance Coverage, but a Collision 
Gap Remains, FORBES (July 1, 2015, 2:30 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenhuet/2015/07/01/ 
new-laws-push-uber-and-lyft-to-bump-up-insurance-coverage-but-a-collision-gap-remains/. 
 61. See, e.g., Mike Isaac, Accusations Fly Between Uber and Lyft, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2014, 
3:36 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/08/12/accusations-fly-between-uber-and-lyft/?_r=0.  
 62. See Farhad Manjoo, Uber and Lyft Have Become Indistinguishable Commodities, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 28, 2014, 2:27 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/08/28/uber-and-lyft-have-
become-indistinguishable-commodities/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0. 
 63. See Vivek Saxena, Lyft vs. Uber: What’s the Difference Between These Dueling Apps?, 
INQUISITR (Aug. 14, 2014), http://www.inquisitr.com/1409677/lyft-vs-uber-whats-the-difference-
between-these-dueling-apps/. 
 64. Request or Cancel a Ride, LYFT, https://help.lyft.com/hc/en-us/sections/203117027-Request-
or-Cancel-a-Ride (last visited May 28, 2016). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Prime Time for Drivers, LYFT, https://help.lyft.com/hc/en-us/articles/214586017-Prime-Time 
(last visited Jan. 10, 2016). 
 67. Safety, LYFT, https://www.lyft.com/safety (last visited May 28, 2016).  
 68. How to Tip Your Driver, LYFT, https://help.lyft.com/hc/en-us/articles/213583978-How-to-
Tip-Your-Driver (last visited Jan. 10, 2016). Uber’s tipping policy was one of the factors that 
contributed to a strike and lawsuit by Uber drivers. See Michael B. Farrell, New Lawsuit Claims Uber 
Exploits Its Drivers, BOS. GLOBE (June 26, 2014), http://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2014/06/ 
26/uber-hit-with-class-action-lawsuit/JFlTJLMuBoXuEmMU3elTAI/story.html; Maya Kosoff, Uber 
Drivers Across the Country Are Protesting Today—Here’s Why, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 22, 2014, 8:10 
AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/uber-drivers-across-the-country-are-protesting-tomorrow--heres 
-why-2014-10. Although it has agreed to permit tipping as part of its settlement of two lawsuits, see 
supra note 50, Uber has reiterated that is does not plan to add a tip feature on the app or to lower fares 
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settlement (which is pending court approval), Uber did not allow 
additional tipping.
69
 Lyft, like Uber, takes a cut of the base fare; however, 
Lyft drivers keep 100% of all tips.
70
 
Yet another variant of a peer-to-peer ride service was Sidecar.
71
 Unlike 
Uber and Lyft, Sidecar gave drivers and passengers more flexibility in 
setting terms—for example, in choosing rides based on drivers, car types, 
and fares.
72
 Sidecar operated in fewer cities than either Uber or Lyft, but 
marketed itself based on its greater flexibility and lower prices.
73
 In 
August 2015, Sidecar indicated that although it was not formally ending 
its ride hailing service, it was redirecting its focus away from ridesharing 
and towards delivery services.
74
 And in January 2016, it sold its assets to 
General Motors and shut down its business, due in part to its inability to 
compete with Uber.
75
  
Finally, it is important to note in describing these ridesharing services 
that there are geographic differences in how the businesses are structured 
and operated. For example, commentators have noted regional differences 
(such as differences in prices and incentive structures) between driving for 
these services in the New York versus the San Francisco market.
76
 
3. Peer-to-Peer Car Rentals 
In addition to peer-to-peer ride services, the sharing economy has also 
seen the emergence of peer-to-peer car rentals, provided by companies 
such as Turo, Getaround, and Drivy.
77
 Car owners create car profiles and 
 
 
to accommodate tipping. See Joshua Brustein, With Settlement, Tipping Is Coming to Uber, CHI. 
TRIBUNE (Apr. 27, 2016, 10:50 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-uber-tipping-
20160427-story.html. 
 69. See Dara Kerr, To Tip or Not to Tip Drivers, That Is Uber’s Question, CNET (Feb. 16, 2015, 
4:00 AM), http://www.cnet.com/news/to-tip-or-not-to-tip-drivers-that-is-ubers-question/. 
 70. See How To Tip Your Driver, supra note 68; see also Lyft Commission Structure, LYFT, 
https://help.lyft.com/hc/en-us/articles/213815618-Lyft-Commission-Structure (last visited Jan. 5, 
2016). 
 71. See SIDECAR, http://www.side.cr/riders/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2016). 
 72. Id. 
 73. See id. 
 74. Ellen Huet, Sidecar Puts Passengers Aside, Pivots to a Mostly-Deliveries Company, FORBES 
(Aug. 5, 2015, 10:30 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenhuet/2015/08/05/sidecar-pivots-to-
mostly-deliveries-company/. 
75. See Why We Sold to GM, SIDECAR (Jan. 20, 2016), https://www.side.cr/why-we-sold-to-gm/. 
 76. See, e.g., Eric Markowitz, Word on the Street: What My Lyft Drivers Told Me About Uber, 
VOCATIV (Aug. 14, 2014, 10:11 AM), http://www.vocativ.com/money/business/lyft-uber/ (noting that 
a license is required to drive for Lyft and Uber in New York); Get a TLC License, UBER N.Y.C., 
http://www.driveubernyc.com/tlc/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2016) (same). 
 77. See DRIVY, https://drivy.com (last visited Jan. 5, 2016); GETAROUND, https://www.getaroun 
d.com/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2016); TURO, https://turo.com/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2016) (formerly 
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manage a calendar to let renters know when the car is available for rent 
and at what rate. Renters enter their travel dates and location details and 
can browse through a selection of vehicles with varying features and 
luxury levels. All of this can be done via smartphone application or 
through the Internet. These services offer insurance coverage for rentals. 
Turo, for example, covers the car owner for $1 million in liability 
insurance and offers 24/7 customer service.
78
 Getaround also insures 
rentals up to $1 million.
79
 If the renter has not paid for tickets or tolls 
during his or her reservation, Turo will reimburse the car owner for those 
charges.
80
 Turo also has additional policies for smoking fees, pet fees, 
cleaning fees, gas fees, and late return fees.
81
 
In exchange for providing the application or marketplace for these 
rentals, the companies take a percentage of the rental price as well as 
additional charges. For example, Turo car owners generally receive 75% 
of the rental price and excess mileage charges.
82
 Like vehicle ridesharing 
services, peer-to-peer car rentals allow individuals to share underused 
vehicles and monetize a previously untapped resource. While this Article 
focuses primarily on ridesharing and home sharing, the existence of peer-
to-peer car rentals demonstrates that sharing-economy arrangements are 
heterogeneous and can encompass a number of different service and rental 
relationships. 
B. Peer-to-Peer Lodging and Accommodation 
Like the peer-to-peer transportation services, peer-to-peer marketplaces 
for accommodation, such as Airbnb
83
 and Roomorama,
84
 operate 
marketplace platforms that connect landlords (called “hosts” by Airbnb) 
and travelers, enabling these transactions without owning any rooms 
 
 
RelayRides). In 2015, Drivy acquired Buzzcar, a former competitor. See Romain Dillet, Community-
Based Car Rental Service Drivy Grabs Another $8.6 Million, Acquires Buzzcar, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 
1, 2015), http://techcrunch.com/2015/04/01/community-based-car-rental-service-drivy-grabs-another-
8-6-million-acquires-buzzcar/. 
 78. Rent Safely, Travel Confidently, TURO, https://turo.com/trust-and-safety (last visited Jan. 10, 
2016). 
 79. GETAROUND, https://www.getaround.com (last visited Jan. 5, 2016). 
 80. What Will I Earn and How Do I Get Paid?, TURO, https://support.turo.com/hc/en-
us/articles/203992000-What-will-I-earn-How-do-I-get-paid-- (last visited Jan. 10, 2016). 
 81. Fees & Fines, TURO, https://support.turo.com/hc/en-us/articles/203990780-Fees-Fines (last 
visited Jan. 10, 2016). 
 82. What Will I Earn and How Do I Get Paid?, supra note 80. 
 83. AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2016). 
 84. ROOMORAMA, https://www.roomorama.com (last visited Jan. 5, 2016). 
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themselves.
85
 On Airbnb, for example, hosts can rent out anything from 
entire homes, to a room in a house, to an air mattress in a living room.
86
 
Hosts decide on the price they will charge and manage their own personal 
rental calendar.
87
 Hosts can set custom prices for individual nights and 
weekends, special events, and monthly stays. Renters, via either the 
smartphone application or the website, input their travel dates and then can 
search through host listings based upon price, location, and amenities. 
Thus, home sharing services allow hosts to monetize unutilized space and 
provide renters an alternative to standard hotel accommodations.
88
 
Like ridesharing companies, the home sharing companies take a cut of 
the rental payment. On Airbnb, for example, the payout for hosts is the 
listing price minus a 3% host-service fee, which Airbnb deducts every 
time a reservation is booked at its website to cover the cost of processing 
guest payments.
89
 In addition, the guest pays a guest-service fee (usually 
6-12%) each time a reservation is booked.
90
 The percentage charged 
depends on the reservation price and decreases as the reservation amount 
increases. Like other sharing economy companies, Airbnb provides 
insurance to hosts,
91
 a guest refund policy,
92
 and customer support.
93
  
 
 
 85. See Sangeet Paul Choudary, The AirBnB Advantage: How to Avoid Competition and Become 
a Multi-Billion Dollar Startup, NEXT WEB (Mar. 10, 2013, 5:00 PM), http://thenextweb.com/ 
insider/2013/03/10/the-airbnb-advantage-how-to-avoid-competition-and-become-a-multi-billion-dollar 
-startup/; see also BEDYCASA, http://www.bedycasa.com/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2016); HOMEAWAY, 
http://www.homeaway.com/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2016); ROOMORAMA, https://www.roomorama.com/ 
(last visited Jan. 5, 2016); WIMDU, http://www.wimdu.com/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2016). 
 86. See What Does the Room Type of a Listing Mean, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/he 
lp/article/5 (last visited Jan. 10, 2016). 
 87. How to Host, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/getting-started/how-to-host (last visited 
Jan. 10, 2016). 
 88. See Tomio Geron, Airbnb and the Unstoppable Rise of the Share Economy, FORBES (Jan. 23, 
2013, 7:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomiogeron/2013/01/23/airbnb-and-the-unstoppable-
rise-of-the-share-economy/. 
 89. What Are Host Service Fees?, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/63 (last visited 
Jan. 10, 2016). 
 90. What Are Guest Service Fees?, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/104 (last 
visited Jan. 10, 2016). 
 91. What Is Host Protection Insurance?, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/937 (last 
visited Jan. 10, 2016). 
 92. Guest Refund Policy, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/324 (last visited May 28, 
2016). 
 93. Airbnb Help Center, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/9 (last visited May 28, 
2016). 
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C. Other Online Peer-to-Peer Marketplaces for Sharing 
Although the focus of this Article is peer-to-peer ride services and 
accommodation rentals, these are just two examples of how the sharing 
economy has grown and developed. With the availability of technology 
that can seamlessly connect peer suppliers and producers, almost anything 
can be shared, and a number of different industries now operate using the 
sharing model to provide a variety of goods.
94
  
One prominent example, TaskRabbit,
95
 allows users to outsource 
freelance services to others in their local neighborhood using an online 
marketplace model. Recently, TaskRabbit shifted their business model 
from a “freewheeling auction” model to a more controlled website.96 
Prospective employers, or “Clients,” choose from a number of broad 
categories, including: “Cleaning,” “Handyman,” “Shopping and 
Delivery,” “Moving Help,” and others. After this selection, clients receive 
a choice of a number of “Taskers” with various hourly rates and skill sets. 
TaskRabbit will let clients set filters so that they only receive matches for 
certain job categories. After a client selects a Tasker, the two schedule a 
time for the job and communicate with one another in real time using a 
custom-messaging platform built by the company. In order to select a 
desired Tasker, clients utilize a user-controlled rating system to help make 
their decision.
97
 TaskRabbit employs a transparent system where clients 
see the hourly rates for the Taskers. TaskRabbit takes a 30% service fee on 
each task.
98
 By using TaskRabbit, Clients and Taskers receive 24/7 
Members Services support and an insurance policy, which guarantees up 
to $1 million of coverage per task.
99
 
 
 
 94. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
 95. TASKRABBIT, https://www.taskrabbit.com/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2016).  
 96. See Adrienne Raphel, Taskrabbit Redux, NEW YORKER, July 22, 2014, 
http://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/taskrabbit-redux (describing TaskRabbit’s original 
auction-like model, which “made work look like a game”). TaskRabbit faced significant scrutiny for 
abandoning its original auction-like bidding system this year. See Harrison Weber, TaskRabbit Users 
Revolt as the Company Shuts Down Its Bidding System, VENTUREBEAT (July 10, 2014, 2:34 PM), 
http://venturebeat.com/2014/07/10/taskrabbit-users-revolt-as-the-company-shuts-down-its-bidding-sys 
tem/. 
 97. TaskRabbit continues to experiment with ways to identify its top workers through its Elite 
Tasker program (based on approval rating and number of tasks performed). Support Center, 
TASKRABBIT, https://support.taskrabbit.com/hc/en-us/articles/206488433-Elite-Tasker-Holiday-Progra 
m-11-2-15 (last visited Feb. 9, 2016). Such workers receive recognition on the website that 
presumably generates more tasks for them. 
 98. What Is the TaskRabbit Service Fee?, TASKRABBIT (May 24, 2016, 1:55 PM), 
https://support.taskrabbit.com/hc/en-us/articles/204411610-What-is-the-TaskRabbit-Service-Fee-. 
 99. The TaskRabbit Trust & Safety Fee, TASKRABBIT (last visited May 17, 2016), 
https://support.taskrabbit.com/hc/en-us/articles/204940570-The-TaskRabbit-Trust-Safety-Fee.  
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In addition to tasks and chores, the sharing economy has also reached 
numerous other industries, including dog boarding,
100
 clothing, bicycles, 
and wifi.
101
 Most of these industries operate on a similar model to 
ridesharing and home sharing: the business creates an online marketplace, 
bringing together consumers and suppliers of the goods or services, and 
takes a percentage commission in exchange for providing the matching 
platform. 
II. TAX ISSUES IN THE SHARING ECONOMY 
We now turn to examining the substantive and doctrinal tax issues 
raised by sharing, focusing on the ridesharing and home sharing sectors. 
Commentators have claimed that tax issues and uncertainties abound for 
those earning income in the sharing economy.
102
 In Parts II and III, we 
closely examine whether and in what respects these claims are accurate. 
We find that while they may be complicated, significant portions of the 
doctrinal tax rules governing the tax liability of sharing economy earners 
are not unclear. More importantly, these rules are generally adequate for 
taxing sharing. In a few respects, particularly regarding employment taxes 
and occupancy and other local taxes, the applicable law is less clear. But 
the conceptual framework and categories of current tax law should 
continue to be adequate once the necessary clarifications are provided 
regarding the law’s application. In short, perhaps in contrast to other 
regulatory spheres, fundamental substantive overhaul of the tax law or 
introduction of new rules is not necessarily required. On the other hand, as 
further discussed in Part III, the sharing economy may raise fresh issues 
with respect to tax compliance.
103
  
The tax issues at stake in the sharing economy vary depending on the 
industry, and contextualized study is required. For example, home sharing 
may implicate the I.R.C. § 280A limitations, while ridesharing may 
require use of the standard mileage expense method.
104
 Thus, for clarity, 
we discuss ridesharing and home sharing separately, in Parts II.A and II.B, 
respectively. In Part II.C, we flag those areas—employment and local 
occupancy taxes—in which there may be uncertainty in determining which 
 
 
 100. See DOGVACAY, http://dogvacay.com/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2016); ROVER, http://www.rover. 
com/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2016). 
 101. See supra note 27. 
 102. See, e.g., supra notes 7, 11. 
 103. See infra Part III.  
 104. See infra Parts II.A.2, II.B.2. 
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rule applies, while re-emphasizing that the rules themselves are quite clear 
and the concepts and categories of tax law remain sufficient. 
A. Income Taxation of Peer-to-Peer Ride Services 
The tax rules that govern ridesharing can broadly be divided into three 
groups: (1) general rules for income inclusion and deduction; (2) rules 
governing apportionment of expenses between business and personal uses; 
and (3) self-employment tax rules. We show in Part II.A that the rules in 
the first two groups may be complex but are for the most part clear. We 
discuss the third group of rules in Part II.C. 
1. General Rules for Income Inclusion and Deduction 
The clear doctrinal rule with respect to income inclusion is that 
ridesharing drivers are taxed on a net basis on their income earned from 
driving activities minus allowable expenses.
105
 Conceptually, this tax 
treatment is not unlike that of other business income earners operating as 
independent contractors. Income sources for ridesharing drivers will 
include the gross fares received as well as any additional tips received. 
They may also include referral and other bonuses, driver credits, and other 
such payments from the ridesharing services themselves. Expenses may 
include gas, amounts paid for vehicle repairs, and driving insurance. 
Ridesharing drivers may be subject to certain documentation requirements 
and other limitations in their ability to deduct expenses.
106
 
As further discussed below, drivers may choose to either deduct actual 
expenses or use the standard mileage method.
107
 
2. Apportionment of Expenses Between Business and Personal Use 
While the general scheme for taxing income and expenses is clear, 
complexities may arise in the ridesharing sector because many ridesharing 
drivers do not drive full time.
108
 Furthermore, the vehicle they use for 
 
 
 105. See I.R.C. §§ 61, 162, 212 (2014). 
 106. Business deductions under I.R.C. § 162 must meet the requirements of I.R.C. § 274(d), which 
dictates that listed property must meet certain documentation requirements. See id. § 274(d). Listed 
property includes: (1) passenger automobiles, and (2) any other property used as a means of 
transportation unless substantially all the use is for the “business of providing to unrelated persons 
services consisting of the transportation of persons or property for compensation or hire.” I.R.C. 
§ 280F(d)(4)(C) (2014). 
 107. See infra Part II.A.2. 
 108. A study commissioned by Uber and conducted by the Benenson Strategy Group found that, 
based on interviews conducted in December 2014, 52% of “partner-drivers” driving with Uber were 
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ridesharing may also be driven for personal use, sometimes predominantly 
for personal use.
109
 Thus, because the tax law only permits deduction of 
business-related expenses, ridesharing drivers may face more significant 
expense allocation and tracking issues than taxicab drivers.
110
  
Most, but not all, expenses of ridesharing drivers will pertain to the 
vehicle they operate. For tax purposes, drivers may either (1) deduct the 
actual business expenses that they incur or (2) recover them using the 
standard mileage method.
111
  
Actual Costs Method. If the driver uses “actual costs,” the relevant 
covered expenses include: depreciation, garage rent, gas, insurance, lease 
payments, licenses, oil, parking fees, registration, repairs, tires, and 
tolls.
112
 If the vehicle serves both business and personal uses, then the 
driver must apportion these expenses between the business and the 
personal use. Such apportionment may be based on miles driven. The 
driver must keep track of personal use miles and business miles and track 
all qualified actual expenses (the listed expenses above). These actual 
expenses are then divided based on mileage, with the business portion 
deductible.
113
 For example, if two-thirds of the miles driven in the vehicle 
are business miles (e.g., driving with Uber), then two-thirds of the actual 
 
 
part-time drivers with no previous driving experience who drove fewer than 30 hours a week. 
BENENSON STRATEGY GRP., UBER: THE DRIVER ROADMAP (2015), available at 
https://newsroom.uber.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/BSG_Uber_Report.pdf [hereinafter UBER 
DRIVER ROADMAP]. For further study, see Jonathan Hall, In the Driver’s Seat: A Closer Look at the 
Uber Partner Experience, UBER (Jan. 22, 2015), http://blog.uber.com/partner-experience (describing 
the decision to commission the study and outlining some of the findings). 
 109. The typical Uber driver uses his or her own car. See generally Uber Vehicle Requirements for 
2016, RIDESHAREAPPS.COM, http://rideshareapps.com/uber-vehicle-requirements-for-2016/ (last 
visited Feb. 9, 2016) (specifying by city the oldest model year accepted for the vehicle and that it must 
be a 4-door vehicle); The Driver, Uber Updates Car Requirements to 2001 or Newer in 2016, 
RIDESHARE DASHBOARD (Feb. 2, 2016), http://ridesharedashboard.com/2016/02/02/uber-updates-car-
requirement-2001-newer-2016/ (same). As noted, other Uber services coordinate with local licensed 
livery and taxicab services. See, e.g., UberTaxi, UBER MOVEMENT BOS., http://boston.ubermoveme 
nt.com/ubertaxi/?rq=taxi (May 28, 2016); see also Mina, Uber, Just the Way You Like It!, UBER (July 
3, 2012), http://blog.uber.com/2012/07/03/choice-is-a-beautiful-thing/ (noting that riders in Chicago 
are able to hail and automatically pay for a taxicab using the UberTAXI app); Uber Moves: San 
Francisco Bay Area, UBER, https://www.uber.com/cities/san-francisco (last visited May 28, 2016) 
(providing access to vehicles under the UberTAXI program in San Francisco that are commercial taxis 
driven by an individual licensed and certified by the city of San Francisco). 
 110. See I.R.C. § 262 (2014) (disallowing deductions for personal expenses not expressly 
provided for by the Code). Cab drivers operating business-use only vehicles would have no need to 
allocate miles (and costs) between business and personal use. 
 111. See Treas. Reg. § 1.274-5(j)(2) (2000); I.R.S. Notice 2014-79, 2014-53 I.R.B. 1001 (Section 
3); I.R.S. News Release IR-2014-114 (Dec. 10, 2014). 
 112. See I.R.S Publ’n No. 463, Travel, Entertainment, Gift, and Car Expenses (2015), at 16–17; 
see also Rev. Proc. 2010-51, 2010-2 C.B. 883. 
 113. See I.R.S. Publ’n No. 463, Travel, Entertainment, Gift, and Car Expenses (2015), at 17. 
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expenses of operating the vehicle may be deducted against the Uber 
business income. The remaining one-third of expenses allocated to 
personal use would not be deductible.
114
 For vehicles for which business 
use does not exceed 50%, ridesharing drivers may be forced to use the 
alternative depreciation system, rather than Modified Accelerated Cost 
Recovery System (“MACRS”) depreciation, and may not be able to make 
the I.R.C. § 179 election to expense certain car costs.
115
  
Standard Mileage Method. On the other hand, if the driver uses the 
standard mileage rate, she must still keep track of the number of miles she 
drives for business, and she can deduct a certain number of cents per 
business mile driven.
116
 For 2015, the allowable standard mileage 
deduction is 57.5 cents per mile.
117
 If the driver uses standard mileage, 
then she cannot deduct her actual car expenses (e.g., lease payments, 
maintenance, repairs, gasoline, oil, insurance, and vehicle registration).
118
 
The standard mileage rate cannot be used in certain circumstances.
119
 For 
example, standard mileage may not be used if the taxpayer has claimed 
depreciation deductions with respect to the car using a method other than 
straight line for the car’s useful life, or if the taxpayer has taken 
accelerated depreciation under I.R.C. § 168 or bonus depreciation under 
I.R.C. § 168(k) with respect to that automobile.
120
 Generally, this means 
 
 
 114. Id. 
 115. I.R.C. § 280F(b)(1) (2014); I.R.S. Publ’n No. 463, Travel, Entertainment, Gift, and Car 
Expenses (2014), at 16–23. 
 116. See Treas. Reg. § 1.274-5(j)(2) (2010); I.R.S. Notice 2014-79, 2014-53 I.R.B. 1001 (Section 
3); I.R.S. News Release IR-2014-114 (Dec. 10, 2014). To use standard mileage, that method must be 
chosen in the first year the car is used in the business. The operator may switch to the actual expenses 
method in subsequent years. For a car that is leased, if a driver uses the standard mileage rate, that 
method must be used for the entire lease period (including renewals). See Topic 510—Business Use of 
Car, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., http://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc510.html (last updated May 20, 2016). 
Other restrictions apply to the use of the standard mileage rate. See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 2010-51, 2010-2 
C.B. 883; I.R.S. Publ’n No. 463, Travel, Entertainment, Gift, and Car Expenses (2014), at 16–23. 
 117. I.R.S. Notice 2014-79, 2014-53 I.R.B. 1001 (Section 2); I.R.S. News Release IR-2014-114 
(Dec. 10, 2014).  
 118. Rev. Proc. 2010-51, 2010-2 C.B. 883 (Section 4); I.R.S. Publ’n No. 463, Travel, 
Entertainment, Gift, and Car Expenses (2014), at 16. 
 119. I.R.S. Publ’n No. 463, Travel, Entertainment, Gift, and Car Expenses (2014), at 16 
(providing that standard mileage cannot be used if you (1) “[u]se five or more cars at the same time 
(such as in fleet operations),” (2) “[c]laimed a depreciation deduction for the car using any method 
other than straight line, for example, MACRS,” (3) “[c]laimed [an I.R.C. § 179] deduction” on the car, 
(4) “[c]laimed the special depreciation allowance on the car,” (5) “[c]laimed actual car expenses after 
1997 for a car you leased,” or (6) “[a]re a rural mail carrier who received a qualified reimbursement”). 
 120. Rev. Proc. 2010-51, 2010-2 C.B. 883 (Section 4.05(3)). Under straight line depreciation, the 
taxpayer recovers the asset’s basis ratably over the estimated useful life of the asset specified by law. 
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that the taxpayer cannot switch to the standard mileage method after 
having used actual operating costs.
121
 
While automobile costs will likely constitute the dominant business 
expenses of ridesharing drivers, other costs may be incurred. For example, 
a ridesharing driver might decide to buy water and candy bars for 
passengers to boost her driver rating.
122
 Such costs might be deductible 
regardless of whether the driver has selected the standard mileage rate 
method or the actual costs method, but the outlays would have to satisfy 
the deductibility requirements of the relevant statutes.
123
 As another 
example, ridesharing drivers must generally use a smartphone as part of 
their driving business. Due to the potential constraints in trying to deduct 
expenses for a phone used partially for business and partially for personal 
use, at least one commentator has urged drivers to buy a separate phone 
used exclusively for their ridesharing business to ensure the full 
deductibility of their ridesharing phone costs.
124
 The existence of these 
additional costs means that even use of the streamlined standard mileage 
rate method would not obviate the need for detailed record keeping. Also, 
at the margins, the business-personal distinction may become less clear, 
and there could be a question as to whether these additional expenses 
satisfy both I.R.C. § 162 (general deductibility of business expenses) and 
§ 274 (further limits on the deductibility of otherwise § 162-qualified 
business expenses).
125
  
To be clear, we do not claim that tax law and tax reporting as applied to 
ridesharing drivers is not complex. Drivers may have to undertake 
significant tracking and reporting burdens regarding their income and 
expenses. Furthermore, apportionment between business and personal uses 
 
 
 121. Federal Tax Coordinator 2d, ¶ L-1903 (RIA Checkpoint Analysis Caution). 
 122. Cf. Jeff Bercovici, Uber's Ratings Terrorize Drivers and Trick Riders. Why Not Fix Them?, 
FORBES (Aug. 14, 2014, 12:31 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffbercovici/2014/08/14/what-are-
we-actually-rating-when-we-rate-other-people/.  
 123. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 162, 274 (2014); Rev. Proc. 2010-51, 2010-2 C.B. 883 (Section 4.03) 
(noting that even if the standard mileage method is selected, the taxpayer may also deduct, as separate 
expenses, items such as parking fees and tolls). 
 124. See Rideshare Dashboard, Lyft and Uber Driver Salary and Tax Rates, LINKEDIN (Dec. 25, 
2014), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/lyft-uber-driver-salary-tax-rates-rideshare-dashboard?forceNo 
Splash=true (“[I]t is recommended you get another mobile phone with data just for Lyft, Uber and 
Sidecar so you can deduct the entire phone bill, or you will need to itemize how much for personal use 
or business purposes.”). 
 125. Although not a likely risk for services like Uber, Lyft, and Sidecar, there is a possibility that 
in other less commercially structured variants, the IRS might deny losses on the ground that the 
activities are hobbies rather than part-time businesses. See Homobiles: Transportation with a Social 
Mission, NPR (Oct. 5, 2014, 7:57 AM), http://www.npr.org/2014/10/05/353849536/homobiles-
transportation-with-a-social-mission (describing a “noncommercial, volunteer, 24/7 ride service for the 
LGBT community and others around San Francisco”). 
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of a vehicle may further increase compliance costs. Complexity and 
administrability concerns may suggest that reform is required. Our point, 
rather, is that for the most part, the ridesharing sector does not raise new 
issues requiring fundamental overhaul of the tax rules, even if their factual 
realities exacerbate some issues currently confronting the taxing authority 
and tax filers. In general, tax laws already have the doctrines and 
structures in place that are necessary to accommodate new filers from the 
ridesharing sector.
126
 As further discussed in Part IV, if deviations from 
existing doctrines are undertaken, they should be put in place for other 
carefully considered goals, and not simply on the grounds that current law 
cannot conceptually “reach” the sharing sector. 
B. Income Taxation of Home Sharing 
Home sharing implicates some of the same tax issues as ridesharing, 
but there are some important differences as well. The main issues with 
respect to home sharing are: (1) the doctrinal rules governing income 
inclusions and deductions; (2) issues that arise in allocating expenses 
between business and personal categories; and (3) state and local 
occupancy taxes. It is possible that some home sharing hosts may 
encounter self-employment tax issues (for example, if they are found to be 
operating a full-service bed and breakfast equivalent), but this is generally 
less likely than in the ridesharing sector. Again, we argue that despite 
complexities surrounding business-personal allocations, the substance of 
the federal income tax law is quite clear. With respect to state and local 
occupancy taxes, the application of these taxes to home sharing may be 
slightly more ambiguous, even though the rules themselves are not 
unclear.
127
 
1. General Rules for Income Inclusion and Deduction 
Home sharing hosts must include rents received in gross income and 
may deduct qualified deductions in computing net taxable income. 
However, the sharing element of home sharing may give rise to 
complications less present in traditional real estate rentals. An important 
concern is the risk that expense deductions will be limited by I.R.C. 
§ 280A. The provision was enacted to police the business-personal 
 
 
 126. Other commentators have explored potential I.R.C. § 132 questions. See Barry & Caron, 
supra note 12, at 82–84. 
 127. See infra Part II.C.2. 
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borderline by imposing limitations on a taxpayer’s deductions in 
connection with the rental of a “dwelling unit which is used by the 
taxpayer during the taxable year as a residence.”128 However, to the extent 
home sharing deductions are not limited by I.R.C. § 280A, taxpayers can 
proceed to do the usual business expense analysis and report all otherwise 
qualified deductions on their tax returns.
129
 
In the most straightforward case, property used exclusively for business 
purposes (including home sharing rentals) and not for any personal 
purposes would not trigger the application of I.R.C. § 280A. Such 
exclusive business-use property might include, for example, a separate 
apartment with its own kitchen and toilet. It might also include a portion 
of the taxpayer’s residence that itself constitutes a separate “dwelling unit” 
within the meaning of I.R.C. § 280A (such as a basement apartment with 
its own kitchen and toilet).
130
 For these properties, taxpayers would not 
need to allocate expenses between personal and business use. On the other 
hand, taxpayers would still need to determine which costs are currently 
deductible and which must be capitalized. It seems likely, however, that a 
significant number of home sharing landlords will have property with 
respect to which there is personal use.
131
 In that case, the I.R.C. § 280A 
limitations would apply.
132
 
2. Expense Limitations Associated with Partial Business-Use Property 
Significant complexities may arise in home sharing rentals of 
properties where there is also some personal use by the taxpayer. There is 
 
 
 128. I.R.C. § 280A(a) (2014). 
 129. Rental expenses are generally reported on I.R.S. Schedule E (Form 1040). 
 130. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.280A-1(c)(1), 45 Fed. Reg. 52,399, 52,401 (Aug. 7, 1980). This 
proposed rule defines a “dwelling unit” as a property that contains “basic living accommodations such 
as sleeping space, toilet, and cooking facilities.” Id. 
 131. For example, Airbnb encourages prospective “hosts” to consider renting “out extra space 
effortlessly.” Hosts Love Using Airbnb, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/info/why_host (last visited 
Jan. 9, 2016). In October 2013, Airbnb reported that its NYC Airbnb study found that 87% of hosts 
rent out the property where they actually live. Press Release, Airbnb, New Study: Airbnb Generated 
$632 Million in Economic Activity in New York (Oct. 22, 2013), available at https://www.airbnb. 
com/press/news/new-study-airbnb-generated-632-million-in-economic-activity-in-new-york; see also 
generally AIRBNB, GROWING THE ECONOMY, HELPING FAMILIES PAY THE BILLS: ANALYSIS OF 
ECONOMIC IMPACTS 2014, at 34 (2015), available at https://www.airbnbaction.com/wp-content/ 
uploads/2016/02/New-York-City_Impact-Report_2015.pdf (noting that for 2014, 90% of hosts were 
renting their primary residence). 
 132. Neither I.R.C. § 280A(c)(3) and § 280A(c)(5) (limiting rental expense deductions where the 
rented dwelling unit is used by the taxpayer as a residence), nor § 280A(e) (requiring apportioning 
expenses between rental activity and personal use, including use as a residence), would be relevant in 
the case of exclusive rental of property with no personal use of any type. 
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reason to think that these mixed-use properties may be a sizable portion of 
home sharing rentals.
133
 In the case of such properties, the following rules 
may limit the taxpayer’s ability to deduct home sharing expenses.134 
a. The “Hotel” Exception 
Taxpayers may be able to participate in home sharing without being 
subject to the I.R.C. § 280A limitations on deductions associated with 
dwelling units if the property falls under the so-called “hotel exception.” 
That exception provides that “[t]he term ‘dwelling unit’ does not include 
that portion of a unit which is used exclusively as a hotel, motel, inn, or 
similar establishment.”135 A room in a home is considered so used if it is 
“regularly available for occupancy by paying customers and only if no 
person having an interest in the property is deemed under . . . [the § 280A 
regulations] . . . to have used the unit as a residence during the taxable 
year.”136 So, for example, a taxpayer who rents a room in her home for 
short-term occupancy to paying guests and who does not use the room 
herself might be able to avoid the limitations of I.R.C. § 280A, if it were 
determined that the room falls under the hotel exception. In that case, 
however, costs associated with common spaces and the building exterior, 
and not related to the business, cannot be deducted.
137
  
Hosts in the home sharing economy face several challenges in trying to 
fall under the hotel exception. The most obvious is the factual question of 
whether the identified room is regularly available for occupancy and 
whether there is personal use of the room by the taxpayer.
138
 So, for 
 
 
 133. See Press Release, Airbnb, supra note 131. 
 134.  The following discussion focuses on the treatment of income and deductible expenses in 
homesharing activities because these tax questions are most dominant and pressing for taxpayers 
venturing into that sector of the economy. Similar complexities, though, dominate the calculation of 
gain or loss on the sale of property used in whole or in part for rental activities. If rental property with 
no personal use is sold at a loss, the loss should be deductible, subject to any applicable passive 
activity loss rules. See generally I.R.C. §§ 165(c)(1)–(2), 469 (2014). If, however, the taxpayer rents 
her home during part of the year, and later sells the home, the rental use does not affect the calculation 
of gain or loss on the sale, and any loss on the sale is not deductible. See Treas. Reg. § 1.165-9(a) 
(1964); I.R.S. Publ’n No. 523, Selling Your Home (2015), at 7, 9. 
 135. I.R.C. § 280A(f)(1)(B) (2014). 
 136. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.280A-1(c)(2), 45 Fed. Reg. 52,399, 52,401–02 (Aug. 7, 1980); see also 
I.R.S Publ’n No. 527, Residential Rental Property (2015), at 2. 
 137. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8732002 (Apr. 2, 1987). 
 138. Case law and rulings suggest that the “used . . . as a residence” requirement is interpreted 
strictly and that any personal use of the space by the taxpayer will take it outside of the hotel 
exception. See, e.g., Fine v. United States, 493 F. Supp. 540, 543–44 (N.D. Ill. 1980), aff’d, 647 F.2d 
763 (7th Cir. 1981); Grigg v. Comm’r, 62 T.C.M. (CCH) 465 (1991), aff’d, 979 F. 2d 383 (5th Cir. 
1992); Byers v. Comm’r, 82 T.C. 919, 925 (1984); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8518003 (Jan. 18, 1985). 
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example, hosts who rent out a couch or an air mattress in the living room 
will be unlikely to qualify for the hotel exception. Similarly, taxpayers 
who rent out a spare room, but also use the room for personal purposes 
when not rented, would likely not qualify. Even for those taxpayers who 
reserve a room in their home solely for rental use, the ability to qualify for 
the “hotel exception” may be hampered by the distinctive operational 
features of this rental economy. For example, to the extent that Airbnb 
hosts have the right to screen, monitor, and evaluate potential renters, the 
room might not be considered “regularly available for occupancy by 
paying customers” in a manner comparable to hotels, motels, and inns.139 
If the taxpayer’s room rental falls within the hotel exception, then the 
general rules for income and deduction where there is no personal use 
apply irrespective of I.R.C. § 280A.
140
 The taxpayer must divide expenses 
between the rental use portion of the property and the personal use portion 
of the property and may only deduct on Schedule E the rental use portion. 
“[A]ny reasonable method” may be used to divide expenses between rental 
and personal.
141
 Certain allowable personal use expenses may continue to 
be deducted on Schedule A.
142
 
b. Partial Rental Use of a Dwelling Unit That Does Not Rise to the 
Level of a Residence 
If a taxpayer rents out property that is considered a “dwelling unit” 
within the meaning of I.R.C. § 280A but is not used exclusively for 
business, then I.R.C. § 280A applies. This scenario would arise, for 
example, if the taxpayer has a condominium that she rents out at fair rental 
value for most of the year but uses for personal purposes for some days. In 
such scenarios where there is partial personal use, two outcomes are 
possible. 
 
 
 139. See, e.g., Am I Allowed to Decline Booking Inquiries?, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/ 
help/article/899 (last visited Jan. 6, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/9XMJ-BUSK (“[Y]ou can tell 
any guest that your listing is unavailable for a trip they’ve asked about.”); see also What If I Feel 
Uncomfortable with a Guest?, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/259 (last visited Jan. 6, 
2016), archived at http://perma.cc/M62A-6NZY (“If a guest sends you a booking inquiry or 
reservation request and you find that they’re not a fit for your space or hosting style, you are free to 
decline the booking.”). More recently, Airbnb has been under pressure to combat discrimination 
encountered by renters on the platform, thus the parameters of hosts’ ability to screen and evaluate 
renters may be in flux. 
 140. See I.R.C. §§ 61, 162, 183, 212 (2014). 
 141. I.R.S. Publ’n No. 587, Business Use of Your Home (2014), at 10 (noting that square footage 
or number of rooms, where rooms are all about the same size, are two commonly used methods). 
 142. For example, home mortgage interest may be deducted. I.R.C. § 163(h)(3) (2014). 
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First, to the extent the level of personal use does not rise to that of a 
“residence,” the less restrictive portion of the I.R.C. § 280A rules applies. 
Personal use will only rise to the level of a “residence” if the use is for 
(1) more than 14 days or (2) 10% of the number of days for which the unit 
is rented at fair rental.
143
 If the personal use does not rise to the level of a 
“residence,” the taxpayer’s deduction for expenses attributable to the 
rental of the unit is limited to Y, where
144
: 
Y = taxpayer’s total rental expenses  x  
number of days in the year the unit is rented at fair value
total number of days in the year the unit is used
  
Thus, consider a case in which a home sharing host rents a unit to 
various guests for 350 days in a year and uses it personally for 7 days. If 
the total expenses associated with the unit were $10,000 for the year, the 
rule provides the deductible expenses may not exceed $9,804.
145
 
c. Partial Rental Use of a Dwelling Unit That Is Used as a 
Residence 
Second, if the level of personal use does rise to the level of a 
“residence,” then the more extensive rules of I.R.C. § 280A apply. This 
situation might exist if, for example, the rented space is a “dwelling unit” 
and the personal use of that space exceeds the threshold for being a 
residence noted above.
146
 If the taxpayer uses the dwelling unit as a 
residence and rents it out for fifteen days or more during the year, then the 
taxpayer must report the income and expenses (including depreciation) 
allocable to rental use on Schedule E, subject to the I.R.C. § 280A 
limitations.
147
  
Specifically, I.R.C. § 280A limits the rental deductions attributable to 
the rental unit to the amount of gross income from the rental activity that 
remains after deducting (1) expenses allocable to the rental activity that 
would be deductible regardless of the rental use, and (2) expenses 
allocable to the rental business but not to the rental property itself. So, for 
example, assume that a taxpayer rents out her condominium for twenty-
 
 
 143. I.R.C. § 280A(d)(1) (2014). 
 144. Id. § 280A(e)(1). This ratio-based limitation does not apply to the deduction of expenses that 
would be deductible regardless of whether the unit (or portion thereof) was rented. Id. § 280A(e)(2). 
 145. Because $10,000 of total rental expense x 350 days rented at fair value ÷ 357 days unit is 
used during the year = $9,804, the total amount of rental expenses permitted under I.R.C. § 280A(e). 
 146. I.R.C. § 280A(d)(1); see also supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
 147. I.R.C. §§ 280A(c)(5), (e)(1) (2012). If the taxpayer used the dwelling unit as a residence and 
rented it for fewer than fifteen days during the year, then the taxpayer reports neither income nor 
expenses associated with the rental activity. Id. §§ 280A(c)(5), (g). 
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eight days and lives in it the remaining 337 days of the year.
148
 She earns a 
total rental income of $5,000, incurs $2,000 worth of expenses that would 
be deductible regardless of the rental activity (e.g., property tax), and 
incurs $400 in expenses related to the rental activity, but not to the unit 
(e.g., a fee to list the property on a home sharing website). Under I.R.C. 
§ 280A(c)(5), this taxpayer is limited to a deduction of $4,446.58 for the 
expenses attributable to the rental unit use but not otherwise deductible 
(e.g., utilities, insurance, repairs, etc.).
149
 Expenses over this limitation 
may be carried over to the next taxable year.
150
  
To take another example, assume that a taxpayer rents out a room in 
her home on Airbnb for twenty-eight days a year but uses it for personal 
purposes on the remaining days. Assume the taxpayer earns $2,000 of 
rental income. Assume that the taxpayer has a total annual mortgage 
interest of $15,000 and total property tax liability of $11,000. The portion 
of mortgage interest related to the rental is $1,200 and the portion of 
property tax related to the rental is $880.
151
 Under these facts, the taxpayer 
would be able to take zero deduction for rental expenses attributable to the 
rental unit but not otherwise deductible (e.g., utilities, insurance) because 
her gross income from home sharing is less than the deductions otherwise 
allowable by the statute (mortgage interest and property tax). 
 
* * * 
 
In sum, the doctrinal tax rules governing income inclusion and expense 
deductions in both ridesharing and home sharing are not unclear. These 
 
 
 148. See id. § 280A(c)(5). 
 149. The property is rented for twenty-eight of the 365 days it is used in the year. Thus, deductible 
rental-related expenses cannot exceed the ratio of 28 days rented/365 days used. Thus, of the $2,000 in 
property taxes, $153.42 is attributable to the rental; calculated as $2,000 in property taxes multiplied 
by the ratio of 28 days rented/365 days used. The remaining $1,846.58 of property tax ($2,000 - 
$153.42) is deductible regardless of rental use. To determine the amount of rental unit expenses 
deductible (other than those such as interest or taxes which are independently deductible), I.R.C. 
§ 280A(c)(5) specifies the following calculation: $5,000 total rental income - $153.42 (otherwise 
permitted property deductions, here the portion of property tax, allocable to the days rented - $400 
(rental expenses not related to the property, here the listing fee) = maximum of other rental unit costs 
allowed as deduction. If the taxpayer’s deductions exceed this annually calculated limit, the taxpayer 
may carryover the unused amounts, subject to some limitations. See I.R.S Publ’n No. 527, Residential 
Rental Property (2014), at 11; Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.280A-3(d), 45 Fed. Reg. 52,399, 52,405–06 (Aug. 
7, 1980). 
 150. See I.R.C. § 280A(c)(5). 
 151. The portion of mortgage interest allocable to the days rented is calculated as 28 days rented ÷ 
365 days used x $15,000 (total mortgage interest) = $1,200 mortgage interest allocable to rental use. 
The portion of property tax allocable to days rented is calculated as 28 days rented ÷ 365 days used x 
$11,000 (total property tax) = $880 property tax allocable to rental use. 
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rules, which have long applied to other small business owners or 
landlords, have equal application in the sharing economy. Yet these rules 
may be complex, and the structure of the sharing economy may exacerbate 
their complexities and may create compliance difficulties for tax return 
filers and enforcement difficulties for taxing authorities. We discuss some 
of these compliance concerns at greater length in Part III. It is important to 
note for now, however, that complexities in the law are not the same as 
saying that the tax law does not have an adequate framework for taxing 
sharing. While they may be less than ideal, the legal rules and frameworks 
are not inadequate. 
C. Self-Employment Taxes and Local Occupancy Taxes 
With respect to federal self-employment taxes and local occupancy 
taxes, the application of the law may be less clear than for federal income 
taxes. Yet, even here, the tax rules are not inadequate. The ambiguity lies 
in the question of whether the existing regime applies to sharing.  
1. Self-Employment Taxes 
One point of ambiguity is whether, for tax purposes, sharing economy 
workers are independent contractors who are responsible for paying self-
employment taxes.
152
 This is more of a concern for ridesharing drivers and 
other task workers, although the issue may arise for some home sharing 
landlords as well. 
The doctrinal rules regarding how self-employment taxes apply to 
independent contractors are well established. Essentially, sharing economy 
earners who are independent contractors would be subject to the same 
rules that apply to independent contractors in other industries. Amounts 
earned by such self-employed independent contractors will be subject to 
self-employment taxes (i.e., social security and Medicare tax at a 15.3% 
 
 
 152. See Lauren Weber & Rachel Emma Silverman, On-Demand Workers: ‘We Are Not Robots,’ 
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 27, 2015, 7:55 PM), http://www.wsj.com/article_email/on-demand-workers-we-are-
not-robots-1422406524-lMyQjAxMTE1NDI2ODYyNjgwWj. The classification issue extends beyond 
taxation. See, e.g., Deepa Das Acevedo, Regulating Employment Relationships in the Sharing 
Economy, EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 20–24), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2657673; Benjamin Means & Joseph A. Seiner, 
Navigating the Uber Economy, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1511, 1513–16 (2016); Brishen Rogers, 
Employment Rights in the Platform Economy: Getting Back to Basics, HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 
(forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 2–9), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abst 
ract_id=2641305; Elizabeth Chika Tippett, Using Contract Terms to Detect Underlying Litigation 
Risks: An Initial Proof of Concept, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 7–
9), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2675846. 
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rate), which the individual will have to pay by filing a Schedule SE.
153
 The 
individual can then deduct half of these taxes on Form 1040, line 27.
154
 
Because they are independent contractors not subject to withholding, such 
individuals may also have to pay estimated taxes, depending on their 
overall tax situation.
155
  
What is less clear, however, is whether sharing economy workers are, 
in fact, independent contractors. As discussed in more detail in Part III, 
most sharing businesses, including the ridesharing businesses, have taken 
the position that sharing workers are independent contractors rather than 
employees.
156
 However, the rules for distinguishing employees from 
independent contractors are complex and may vary depending on the 
precise work relationship and the specific law at issue.
157
 In the tax 
context, for example, the IRS has developed a 20-factor test to distinguish 
independent contractors from employees, and courts have considered a 
number of these factors in classifying workers.
158
 In brief, the IRS and 
courts will normally look at a variety of behavioral, financial, and 
 
 
 153. See generally Self-Employed Individuals Tax Center, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 
http://www.irs.gov/Individuals/Self-Employed#obligations (last visited Jan. 6, 2016). For 2015, the 
15.3% self-employment tax reflects a social security tax component of 12.4% and a Medicare tax of 
2.9%. I.R.C. § 1401(a), (b)(1) (2014). The additional Medicare tax introduced in 2013 imposes an 
additional 0.9% tax for compensation, including self-employment income above a threshold amount. 
Id. § 1401(b)(2). 
 154. See I.R.C. § 164(f)(1) (2014); I.R.S. Cat. No. 24811V, (Jan. 26, 2015), at 31. Thus, drivers 
include their net driving income and a deduction for half of the self-employment taxes on Form 1040 
along with any other taxable income. 
 155. See I.R.C. § 6654(a), (d) (2014); see also I.R.S Publ’n No. 505, Tax Withholding and 
Estimated Tax (2015), at 23–32 (discussing circumstances under which estimated tax payments are 
required). 
 156. See, e.g., Brian, Uber Driver Partner (Full-Time Independent Contractor), UBER (Mar. 28, 
2014), http://newsroom.uber.com/drive-with-uber-earn-cash-with-your-car-4/; see also Terms and 
Conditions, UBER, https://www.uber.com/legal/usa/terms (last visited Jan. 6, 2016), archived at 
https://perma.cc/A5XU-AQ87?type=source (“The Services constitute a technology platform that 
enables users of Uber’s mobile applications or websites provided as part of the Services (each, an 
“Application”) to arrange and schedule transportation and/or logistics services with third party 
providers of such services, including independent third party transportation providers and third party 
logistics providers under agreement with Uber or certain of Uber’s affiliates . . . .”). Moreover, Uber 
sends drivers a Form 1099, rather than the Form W-2 used for employees. About Partner Taxes, UBER, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20151008212047/https://help.uber.com/h/1bf76075-7fe3-4c15-ac58-a4bef 
827e017 (“If you’re a partner based in the United States, you will receive a 1099-K and/or 1099-MISC 
form to report income you earned with Uber.”). 
 157. See TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION, REF. NO. 2013-30-058, 
EMPLOYERS DO NOT ALWAYS FOLLOW INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE WORKER DETERMINATION 
RULING 2 (2013) (“IRS estimates that employers misclassify millions of workers as independent 
contractors instead of employees. . . . allow[ing] employers to avoid paying a significant amount of 
money in employment taxes . . . .”). 
 158. See, e.g., Schramm v. Comm’r, 102 T.C.M. (CCH) 233 (2011); Levine v. Comm’r, T.C.M. 
(RIA) 2005-86 (2005); Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296. 
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relational factors to distinguish employees from independent 
contractors.
159
 Very generally, a worker is an independent contractor if the 
business paying the worker has the right to control or direct only the result 
of the work and not what will be done and how.
160
  
Because of the unique structures of the sharing economy, some have 
argued that it is unclear whether sharing workers should be classified as 
independent contractors or employees, and the issue is a contested and 
unresolved one across a number of legal fields.
161
 The resolution of this 
issue will vary depending on the area of law. For example, the IRS, the US 
Department of Labor, and various state agencies will apply their own tests 
and standards in making the independent contractor vs. employee 
determination.  
In this regard, some lawsuits have recently been filed, arguing that 
Uber drivers are employees rather than independent contractors.
162
 Two 
California District Court cases went forward after summary judgment was 
 
 
 159. This is often called the 20-factor test. The factors listed in Rev. Rul. 87-41 include: 
(1) whether the person for whom services are performed has the right to require compliance with that 
person’s instructions; (2) whether there is worker training; (3) whether the worker’s services are 
integrated into business operations; (4) whether the “[s]ervices must be rendered personally”; 
(5) whether the person for whom services are performed hires assistants; (6) whether there is a 
continuing relationship; (7) whether set hours are established; (8) whether full time work is required; 
(9) whether the work must be done on the employer’s premises; (10) whether the work must be 
performed in a specific sequence; (11) whether the worker must submit regular reports; (12) whether 
the worker is paid by the hour, week, or month; (13) whether the person for whom services are 
performed pays the workers’ business or travel expenses; (14) whether the person for whom services 
are performed “furnish[es] significant tools, materials, [or] other equipment”; (15) whether the worker 
invests in facilities used in performance of services that are not furnished by the employer (indicating 
independent contractor); (16) whether the worker can realize a profit or loss; (17) whether the worker 
works for more than one firm at the same time; (18) whether the worker makes her services available 
to the general public; (19) whether there is a right to discharge the worker; and (20) whether the 
worker can terminate the relationship at any time without incurring liability (indicating employee). 
Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296. 
 160. See, e.g., Independent Contractor Defined, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., http://www.irs.gov/B 
usinesses/Small-Businesses-&-Self-Employed/Independent-Contractor-Defined (last visited Jan. 6, 
2016). 
 161. See, e.g., Weber & Silverman, supra note 152. 
 162. See, e.g., Yucesoy v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. C−15−0262 EMC, 2015 WL 3657656, at *1261–
62 (N.D. Cal. June 12, 2015); Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1069-70 (N.D. Cal. 2015); 
O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. C-13-3826 EMC, 2013 WL 6354534, at *1–3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 
2013); Lavitman v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. SUCV201204490, 2013 WL 6354534, at *1–3 (Mass. 
Super. Ct. Jan. 26, 2015); see also Complaint at 10, Liu v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. CGC-14-536979 
(Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 27, 2014); Complaint at 2, Fahrbach v. Gafurov, No. CGC-13-533103 (Cal. 
Super. Ct. July 25, 2013). For summaries of Uber litigation, see, e.g., Weber & Silverman, supra note 
152; Independent Contractors or Employees?, COMMUNITYENTERPRISELAW.ORG, http://community 
enterpriselaw.org/independent-contractors/ (last visited Jan. 6, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/ 
UAK9-N5WV; Uber Drivers, UBER LAWSUIT, http://uberlawsuit.com (last visited Jan. 6, 2016), 
archived at http://perma.cc/2AT4-9RX4. 
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denied on Uber’s and Lyft’s motions for rulings that drivers are 
independent contractors for purposes of California state law.
163
 There are 
now settlement agreements pending court approval in these cases, though 
both are subject to modification and change.
164
 Under both settlements, 
drivers will continue to be classified as independent contractors. Those 
agreements, however, do not prevent courts or government regulators from 
reclassifying drivers as employees in the future. In addition, labor 
commissions in various states have gone both ways on the issue.
165
 While 
the standards applied by these courts and commissions can differ from the 
test that would be applied by the IRS and courts for tax purposes, the 
existence of these rulings shows that the issue is live and contested, and 
the resolution is far from clear.
166
  
With respect to tax law, if ridesharing drivers or other sharing economy 
workers are found to be employees for tax purposes, then responsibility 
for collecting the Medicare and social security taxes would rest with the 
ridesharing businesses themselves, not the individual drivers. Payments to 
the drivers would be subject to wage withholding, and not just information 
reporting. Thus, the Form 1099-K information reporting issue discussed 
below would cease to be an issue.
167
 Again, it is important to reiterate that 
the tax law itself is not inherently inadequate as applied to sharing.
168
 The 
 
 
 163. See Cotter, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1080–81; O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 
1153 (N.D. Cal. 2015); see also Uber Drivers, supra note 162 (reviewing status of Uber driver 
litigation). 
 164. See sources cited supra note 50; see also Cotter v. Lyft, Docket No. 3:13-cv-04065 (N.D. 
Cal.) (various filings dated January 26, 2016, through May 13, 2016). 
 165. See, e.g., Berwick v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 11-46739 EK, 2015 WL 4153765, at *6 (Cal. 
Labor Comm’n June 3, 2015) (ruling that Uber driver was employee), appeal docketed, No. CGC-15-
546378 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 16, 2015); Alatraqchi v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. C−13−03156 JSC, 2013 
WL 4517756, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2013) (ruling that Uber driver was independent contractor). 
We have even seen a single state agency rule and then reverse its position. In May 2015, the Florida 
Department of Economic Opportunity determined that an Uber XL driver was an employee eligible for 
unemployment benefits. However, on September 30, 2015, the agency reversed that May decision, and 
held that the driver was an independent contractor. Final Order, Rasier LLC v. Dep’t of Econ. 
Opportunity, No. 0026 2834 68-02 (Fla. Dep’t of Econ. Opportunity 2015), available at 
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2447547-mcgillis.html. See, e.g., Davey Alba, Florida 
Says Uber Driver Isn’t an Employee After All, WIRED (Oct. 1, 2015, 6:20 PM), http://www.wired. 
com/2015/10/florida-uber-decision-reversal/. 
 166. See Maya Kosoff, The California Labor Commission Just Ruled that an Uber Driver is an 
Employee—Here’s Why It Could Dramatically Change Uber’s Business Model, BUS. INSIDER (June 
17, 2015, 11:21 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/uber-and-lyft-employee-lawsuits-could-change-
business-models-2015-6, archived at http://perma.cc/C6DL-WGMB (considering the possible 
ramifications of a state labor commission ruling). 
 167. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
 168. But see Lauren Weber, What If There Were a New Type of Worker? Dependent Contractor, 
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 28, 2015, 10:28 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/what-if-there-were-a-new-type-
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question is how sharing economy workers fit into the employee vs. 
independent contractor distinction created by the law. That question is 
open but ultimately resolvable. Some commentators have suggested that 
the worker classification categories of current law are unsatisfactory and 
that a new category of worker might be necessary to better capture 
economic relationships in the new “1099 economy.”169 Again, we do not 
rule out the possibility or advisability of such fundamental legal reform. 
Rather, our position is that if such fundamental reform is undertaken, it 
should be done for policy reasons other than the assertion of current law’s 
inability to address the legal question. The independent contractor vs. 
employee determination is ultimately resolvable within the confines of 
current law. 
2. State and Local Hotel Occupancy Taxes 
Another issue that has confronted home sharing businesses and earners 
is the question of whether hosts are liable for various state and local 
occupancy taxes, room taxes, or hotel taxes when they rent out properties 
or rooms, and if so, who is responsible for collecting and paying over the 
tax.
170
 Such occupancy taxes are imposed on rentals (usually short-term 
rentals) of hotel rooms, on a per night basis.
171
 For example, San 
Francisco’s transient occupancy tax is 14%.172 The occupancy tax issue 
actually encompasses a number of separate issues, including: (1) whether 
the transaction gives rise to the occupancy tax at all; (2) if so, whether the 
guest, the host, or the home sharing business itself (i.e., Airbnb) is 
responsible for collecting and paying over the tax; and (3) how the tax 
should be priced or presented to the guest as part of the total rental price.  
 
 
of-worker-dependent-contractor-1422405831 (advocating a third, dependent-contractor classification 
in the labor protection context). 
 169. See generally id. (exploring the idea of dependent contractor as an intermediate category 
between employee and independent contractor). 
 170. See, e.g., ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN, OFFICE OF THE N.Y. STATE ATT’Y GEN., AIRBNB IN THE 
CITY 9, App. A (2014), available at www.ag.ny.gov/pdfs/Airbnb%20report.pdf; see also How Does 
Occupancy Tax Collection and Remittance by Airbnb Work?, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/ 
article/1036/how-does-occupancy-tax-collection-and-remittance-by-airbnb-work?topic=264 (last visited 
Jan. 6, 2016) (noting that occupancy taxes may apply to rental of rooms, and noting that generally it is 
the host’s decision and role to collect these taxes except in locations where Airbnb has “made 
agreements with governments to collect and remit local taxes on behalf of hosts”). 
 171. See, e.g., Room Occupancy Tax, DEP’T OF REVENUE, http://www.mass.gov/dor/businesses/ 
current-tax-info/guide-to-employer-tax-obligations/trustee-and-excise-taxes-requiring-registration/room- 
occupancy-tax.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2016) (imposing tax on rent received from an individual 
occupying “the lodgings for 90 consecutive days or less”). 
 172. S.F., CAL., BUS. & TAX REGULATIONS CODE art. 7, § 1.504-1 (2003). 
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These questions have been under dispute with a number of state and 
local regulators, and the answers and approaches have varied based on 
locality.
173
 Although various state regulators had taken the position that 
Airbnb rentals were basically hotel rooms, Airbnb had initially resisted 
that characterization, and Airbnb hosts had, for the most part, not been 
collecting and paying over these taxes.
174
 This situation created both a 
substantive and an enforcement issue. The substantive issue was whether 
Airbnb rentals were in fact hotel rooms subject to the occupancy tax. 
Assuming the answer to the substantive law question was “yes,” an 
enforcement problem arose because of the difficulty in tracking down 
individual hosts to enforce compliance. Anecdotally, it seemed that very 
few hosts actually complied with such hotel tax payment obligations.
175
 
Relatedly, Airbnb had initially taken the credible position that it does not 
own the rooms being rented, but functions merely as a middleperson and 
thus is not liable for collecting (and in some instances is not allowed to 
collect) the hotel tax.
176
  
However, facing potential enactment of less favorable regulatory 
regimes, Airbnb eventually conceded that Airbnb rentals may be subject to 
the hotel tax and certain sales taxes and agreed in certain states, cities, and 
localities (for example, Multnomah County and Portland, Oregon, San 
Francisco, San Jose, San Diego, Phoenix, Chicago, North Carolina, Rhode 
Island, and Washington, D.C.) to act as a collection agent for those taxes 
 
 
 173. See, e.g., Verne Kopytoff, Airbnb’s Woes Show How Far the Sharing Economy Has Come, 
TIME (Oct. 7, 2013), http://business.time.com/2013/10/07/airbnbs-woes-show-how-far-the-sharing-
economy-has-come/. 
 174. See Said, supra note 11. 
 175. See Steven T. Jones, Airbnb Isn’t Sharing, S.F. BAY GUARDIAN (Mar. 19, 2013, 3:54 PM), 
http://www.sfbg.com/2013/03/19/airbnb-isnt-sharing, archived at http://perma.cc/GX9N-7L34; Tuttle, 
supra note 7. In the traditional hotel context, the hotel collects the tax on its rooms and remits the tax 
to the government. 
 176. Airbnb’s position had been that it operated a new form of economic activity not covered by 
traditional regulations. Even when Airbnb has agreed to facilitate the collection and remission of these 
taxes, it continued to maintain that it really was not obligated. See Kopytoff, supra note 173 (noting 
that while Airbnb’s earlier position was that hotel taxes did not apply to its model, its CEO Brian 
Chesky has conceded that “We believe it makes sense for our community of hosts to pay occupancy 
tax to the cities in which they live, with exceptions under certain thresholds, and we are eager to 
discuss how this might be made possible”); see also Sarah Buhr, Brian Chesky Talks About Just How 
Different the Hotel Business Is from Airbnb, TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 9, 2014), http://techcrunch.com/2 
014/09/09/brian-chesky-hotels-and-airbnb-are-the-same-but-different/, archived at http://perma.cc/6S 
2W-4D5E (quoting Chesky’s inconsistent position on whether Airbnb is a hotel); Phillip Matier & 
Andrew Ross, Airbnb Pays Tax Bill of ‘Tens of Millions’ to S.F., S.F. CHRON. (Feb. 18, 2015, 8:48 
PM), http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/matier-ross/article/M-R-Airbnb-pays-tens-of-millions-in-back-60 
87802.php, archived at http://perma.cc/V53W-EZMA (noting Airbnb’s “concerns” about San 
Francisco’s assessment of back taxes). 
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owed by the hosts.
177
 In these locations, Airbnb began collecting the taxes 
from renters and paying them over to the appropriate government body. 
Thus, even though the business structure of the Airbnb model differs from 
traditional hotels, the net result in some locations has been the creation of 
a de facto withholding-agent obligation (in some instances, the state, city, 
or locality has actually changed the regulations to do this) imposed on 
Airbnb to facilitate otherwise near-impossible compliance. On November 
11, 2015, Airbnb released “The Airbnb Community Compact” in which it 
announced that it would help “ensure the efficient collection of tourist 
and/or hotel taxes in cities that have such taxes” and that it would “work to 
implement this initiative in as many communities as possible.”178 
Commentators have taken this as a sign that the industry, and in particular 
Airbnb, has reached a level of maturity that requires it to engage more 
directly with state and local governments and their laws, but seeks to set 
the terms of that engagement.
179
 Interestingly, Airbnb’s release of its 
“Community Compact” came shortly after a public relations imbroglio in 
October 2015, following a series of ads released in San Francisco that 
suggested, in a “flippant tone,” how the city could better use the 
company’s hotel tax payments to the city.180 The controversy over the 
advertising campaign erupted at an inopportune moment; San Francisco 
was set to vote on a ballot measure that would limit homesharing rentals 
 
 
 177. See, e.g., Emily Badger, Airbnb Is About to Start Collecting Hotel Taxes in More Major 
Cities, Including Washington, WASH. POST (Jan. 29, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
wonk/wp/2015/01/29/airbnb-is-about-to-start-collecting-hotel-taxes-in-more-major-cities-including- 
washington/; see also In What Areas Is Occupancy Tax Collection and Remittance by Airbnb 
Available?, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/653 (last visited Jan. 6, 2016), archived at 
http://perma.cc/Z7Y2-CFV3; Taylor Knopf, Airbnb to Collect and Pay Taxes in North Carolina, 
NEWS & OBSERVER (May 18, 2015, 7:40 PM), http://www.newsobserver.com/news/local/counties/ 
wake-county/article21331905.html, archived at http://perma.cc/Q6Q3-MKAF; Kate Rogers, San 
Francisco Moves Closer to Legalizing Airbnb, CNBC (Oct. 22, 2014, 9:40 AM), 
http://www.cnbc.com/id/102102286, archived at http://perma.cc/MYY6-YHMY; Ben Trefny, Airbnb 
to Start Charging Hotel Taxes in a Handful of Cities, NPR (Apr. 18, 2014, 5:01 PM), 
http://www.npr.org/blogs/alltechconsidered/2014/04/18/304564169/airbnb-to-start-charging-hotel-taxe 
s-in-a-handful-of-cities. AirBNB has also agreed to collect taxes with respect to reservations in a 
number of foreign cities and countries, including India and Paris. In What Areas Is Occupancy Tax 
Collection and Remittance by Airbnb Available?, supra. 
 178. AIRBNB, THE AIRBNB COMMUNITY COMPACT 2 (2015), available at http://publicpolicy. 
airbnb.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Airbnb-Community-Compact.pdf; see also David McAfee, 
Airbnb Broadens Efforts to Collect Hotel, Tourist Taxes, BNA DAILY TAX REP, No. 47 (Nov. 20, 
2015). 
 179. See, e.g., McAfee, supra note 178; Carolyn Said, Airbnb Will Pay Taxes, Play Nice with 
Cities—on Its Terms, S.F. CHRON. (Nov. 12, 2015, 8:05 AM), http://www.sfchronicle.com/business/ 
article/Airbnb-will-pay-taxes-play-nice-with-cities-6626099.php. 
 180. See Sydney Ember & Mike Isaac, Airbnb Ads Flop in San Francisco, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 22, 
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/23/business/media/airbnb-ads-flop-in-san-francisco.html. 
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such as Airbnb.
181
 Ultimately, the ballot measure did not pass, but 
apparently Airbnb sought to temper its somewhat aggressive stance vis-à-
vis state and local governments by releasing the Community Compact.
182
 
To reiterate, however, it is important to note that what is unclear is how 
the hotel and occupancy taxes should apply to home sharing businesses 
and who should collect the tax. These questions depend on whether the 
home sharing rentals are equivalent to hotel rooms under the applicable 
tax law. This issue is contested, but clarification is possible within the 
parameters of current law.  
In summary, we have argued in Part II that in many respects, the 
structures and concepts of current tax law are adequate to the task of 
taxing sharing economy earners. On the other hand, we concede that on 
some issues, clarification is required. For example, clarification is required 
with respect to liability for self-employment taxes and local occupancy 
taxes. In addition, there are also open questions regarding how and 
whether other local taxes apply to sharing. For example, one open question 
is whether Uber rides should be subject to taxes and fees imposed on 
taxicab rides in certain localities.
183
 Furthermore, sharing economy 
arrangements may also continue to raise questions with respect to tax 
expenditures, such as exclusions from the income tax base. Jordan Barry 
and Paul Caron have explored, for example, the application of the I.R.C. 
§ 132 qualified bicycle commuting expense fringe benefit to bicycle 
sharing programs, and have critiqued the IRS’s position that bicycle 
sharing programs do not qualify for that benefit.
184
 Barry and Caron have 
also pointed out the non-applicability of the I.R.C. § 132(f) transportation 
fringe benefit to car sharing programs.
185
 Similar issues with respect to 
deductions, exemptions, and other tax expenditures are likely to arise in 
other contexts. 
Yet these types of issues can ultimately be resolved within the 
framework of existing tax laws. Unlike perhaps some other areas of law 
and regulation, the challenge for tax lies in clarification of the substantive 
law and potential incremental modifications, rather than fundamental 
overhaul. If reform of current law is to be undertaken, it should be 
 
 
 181. Id. 
 182. See Mike Isaac, Airbnb Pledges to Work with Cities and Pay ‘Fair Share’ of Taxes, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 11, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/12/technology/airbnb-pledges-to-work-with 
-cities-and-pay-fair-share-of-taxes.html. 
 183. See sources cited infra note 294 (discussing application of New York City’s 50 cent tax per 
ride to Uber rides). 
 184. Barry & Caron, supra note 12, at 9–12. 
 185. Id. at 12–14. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss4/7
  
 
 
 
 
2016] CAN SHARING BE TAXED? 1027 
 
 
 
 
undertaken for well-reasoned tax policy reasons, and not merely because 
the sharing sector is “too new” to be governed by current law. 
III. TAX COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT CHALLENGES IN THE SHARING 
SECTOR: OPPORTUNISM AND MICROBUSINESS 
While the tax rules that apply to sharing are not fundamentally unclear, 
nor particularly novel, tax compliance and enforcement may present 
distinctive challenges due to two intersecting features of the sharing 
economy. First, in determining how and whether to comply with existing 
laws and regulations, sharing economy businesses have the propensity to 
pick the more favorable regime if there is any ambiguity as to which 
regime applies. We call this behavior “tax opportunism.” Second, many 
sharing earners may earn relatively small income amounts, may use 
otherwise personal property for business purposes, and may be filing and 
reporting independent contractor business income for the first time. The 
confluence of these two realities—tax opportunism and the microbusiness 
characteristics of sharing—may present challenges in ensuring that sharing 
earners are complying with the tax laws. However, the precise nature of 
those challenges should be clarified through further empirical study.
186
  
In this Part, we describe in greater detail the existence and impact of 
these two realities in the sharing economy. In Parts III.A and III.B, we 
discuss the concept of tax opportunism and delineate four examples of the 
phenomenon: (a) the decision by certain sharing businesses to classify 
themselves as third party settlement organizations for purposes of the 
information reporting rules; (b) the sharing businesses’ affirmative 
adoption of independent contractor classification for all drivers and hosts, 
rather than employee classification; (c) Airbnb’s decision out of the gate 
not to collect local hotel or occupancy taxes; and (d) the decision by 
ridesharing businesses to operate outside the taxicab medallion system in 
various localities. Parts III.A and III.B also explain why tax opportunism 
more accurately captures a distinctive aspect of the conduct of certain 
sharing economy businesses than either regulatory arbitrage or outright 
illegality. In Part III.C, we describe the microbusiness character of the 
sharing economy and the challenges that this creates.  
 
 
 186. We undertake such study in subsequent work. See Oei & Ring, supra note 19 (manuscript at 
26–55).  
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A. Tax Opportunism: The Information Reporting Example 
A dominant narrative for describing the regulatory strategies of sharing 
economy businesses suggests that these businesses possess a flagrant and 
aggressive disregard for the law, engaging in outright legal violations on 
the theory that it is better to beg forgiveness later than ask permission in 
advance.
187
 We offer an alternative narrative—tax opportunism—to 
describe certain aspects of how sharing businesses have dealt with tax 
laws and regulations.  
1. Opportunism, Arbitrage, and Illegality 
a. Tax Opportunism 
Tax opportunism arises when a sharing business, which has features in 
common with two regimes (A and B) that are subject to different 
regulatory treatment (with A being more lightly regulated), takes the 
position that it looks more like A than B. Certain sharing businesses tend 
to engage in such tax opportunism where there is ambiguity regarding 
which regime applies. When engaging in opportunistic behavior, the 
sharing economy business makes a tax reporting or compliance choice for 
which there is at least some legal basis. That choice provides a regulatory 
advantage to the sharing business as compared with the (arguably more 
appropriate) alternative reporting or compliance position. 
Of course, taxpayer adoption of favorable reporting positions is not 
surprising or unusual. Many other taxpayers adopt favorable tax return 
positions and lobby lawmakers for favorable regulatory treatment. 
Therefore, in a sense, the opportunism displayed by the sharing businesses 
is not a new phenomenon. However, sharing does present a unique context 
in which such behavior arises. First, the sharing sector represents a 
material shift in the way businesses are structured and workers are hired, 
and sharing constitutes a notable departure from traditional industries for 
which it substitutes, such as transportation and lodging. The uniqueness of 
sharing presents businesses with an opportunity to adopt favorable 
regulatory positions supported by small gaps and ambiguities in the law.
188
 
Second, there are notable aspects of how the sharing industry has 
exercised opportunism that are peculiar to the sharing sector. For example, 
unlike some other businesses, sharing businesses have staked out 
 
 
 187. See, e.g., Clampet, supra note 8. 
 188. This is not to say there is not vocal opposition to such displays of opportunism. 
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potentially aggressive reporting positions without having first sought 
advance rulings or having consulted with taxing authorities. Additionally, 
many sharing businesses have taken these actions in plain sight. In other 
words, the opportunistic behavior of the industry is not hidden on a line of 
a tax return. The industry’s ability to act opportunistically in this manner 
may be partly due to the uniqueness of sharing as a technology-based 
sector without large capital outlays upfront.
189
 It might also stem from 
sharing businesses’ ability to tap into an enthusiastic demographic of 
consumers to harness public support for favorable regulatory treatment in 
a way not available to other nascent industries. 
Tax opportunism is a distinct category of behaviors and is best 
understood in comparison to the two other analytical categories that might 
describe the sharing economy’s regulatory actions: regulatory arbitrage190 
and outright illegality. Tax opportunism’s meaningful differences from 
these two categories suggest different regulatory prescriptions.
191
  
b. Regulatory Arbitrage 
Regulatory arbitrage can be understood to mean those situations in 
which a participant pursues a particular transaction form or structure in 
order to secure identified regulatory benefits, even though that structure 
may add non-regulatory transaction costs.
192
 According to one definition, 
an actor engages in regulatory arbitrage when it manipulates “the structure 
of a deal to take advantage of a gap between the economic substance of a 
transaction and its regulatory treatment.”193 The actor will take this step if 
 
 
 189. For example, Uber did not have to purchase a large, nationwide fleet of vehicles to launch its 
business. 
 190. See Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227, 230 (2010); see also Jordan 
Barry, On Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 69, 73–75 (2011) (commenting on 
Fleischer’s regulatory arbitrage analysis). 
 191. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 192. Fleischer, supra note 190, at 227–30. Whether the transaction (1) is modified from its 
original design at some cost to secure the desired regulatory benefits, or (2) was designed at the outset 
with an eye to the regulatory advantages despite additional costs incurred, is not relevant here. Both 
cases constitute regulatory arbitrage in that the parties incur extra costs to pursue a design that 
provides regulatory benefits. The difference between the two scenarios might depend on factors such 
as the stage at which advisors and lawyers became involved and the degree to which the arbitrage 
opportunity has become widely known. Both scenarios are distinct from the dynamics that have 
occurred in the sharing economy, where desirable treatment has become available largely due to the 
inherent unique business design of the sector. Cf. Annelise Riles, Managing Regulatory Arbitrage: A 
Conflict of Laws Approach, 47 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 63, 69, 72 (2014) (describing regulatory arbitrage 
as containing a “functional similarity” of financial products across different markets paired with a 
“relatively stable formal difference” in laws that “affords some tax or regulatory advantage”). 
 193. Fleischer, supra note 190, at 230. 
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it determines that the costs of adjusting the plan (including transaction 
costs and legal constraints such as anti-abuse rules)
194
 are outweighed by 
the regulatory advantages.  
The tax opportunism exercised by sharing actors is different from 
traditional regulatory arbitrage because the sharing businesses have been 
able to rely on the core feature of their innovative business design—the 
use of Internet platforms to bring individual producers and consumers 
together in a manner sufficiently distinct from traditional industry—to take 
advantage of regulatory gaps. Thus, at least at the outset, the sharing 
businesses’ “first best” business structure provided the basis for the 
advantageous tax positions they claimed. In contrast, traditional regulatory 
arbitrage is understood to entail modifying or redesigning business 
structures at a cost in order to secure such regulatory advantages.  
Of course, there will be some overlap between the “opportunism” and 
“arbitrage” constructs. Some sharing economy business planning may 
contain components of arbitrage, particularly as the industry evolves. For 
example, while regulatory opportunities derive from distinct features of 
the sharing model, sharing economy actors may over time seek to 
strengthen their regulatory position by making additional business choices 
that come at some transactional cost. However, because of the unique 
regulatory opportunities created by their innovative platforms, it is 
important to distinguish the sharing economy’s unique brand of 
opportunism. As discussed in Part IV, the tax system might pursue 
distinctive strategies and responses to combat this type of opportunism, as 
compared with traditional regulatory arbitrage.  
c. Illegality 
Tax opportunism is also distinct from a charge of outright illegality or 
failure to comply with obvious rules. Some commentators have claimed, 
for example, that sharing businesses regularly flout the law, perhaps with 
the goal of allowing the industry to take hold before acquiescing to 
regulation so as to increase their negotiating leverage vis-à-vis regulatory 
authorities.
195
 We think, however, that in a number of cases, the tax rules 
are not so obvious that failure to embrace the most onerous interpretation 
can be fairly labeled “illegal.” Tax opportunism takes advantage of actual 
 
 
 194. Id. at 230, 253. 
 195. See, e.g., Clampet, supra note 8; see also Editorial Board, The Dark Side of the Sharing 
Economy, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 30, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/01/opinion/the-dark-side-of-
the-sharing-economy.html?_r=0 (noting that some Airbnb rentals may be illegal). 
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gaps and inconsistencies in the law, even though such gaps may be small. 
While taxpayers, tax advisors, and the IRS sometimes disagree on when 
conduct constitutes intentional noncompliance as compared to viable 
taxpayer interpretation, both exist, and the law treats intentional disregard 
differently from plausible interpretation.
196
 As was the case with 
distinguishing tax opportunism from arbitrage, recognizing that tax 
opportunism may be distinct from illegality may suggest a different set of 
regulatory strategies for managing such opportunism.
197
  
2. Tax Opportunism in Information Reporting 
The position taken by some sharing businesses with respect to third-
party information reporting represents a key example of tax opportunism. 
Information reporting and withholding are two mechanisms by which 
taxing authorities secure taxpayer compliance with tax payment 
obligations. Information reporting generally refers to a process by which a 
third-party payor reports to the IRS amounts that the payor paid to a 
payee. Withholding occurs when a third-party payor withholds a specified 
amount from a payment made to the payee and remits that amount to the 
IRS.
198
 Third-party information reporting and withholding help the IRS 
identify income earned by taxpayers and collect income tax due.
199
 Studies 
suggest that in sectors where information reporting and withholding are 
difficult to impose (e.g., cash businesses), tax compliance declines.
200
 
 
 
 196. Criminal tax law, for example, treats certain taxpayer conduct as a willful failure to comply 
with the law, not a plausible disagreement warranting merely back taxes, interest charges, and civil 
penalties from the errant taxpayer. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 7201 (2012). 
 197. See infra Part IV. 
 198. See infra Part III.B.1 (discussing the employee/independent contractor debate). 
 199. See Leandra Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps to Reduce the Tax Gap: When Is 
Information Reporting Warranted?, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1733, 1737–38 (2010) [hereinafter 
Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps]; Slemrod et al., supra note 17, at 3–6; see also Leandra 
Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps: The Roles Third Parties Play in Tax Compliance, 60 STAN. L. 
REV. 695, 727–28 (2007) (exploring how tax law can employ the incentives of third parties to reduce 
tax evasion). 
 200. See sources cited supra note 199; see also James Alm et al., Do Individuals Comply on 
Income Not Reported by Their Employer?, 37 PUB. FIN. REV. 120, 122 (2009) (finding, in part based 
on experiments, that individuals who have relatively more nonmatched income (i.e., income not 
subject to third party information reporting) have significantly lower tax compliance rates than those 
with less nonmatched income); Morse et al., supra note 17, at 49 (finding, in part based on field 
interviews, that almost all interviewees believed that small businesses did not report some cash 
income; that interviewees frequently opined that such failure was important (sometimes more 
important) for payroll tax and sales tax evasion, as well as income tax evasion; and that many small 
businesses that evade taxes do so by “constructing parallel cash economies” (i.e., collecting cash, 
paying expenses in cash, using cash for purchases without depositing it, hoarding cash, not recording 
cash transactions, and self-financing)). 
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a. General Information Reporting Rules 
Because most sharing businesses have taken the position that sharing 
earners are independent contractors, those sharing businesses are not 
performing tax withholding on amounts paid to sharing earners.
201
 Sharing 
businesses are, however, responsible for information reporting with 
respect to independent contractor income.
202
 There are two primary 
information reporting regimes that are relevant to the sharing economy: 
(1) Form 1099-MISC information reporting required under I.R.C. § 6041, 
and (2) Form 1099-K information reporting required under I.R.C. 
§ 6050W.
203
 I.R.C. § 6041 generally requires persons engaged in a trade or 
business and paying rents, salaries, compensations, remunerations, 
emoluments, or certain other fixed or determinable gains, profits, and 
income of $600 or more to report the payment (to the Service and the 
recipient) on Form 1099-MISC.
204
 For tax years before 2011, Form 1099-
MISC would have been the form used to report amounts paid to 
independent contractors. 
I.R.C. § 6050W, effective January 2012 for the 2011 tax year, now 
requires “payment settlement entities” (“PSEs”) to report certain credit 
card payments and third party network transactions on Form 1099-K. The 
statute divides PSEs into two groups and applies different information 
reporting obligations to each. First, banks and other “merchant acquiring 
entities”205 must report all payments made to payees in settlement of credit 
card transactions.
206
 Second, all “third party settlement organizations”207 
making payments to payees in settlement of third party network 
transactions must report such payments on Form 1099-K if the payments 
 
 
 201. See, e.g., Tax Information, LYFT, https://help.lyft.com/hc/en-us/articles/213582038-Tax-
Information (last visited Jan. 6, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/KU4U-JSWV (“[D]rivers . . . . are 
not . . . employee[s] of [the company].”). 
 202. See supra note 201. 
 203. A different third-party reporting regime, along with special tax burdens, applies to those 
making payments to employees. See supra Part.II.C.1. Because the sharing businesses have classified 
sharing earners as independent contractors, withholding does not apply. Id. 
 204. See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 2016 INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 
1099-MISC (2015), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1099msc.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 
2016). 
 205. The term is defined to cover entities with a contractual obligation to make payments to 
participating payees in payment card transactions. I.R.C. § 6050W(b)(2) (2014). 
 206. Treas. Reg. § 1.6050W-1(a)(4)(A) (2010). These payors are collectively known as “merchant 
acquiring entities.” Id. § 1.6050W-1(b)(2). 
 207. “Third party settlement organizations” are those central organizations with the contractual 
obligation to make payments to participating payees of third party network transactions. I.R.C. 
§ 6050W(b)(3); Treas. Reg. § 1.6050W-1(c)(2). 
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to the participating payee exceed $20,000 and if there are more than 200 
transactions with the participating payee.
208
 The term “third party 
settlement organization” was meant to include services such as PayPal, 
Amazon, and Google Checkout.
209
 Thus, it is clear that “merchant 
acquiring entities” (such as certain banks) are subject to more stringent 
information reporting obligations than “third party settlement 
organizations,” because third party settlement organizations need only 
report when high income and transaction volume thresholds are met. 
Two additional rules are significant. First, persons who receive 
payments from PSEs on behalf of other participating payees and who 
distribute such payments to those payees are treated as “aggregate 
payees.” An aggregate payee is treated as the payee with respect to the 
PSE making the initial payment but is itself viewed as the PSE with 
respect to the participating payees to whom it distributes the aggregated 
payment.
210
 Thus, for example, an aggregate payee receiving payments 
from a bank in settlement of credit card transactions would receive a Form 
1099-K from that bank reporting those payments, and would in turn have 
to issue a Form 1099-K to each payee to whom it distributed the 
payments.
211
 Presumably, if the originating payor is a bank, then the more 
stringent “merchant acquiring entity” rule would apply and require the 
aggregate payee to report all payments, no matter how small.  
Second, regulations under I.R.C. § 6050W and the instructions to Form 
1099-K clarify the intended coordination between Form 1099-K and Form 
1099-MISC issuances. If a payment is made by credit card (or through a 
third party payment network) and that payment would otherwise be 
subject to reporting on a Form 1099-MISC, no Form 1099-MISC need be 
issued by the business purchasing the goods or services. Instead, any 
reporting is done by the PSE on a Form 1099-K, to the extent required by 
I.R.C. § 6050W.
212
 For example, if a business pays a repair person $600 
via credit card to fix business equipment, then prior to the new I.R.C. 
§ 6050W rules, the business would have been required to issue a Form 
 
 
 208. I.R.C. § 6050W(e). 
 209. See Kelly Phillips Erb, Credit Cards, the IRS, Form 1099-K and the $19,399 Reporting Hole, 
FORBES (Aug. 29, 2014, 11:13 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kellyphillipserb/2014/08/29/credit-
cards-the-irs-form-1099-k-and-the-19399-reporting-hole/ (using PayPal as an example of the kind of 
entity classified as a third party settlement organization). 
 210. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6050W-1(d)(1). 
 211. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6050W-1(e), Example 21. The regulations are not entirely clear on the 
application of the aggregate payee rule where the initial PSE is a third party settlement organization 
and not a merchant acquiring entity. 
 212. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6041-1(a)(iv) (2014); see also DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 204, 
at 3. 
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1099-MISC to the repair person under I.R.C. § 6041. After new I.R.C. 
§ 6050W, however, the business does not issue a Form 1099-MISC. 
Instead, the bank paying on the credit card issues a Form 1099-K.
213
 Both 
the regulations and the Form 1099-K instructions provide that in 
determining whether a payment is subject to the Form 1099-K reporting 
regime rather than the Form 1099-MISC regime, the $20,000/200 
transaction threshold is disregarded.
214
 A likely interpretation of this 
language is that I.R.C. § 6050W applies if the payment is made by either 
category of PSE, and furthermore, that if the payor is a third party 
settlement organization, then no reporting (under either Form 1099-K or 
1099-MISC) would be required for payments below the threshold of 
$20,000 and 200 transactions.
215
 As discussed below, this intersection of 
the rules gives rise to a potentially large reporting gap in the case of third 
party settlement organizations.
216
 But at least some commentators have 
proposed an alternative viable interpretation: all payments that are no 
longer reportable on Form 1099-MISC must now be reported on Form 
1099-K, regardless of the de minimis threshold.
217
  
b. Information Reporting Positions Taken by Sharing Businesses 
and Potential Effects 
Against this backdrop, Lyft and Sidecar took the position that, for the 
2014 tax year, their drivers (whom they treat as independent contractors) 
would receive: (1) a Form 1099-K, if the driver provided more than 200 
rides and received more than $20,000 for these rides during the year; and 
(2) a Form 1099-MISC, if the driver earned referral bonuses or other 
special direct payments from Lyft or Sidecar during the year exceeding 
 
 
 213. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6041-1(a)(v), Examples 1 & 2. 
 214. Treas. Reg. § 1.6041-1(a)(iv); DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 204, at 3. 
 215. See Erik J. Christenson & Amanda T. Kottke, Guidance Needed to Clarify Reporting 
Obligations for Online Marketplaces and Peer-to-Peer Platforms, 55 TAX MGMT. MEMORANDUM 243 
(2014). 
 216. See discussion infra Part III.A.2.b. If a business makes a payment via a third party network 
(such as PayPal) of $600 or more that would previously be reported on Form 1099-MISC, the business 
no longer reports on Form 1099-MISC. Instead, the reporting obligation presumably shifts to the third 
party settlement organization (in this example, PayPal) under I.R.C. § 6050W. The gap arises because 
PayPal does not issue a Form 1099-K unless the payments to the payee equal at least $20,000 and 
there are at least 200 transactions. Therefore, payments of $600 or more that previously would have 
been reported are unlikely to be reported, except in the case of significant payees (those with high 
dollar payments and many transactions). See Treas. Reg. § 1.6041-(a)(iv); DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 
supra note 204, at 3; see also Erb, supra note 209 (noting that the IRS confirmed that there is a notable 
reporting hole created by the intersection of I.R.C. §§ 6041 and 6050W). 
 217. See Christenson & Kottke, supra note 215. 
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$600.
218
 Until early 2015, Uber also took this position.
219
 This reporting 
position indicates that the ridesharing businesses consider themselves 
“third party settlement organizations” under I.R.C. § 6050W, akin to 
businesses such as PayPal.
220
 As such, they would have no reporting 
obligations for payments made for rides unless the driver exceeds the 
reporting threshold of $20,000 and 200 rides.  
In early 2015, Uber changed its position and announced that it would 
issue a Form 1099-K to all drivers for their driving income, regardless of 
thresholds.
221
 It is not clear what prompted Uber to embrace a more 
burdensome reporting policy of issuing a Form 1099-K to each driver, 
given that its own business practices remained unchanged.
222
 It is also not 
certain how Uber is justifying its shifting position without conceding that 
it reported improperly in the prior three years.
223
  
Uber and Lyft (and Sidecar, when it was in business) also issue drivers 
a Form 1099-MISC for direct payments made by the platforms to the 
drivers (e.g., bonuses) of $600 or more because, with respect to those 
payments, they do not serve as an intermediary of any type between riders 
and drivers. For such direct payments, the rules of I.R.C. § 6041 apply 
because the I.R.C. § 6050W rules do not.
224
  
 
 
 218. See Support Center, Does Driving Incur Any Taxes?, SIDECAR (Apr. 22, 2014, 5:14 PM), 
http://support.side.cr/customer/portal/articles/924061; Tax Information, supra note 201; see also 
Pender, supra note 7; Justine Sharrock, Life Behind the Wheel in the New Rideshare Economy, 
BUZZFEED (May 8, 2013, 12:30 PM), http://www.buzzfeed.com/justinesharrock/life-behind-the-
wheel-in-the-new-rideshare-economy. 
 219. See Harry Campbell, All of Your 2015 Rideshare Tax Questions Answered, RIDESHARE GUY 
(Feb. 17, 2016), http://therideshareguy.com/all-of-your-2014-rideshare-tax-questions-answered-a-
turbotax-giveaway/; The Driver, Uber or Lyft Taxes: What to do Without a 1099 Form, RIDESHARE 
DASHBOARD (Jan. 8, 2015), http://ridesharedashboard.com/2015/01/08/uber-lyft-taxes-what-to-do-
your-taxes-without-1099/. 
 220. See I.R.C. § 6050W (2014); see also Kathleen Pender, Here’s Why Uber and Lyft Send 
Drivers Such Confusing Tax Forms, S.F. CHRON. (Feb. 20, 2015, 1:35 PM), http://www.sfgate.com/ 
business/networth/article/Here-s-why-Uber-and-Lyft-send-drivers-such-6092403.php. 
 221. See Pender, supra note 220; Tristan Zier, How to Read Your Uber 1099, ZEN99 (Feb. 3, 
2015), https://web.archive.org/web/20150503200230/http://tryzen99.com/blog_posts/read-uber-1099. 
 222. It is possible that Uber perceived the importance of relatively lax information reporting at the 
outset to incentivize drivers to drive for Uber, so as to obtain a first mover advantage and become a 
market leader in ridesharing. Having cemented its position as a market leader, Uber may have then 
decided to embrace tighter information reporting standards in order to (1) appease regulators and 
(2) force competitors such as Lyft and Sidecar to embrace similar tightened information reporting 
standards (on the theory that if the standards made driving less attractive, such secondary players in the 
market might suffer more from a smaller pool of willing drivers). Our thanks to Jordan Barry for 
pointing out this insight. 
 223. Uber might argue it is merely ensuring that it is providing the fullest information possible to 
all parties, including the government. 
 224. The fact that Lyft and Uber plan to issue a Form 1099-MISC for these payments indicates 
that the payments will not be made by credit card or third party payment network. If the payments 
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The Form 1099-K information reporting position taken by some of the 
ridesharing businesses gives rise to an information-reporting gap because 
drivers who do not earn ride income exceeding $20,000 through more than 
200 rides will not have their income reported to the IRS.
225
 Although the 
absence of third-party reporting does not relieve drivers of the obligation 
to report all driving-related income on their tax returns, it does make it 
more difficult for the IRS to track total receipts and ensure gross income 
inclusions.
226
  
The tax information reporting position taken by ridesharing businesses 
(Lyft to the present, Sidecar while it was in business, and Uber until early 
2015) is an instance of tax opportunism in action. When faced with 
potentially ambiguous third-party reporting obligations under I.R.C. 
§ 6050W, these sharing businesses chose the less burdensome 
interpretation by identifying themselves as “third party settlement 
organizations” rather than as “merchant acquiring entities.” This position 
is not wholly unreasonable, yet its correctness is at least debatable. First, it 
is far from clear that the “third party settlement organization” category 
was intended to cover Uber, Lyft, and Sidecar as well as Amazon, PayPal, 
and Google Checkout. There are important differences between 
ridesharing and these online settlement organizations, such as their relative 
control over payees’ conduct (drivers, in the case of Uber and Lyft).227 
Second, it is possible that a sharing business might be viewed as an 
“aggregate payee” under I.R.C. § 6050W. Under that theory, the 
 
 
were so made, a Form 1099-K issued by the PSE would presumably be the appropriate document. 
 225. Lyft itself has acknowledged the existence of that gap. See Tax Information, LYFT, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20160211181123/https://help.lyft.com/hc/en-us/articles/213582038-Tax-
Information (explaining the circumstances under which a driver will receive a Form 1099-K, Form 
1099-MISC, or no form at all); see also supra note 216 and accompanying text. 
 226. But see discussion infra Part III.A.2.d. 
 227. See discussion infra Part III.B.1. The IRS recently ruled in Private Letter Ruling 201619006 
(modifying Private Letter Ruling 201604003) that a taxpayer that “provides an [Internet] platform and 
marketplace through which” customers and providers of a service can transact was a “third party 
settlement organization” for purposes of the I.RC. § 6050W reporting requirements. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. 
Rul. 201619006 (May 6, 2016). The IRS noted that the taxpayer requesting the ruling “only provides 
the platform which allows Providers and Customers to connect and serves as a payment collection 
agent for purposes of accepting payments from Customers on behalf of Providers.” Id. It further noted 
that the service providers decide what amount to charge and that taxpayer “plays no role.” Id. Thus, 
the requesting taxpayer was presumably not a ridesharing company actively involved in setting rates. 
Despite the taxpayer’s concession that “payments from Customers to Taxpayer are payment card 
transactions or third party network transactions subject to [I.R.C. § 6050W] information reporting” and 
that “the relevant merchant acquiring entity or third party settlement organization issues Forms 1099-K 
to Taxpayer,” the private letter ruling did not consider whether the taxpayer was an “aggregate payee” 
for purposes of I.R.C. § 6050W. Id. The issuance of this Private Letter Ruling demonstrates that the 
IRS is starting to weigh in on the information reporting question. See id.; I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 
201604003 (Aug. 24, 2015). 
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ridesharing business itself receives a Form 1099-K from its own PSE 
(bank) and then would be regarded as a PSE vis-à-vis the drivers, 
presumably required to “step into the bank’s shoes” as an aggregate payee 
and report all transactions the bank was required to report. The 
characterization of ridesharing businesses as aggregate payees might call 
into question the claim that they are “third party settlement organizations.” 
Third, as noted above,
228
 the proper relationship between Form 1099-
MISC and Form 1099-K reporting may still be ambiguous with respect to 
the application of the 200 transactions/$20,000 de minimis threshold.
229
 
The alternative interpretation leaves open the possibility that there is no 
statutory gap in some cases, and if reporting under I.R.C. § 6041 is not 
required, then I.R.C. § 6050W (Form 1099-K) reporting might be required 
regardless of how few transactions occurred or how little was earned.
230
  
Finally, it should be noted that this interpretation of information 
reporting responsibilities has not been universally embraced by all sharing 
businesses. As discussed, Uber is now filing Forms 1099-K for all drivers. 
Airbnb, which announced its shift to Form 1099-K reporting for 2013, was 
initially unclear on whether it would report all payments made to hosts, 
but eventually clarified that it would only issue Forms 1099-K to hosts 
earning over the 200 transactions/$20,000 threshhold.
231
 Similarly, 
TaskRabbit appears to be taking the position that unless the Tasker has 
earned over $20,000 and performed more than 200 tasks, no Form 1099-K 
will be issued.
232
 Moreover, TaskRabbit’s website specifies that all tax 
reporting will not be done by TaskRabbit but rather by Braintree 
Payments, TaskRabbit’s processing partner.233 Gigwalk, a similar service 
to TaskRabbit, also will not itself be issuing Forms 1099-K, but rather will 
 
 
 228. See supra notes 215–17 and accompanying discussion. 
 229. See supra notes 214–17 and accompanying discussion. 
 230. See Christenson & Kottke, supra note 215. 
 231. See, e.g., How Do Taxes Work for Hosts?, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/481 
(last visited Jan. 7, 2016) (“[W]e may provide hosts who’ve submitted a W-9 with a Form 1099-K 
showing their reportable earnings from the previous year.”); What Tax Forms Should I Expect to 
Receive from Airbnb?, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/414 (last visited Jan. 7, 2016) 
(noting that “[i]n previous years, we issued 1099-MISC forms to hosts. Starting with the 2013 tax year, 
we’re sending 1099-K forms instead. This shouldn’t change the way you file your taxes”); Should I 
Expect to Receive a Tax Form from Airbnb?, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/414/ 
should-i-expect-to-receive-a-tax-form-from-airbnb (last visited May 17, 2016) (“The Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) requires that all US companies processing payments, including Airbnb, report the gross 
earnings of US customers that earn over $20,000 and have 200+ transactions in the calendar year. If 
you cross both IRS thresholds in a calendar year, Airbnb will provide you with a Form 1099-K.”); see 
also Pender, supra note 7. 
 232. Tax Information and FAQs, TASKRABBIT (Apr. 14, 2016), https://taskrabbit.zendesk.com/en 
tries/61642320-Tax-Information. 
 233. Id. 
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be leaving it to PayPal to provide such forms, and PayPal will not provide 
a Form 1099-K unless the more than 200 transactions/$20,000 threshold is 
met.
234
 The heterogeneity of industry interpretations suggests that the 
notion that Lyft and Sidecar are “third party settlement organizations” is at 
least questionable. 
c. Comparison to Taxicab Industry Reporting Positions 
It is instructive to compare the information reporting positions taken by 
certain ridesharing businesses with the positions taken by a traditional 
industry with which ridesharing companies compete: the taxicab industry. 
The usual income and expense tax rules apply to the taxicab industry.
235
 
However, the types of ownership, leasing, and driving arrangements in the 
taxicab industry are heterogeneous.
236
 Therefore, no single pattern of third 
party information reporting encompasses all taxicab companies.  
According to the IRS taxicab industry audit techniques guide, some 
26% of taxi drivers in 2008 were self-employed.
237
 Self-employed taxi 
drivers, who operate with no commercial intermediary between them and 
the passenger, would presumably receive Form 1099-K from their bank or 
other credit card settlement entity for payments received by credit card,
238
 
but not for cash transactions or cash tips.
239
 Drivers who work for taxicab 
companies may be classified as independent contractors or employees.
240
 
Employees would presumably receive a Form W-2 from the employer 
 
 
 234. Nikki, Will I Be Receiving a 1099 or Other Tax Form?, GIGWALK (Sept. 3, 2015, 9:46 AM), 
https://gigwalk.zendesk.com/hc/en-us/articles/203202350-Will-I-be-receiving-a-1099-or-other-tax-form-. 
 235. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 61, 62, 67, 68, 162, 168, 179 (2014). 
 236. In New York City, for example, some drivers own individual medallions and own and drive 
their own taxicabs. See, e.g., DESIGN TRUST FOR PUB. SPACE & N.Y.C. TAXI & LIMOUSINE COMM’N, 
TAXI 07: ROADS FORWARD 40–51 (Rachel Abrams et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter TAXI 07: ROADS 
FORWARD]; N.Y.C. TAXI & LIMOUSINE COMM’N, 2014 TAXICAB FACTBOOK 1, 8 (2014), available at 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/tlc/downloads/pdf/2014_taxicab_fact_book.pdf [hereinafter 2014 TAXICAB 
FACTBOOK]. Some own the vehicle but lease the medallion from a medallion owner or lease manager. 
Some drivers lease both cab and medallion from a fleet owner. Thus, the industry encompasses a 
number of different business relationships. 
 237. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., CASH INTENSIVE BUSINESSES AUDIT TECHNIQUES GUIDE—
CHAPTER 17—TAXICABS 3 (2010), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/cashchapter17_ 
248965.pdf [hereinafter IRS AUDIT GUIDE]. 
 238. Pursuant to I.R.C. § 6050W (2014). 
 239. See Sarah E. Mooney, Update on the New Form 1099-K Rules: Q & A, DISPATCH (Taxicab, 
Limousine & Paratransit Ass’n, Rockville, Md.), Feb. 2011, at 1, 4, available at http://www.stl-
taxi.com/documents/1099-k.pdf. 
 240. See, e.g., IRS AUDIT GUIDE, supra note 237, at 3. 
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setting forth their income and withholding amounts but would have to 
report tips to the employer per I.R.C. § 6053(a).
241
  
Independent contractor drivers who work through a taxicab company 
and receive payment on non-cash fares through that company would also 
receive a Form 1099 from the company. Presumably, because the payment 
is originating with the passenger, the taxicab company would issue Form 
1099-K to drivers rather than Form 1099-MISC.
242
 At present, the 
apparent trend among taxicab companies is to consider themselves 
aggregate payees for Form 1099-K reporting purposes.
243
 The taxicab 
companies would receive a Form 1099-K from banks with respect to credit 
card payments, and would (as aggregate payee) in turn issue a Form 1099-
K to each independent contractor driver.
244
 Attorney advisers to taxicab 
companies seem to be taking the position that all amounts must be 
reported, no matter how small.
245
 Thus, the ridesharing businesses and the 
taxicab companies appear to have pursued different interpretations of 
I.R.C. § 6050W, with the ridesharing businesses adopting the less onerous 
reporting stance, at least at the outset.  
d. Potential Tax Compliance Effects of Form 1099-K Reporting  
Despite indications that third-party reporting improves tax compliance, 
the precise compliance effects of some sharing businesses’ decision to rely 
on the Form 1099-K $20,000/200 rides reporting threshold (by not 
reporting unless that threshold is crossed) are not entirely clear. Tax 
compliance research to date indicates that compliance is higher for income 
subject to information reporting than, say, cash. This evidence would 
suggest that higher reporting thresholds would have a negative impact on 
taxpayer compliance.
246
  
 
 
 241. See id. at 7; see also I.R.C. § 6053(a) (2014). 
 242. See I.R.C. § 6041 (2014). 
 243. See, e.g., 2011 Year in Review, TRANSP. LEADER, Winter 2012, at 26, available at 
http://www.tlpa.org/news/2011_Year_in_Review.pdf (noting that the transportation businesses “will 
receive a Form 1099-K from the entity that settles electronic payment transactions listing its total gross 
receipts from credit card transactions processed during the calendar year. . . . [and then] [t]he company 
must also file a Form 1099-K for each driver to whom it has paid or credited amounts on account of 
fares and tips paid by credit card”). 
 244. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6050W-1(d)(1), (e), Example 22 (2010). 
 245. See, e.g., CHIP WATKINS, WEBSTER, CHAMBERLAIN & BEAN, LLP, FORM 1099 UPDATE 2 
(2011), (advising that “[o]ne credit card transaction is sufficient to trigger the Form 1099-K reporting 
obligation”), available at http://octap.net/form_1099_update.pdf; 2011 Year in Review, supra note 
243, at 26; Mooney, supra note 239, at 1. 
 246. See Alm et al., supra note 200, at 122; Brian Erard & Chih-Chin Ho, Explaining the U.S. 
Income Tax Compliance Continuum, 1 EJOURNAL TAX RES. 93, 97–101 (2003) (finding, based on 
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However, the study of Form 1099-K reporting is in its infancy, 
particularly with respect to the sharing economy. There are reasons to 
think that the effectiveness of Form 1099-K in ensuring compliance may 
be limited. For example, Leandra Lederman suggests that the effectiveness 
of Form 1099-K on tax compliance may be limited due to its inability to 
track cash and to monitor expenses.
247
 A recent study of Form 1099-K 
reporting suggested that while Form 1099-K might lead to increased 
reported receipts among certain taxpayers, this increase might be partially 
offset by increases in reported expenses.
248
 That same study suggested, 
however, that Form 1099-K might incentivize taxpayers who had not 
previously filed Schedule C to file that form.
249
 Yet another study suggests 
that small business owners might regard credit card payments as 
reportable (in contrast to cash payments), even in the absence of third-
party information reporting.
250
 While the study examines a different group 
of businesses, it does raise the possibility that the electronic nature of 
amounts earned in ridesharing may incentivize drivers to report such 
income, regardless of whether Form 1099-K is received.
251
  
These studies indicate that the effects of Form 1099-K on tax 
compliance may be complex. In general, it seems likely that higher 
 
 
micro-simulation database encompassing both nonfilers and underreporters, that compliance across 
thirty-four occupational groups has strong positive association with share of income subject to third-
party reporting, but strong negative association with the burden of preparing and filing a tax return); 
Morse et al., supra note 17, at 49–51. 
 247. Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps, supra note 199, at 1750–52 (arguing that I.R.C. 
§ 6050W reporting effectiveness may be impacted by the fact that (1) taxpayer basis is not tracked, (2) 
high reporting thresholds may exclude many taxpayers from reporting, and (3) Form 1099-K amounts 
cannot be easily matched to tax return amounts). 
 248. Slemrod et al., supra note 17, at 32 (estimating that 1099-K introduction led to a 24% 
increase in reported receipts for those firms reporting receipts exactly equal to the 1099-K-reported 
amount, but also estimating that this group of firms also increased reported expenses by 13%, which 
offsets the impact of Form 1099-K on total tax payments, even in groups most strongly affected by 
Form 1099-K). 
 249. Id. (finding that of firms reporting receipts within 5% of the Form 1099-K amount, 66% did 
not file Schedule C in the previous year; of firms reporting exactly the Form 1099-K amount, half did 
not file Schedule C in the previous year). 
 250. Morse et al., supra note 17, at 50–51 (reporting that most interviewees regarded credit card 
receipts as taxable and reportable revenue). 
 251. Increased reporting among drivers could be the result of either (1) knowledge that most rides 
are paid for by credit card, or (2) the belief that Uber’s deposits and payments to drivers are akin to 
credit cards in their ability to be traced. One caveat in trying to translate the findings of the Morse et 
al. study to the sharing economy concerns the nature of the taxpayers studied. To the extent the study 
focused on small, cash-based business owners, such taxpayers may have a different perspective on 
their likelihood of audit as compared to occasional part-time sharing earners. Thus, the two groups 
may think about the implications of credit card reporting and the Service’s ability and inclination to 
track and trace payments differently. For example, ridesharing drivers may have devoted less attention 
to thinking through issues of audit trigger versus audit investigation. 
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reporting thresholds may adversely affect tax compliance in some respects 
and that more comprehensive information reporting would facilitate 
greater degrees of tax compliance (in terms of income inclusion and 
Schedule C filing). On the other hand, this effect may be partially offset by 
other factors (such as increased expense taking). The extent to which these 
effects occur warrants further study.
252
  
e. Explaining the Information Reporting Positions of Sharing 
Businesses 
Why are some sharing businesses embracing high information 
reporting thresholds? Why are others content to report all income? Why do 
some change their positions midstream? It is beyond the scope of this 
Article to set forth a comprehensive theory of why tax opportunism occurs 
(and why it sometimes does not). Suffice it to say that there are clear 
regulatory advantages to sharing businesses of embracing less onerous 
information reporting.  
First, there are obvious benefits associated with not having to incur the 
costs of issuing tax forms to every single driver and the IRS. Second, 
because information reporting gives the Service an accurate picture of the 
income received by each ridesharing driver, the absence of information 
reporting below the threshold may accord low-earning/low-frequency 
drivers the (illegal) opportunity to not declare income receipts on their tax 
return. This can effectively lower the tax costs to drivers and may 
incentivize the marginal driver to engage in ridesharing driving when they 
otherwise might have been deterred by tax compliance and other tax costs. 
Regardless of the long-term stability of this information reporting position, 
it may have had the regulatory advantage of helping draw new drivers to 
invest in a ridesharing career at the outset with the potential of keeping 
them in the sector down the road. Again, we do not claim that drivers will 
definitely take advantage of this opportunity to underreport. As noted, 
further empirical study is required to ascertain the precise impact of Form 
1099-K information reporting.
253
 Our point, rather, is that embracing less 
onerous information reporting thresholds renders these opportunities 
available.  
 
 
 252. For recent examples of such inquiry, see Oei & Ring, supra note 19 (manuscript at 27–37); 
Bruckner, supra note 19. 
 253. See supra Part III.A.2.d.  
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B. Other Examples of Tax Opportunism  
Although the tax opportunism described above concerned tax 
compliance, we anticipate that this phenomenon could also arise with 
regard to substantive tax rules, or rules that might effectively bridge the 
two categories. We now discuss three other instances of tax opportunism, 
some of which might arguably bridge the gap between substantive law and 
tax compliance. These are: (1) the sharing businesses’ decision to classify 
sharing workers as independent contractors rather than employees; 
(2) Airbnb’s initial position with respect to local occupancy taxes; and 
(3) the ridesharing businesses’ decision to operate outside of the taxicab 
medallion system. 
1. Sharing Economy Businesses and the Employee-Independent 
Contractor Divide 
As discussed above, classification of a worker as an employee rather 
than an independent contractor gives rise to disparate employment tax and 
other obligations.
254
 In fact, the threshold determination of independent 
contractor classification is the feature that gives rise to the issues 
surrounding Form 1099 reporting described above. Generally speaking, if 
the individual receiving payment is an employee, then the employer has 
reporting, withholding, and employment tax payment obligations. 
Employers would have to withhold federal income taxes, social security 
taxes, and Medicare taxes from the wages of employees and provide 
employees with a Form W-2.
255
 If the individual is an independent 
contractor, then the individual herself is responsible for employment taxes, 
and the business does not have a withholding obligation.
256
 The business 
would then provide the relevant information reporting forms (Forms 1099-
K or 1099-MISC), which is what the sharing businesses have done to date. 
Thus, the ability to classify workers as independent contractors has 
tangible benefits for the paying entity in terms of administrative costs and 
burdens, and may lead to a tendency to “overclassify” workers as 
independent contractors to avoid the additional withholding and other tax 
burdens associated with having employees.
257
  
 
 
 254. See supra Part II.C.1. 
 255. See I.R.C. §§ 3401, 3402, 3501 (2014); see also INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUBLICATION 
15: (CIRCULAR E), EMPLOYER’S TAX GUIDE 20–24 (2016), available at https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
pdf/p15.pdf. 
 256. See sources cited supra note 255; see also I.R.C. § 6041 (2014). 
 257. For a survey of the issues on the employment law side, see Rogers, supra note 152 
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The determination of worker classification, which rests initially in the 
hands of the paying entity, represents another instance of tax opportunism. 
As was the case with information reporting, sharing businesses have 
embraced the less onerous independent contractor classification. The 
unique structure of sharing businesses offers an opportunity to treat 
sharing earners (drivers, taskers, etc.) as independent contractors. For 
example, the fact that ridesharing businesses may be able to claim that 
they function as matchmakers between buyers and sellers of services 
through technology platforms may be used to buttress independent 
contractor classification under the IRS 20-factor test.
258
 Such arguments 
may not be as easily available to traditional industries such as taxicabs.  
Yet, as discussed above, the question of whether independent 
contractor status is the correct classification is an open one. As observed in 
Part II.C, the line between employees and independent contractors is a 
long established, though heavily fact-specific and frequently debated, 
boundary.
259
 Commentators have noted that it is possible that Uber drivers 
are more accurately classified as employees, and there are a number of 
active lawsuits addressing this question in a variety of legal contexts.
260
 
Both Uber and Lyft have recently negotiated settlements in lawsuits that 
will allow drivers to continue to be treated as independent contractors.
261
 
However, those class action settlements do not eliminate the ability of 
individuals or the government to challenge that classification in other 
contexts. 
In addition, legal developments regarding worker classification outside 
of sharing may be relevant. For example, active lawsuits regarding 
whether FedEx drivers are independent contractors or employees may 
impact the classification of Uber drivers as employees.
262
 Although Uber 
currently treats its drivers as independent contractors,
263
 commentators 
have recognized that the FedEx litigation may constrain ridesharing 
 
 
(manuscript at 4, 34–36). 
 258. See supra note 159. The sharing businesses may be drawing an implicit or explicit parallel to 
Amazon and PayPal. 
 259. See supra Part II.C.1. 
 260. See, e.g., Farrell, supra note 68; see also sources cited supra notes 162–66. 
 261. See supra notes 50, 164. At the time of this writing, those settlements are still pending court 
approval. 
 262. See, e.g., Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49201 
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2016) (conditionally granting approval to a proposed class action settlement); 
Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 765 F.3d 981, 997 (9th Cir. 2014) (ruling that the 
FedEx drivers were employees under California state law, despite the company’s claims that they were 
independent contractors); Ben Rooney, The FedEx Driver Who Sued and Won, CNN MONEY (Nov. 21, 
2014, 9:22 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2014/11/20/news/companies/fedex-driver-lawsuit/index.html.  
 263. See, e.g., supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
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services’ ability to so classify their drivers.264 More recently, the National 
Labor Relations Board ruled in a case involving Browning-Ferris, a waste 
management company, that both Browning-Ferris and a subcontractor 
were joint employers of the represented workers, notwithstanding a labor 
services agreement specifying that the subcontractor was the sole 
employer.
265
 While the decision applies to franchising and subcontracting, 
commentators note that the decision fuels the debate regarding who is an 
employee in the changing economy and may impact sharing economy 
platforms.
266
  
Of course, the independent contractor versus employee determination 
will have to be made separately for each discrete business (and possibly 
for different classes of workers within a business) because the inquiry is 
necessarily context dependent. It is possible, therefore, that some sharing 
workers are properly classified as employees while others are properly 
considered independent contractors. 
Even if some sharing earners are subsequently adjudged to be 
employees, however, the initial embrace of independent contractor 
classification at the outset holds benefits for sharing businesses. First, it 
puts the burden of litigating or challenging the independent contractor 
classification on the shoulders of workers whose interests are dispersed.
267
 
Second, even if sharing earners are eventually found to be employees, 
independent contractor classification will have lowered costs for sharing 
businesses during the time period it is in effect.  
Finally, it is likely that even if certain sharing workers were found to be 
employees based on their current economic relationships with the sharing 
businesses, the sharing businesses may be able to restructure or tweak 
 
 
 264. See, e.g., Patrick Hoge, Independent Contractor Ruling on FedEx Drivers Could Affect 
“Sharing Economy,” S.F. BUS. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2014, 3:31 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/san 
francisco/blog/techflash/2014/08/independent-contractor-ruling-fedex-uber-lyft.html?page=all; Will 
Small, Ninth Circuit Rules FedEx Misclassified Workers, SMALL & SCHENA LLP (Aug. 29, 2014), 
http://www.smallschena.com/blog/2014/8/29/ninth-circuit-rules-fedex-misclassified-workers. 
 265. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Cal., Inc., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186 at 3, 20 (2015). 
 266. See, e.g., Kimberly Adams, NLRB Decision Pushes ‘Employee’ Debate, MARKETPLACE 
(Aug. 28, 2015, 11:23 AM), http://www.marketplace.org/2015/08/28/economy/nlrb-decision-pushes-
employee-debate; Martha C. White, NLRB Ruling Redefining ‘Employer’ Could Have Big Impact If It 
Stands, NBC NEWS (Aug. 28, 2015, 2:33 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/business/business-news/nlrb-
ruling-redefining-employer-could-have-big-impact-if-it-n417866. 
 267. Even if sharing workers were to organize, there would be costs associated with such 
organization. Nick Wingfield & Mike Isaac, Seattle Will Allow Uber and Lyft Drivers to Form Unions, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/15/technology/seattle-clears-the-way-
for-uber-drivers-to-form-a-union.html?_r=0. In December 2015, the Seattle City Council voted to 
approve a bill permitting ridesharing drivers to form unions. This law has been characterized as “the 
first legislation of its kind in the country.” Id. 
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these relationships so as to more effectively avoid employee classification. 
Thus, tax opportunism may occur dynamically and iteratively, through a 
process of trial and error. To the extent these adjustments create new 
transaction costs for the sharing businesses, the regulatory strategy may be 
described as occurring at the border of tax opportunism and regulatory 
arbitrage. 
2. Airbnb and Local Hotel and Occupancy Taxes 
One of the most volatile tax issues arising in home sharing has been the 
sector’s position on local hotel and occupancy taxes. As discussed above, 
Airbnb initially adopted the position that it was not responsible for 
collecting local hotel and occupancy taxes because it did not own the 
rooms rented and functioned merely as an intermediary.
268
 This position 
actually has two dimensions: First, that Airbnb was not liable for such 
taxes because the individual hosts were the ones responsible; and second, 
that Airbnb had no liability as a collection agent for such taxes.
269
  
Airbnb’s decision to take this position constitutes another example of 
tax opportunism. Like certain ridesharing businesses’ position that they 
are “third party settlement organizations,” Airbnb’s unwillingness to 
collect and remit occupancy taxes provided it with two potential 
commercial advantages.  
First, collection and remittance of the taxes would impose 
administrative costs on Airbnb, and avoidance of these costs for as long as 
possible would provide an advantage over competitors (such as the hotel 
industry) who have to incur the administrative costs of acting as a 
collection agent. Second, if Airbnb did not collect and remit the tax, it 
would be unlikely that the hosts would do so, particularly as new, 
sporadic, nonprofessional entrants into the world of short-term rentals. 
Thus, non-collection and non-remittance of occupancy taxes could 
effectively give Airbnb a competitive pricing advantage over hotels and 
could also help entice more guests and hosts into home sharing by 
lowering tax-inclusive rental prices and apparent transaction costs, thereby 
increasing the competitiveness and viability of the new sector.  
In sum, even though it is becoming increasingly apparent that Airbnb’s 
initial position might be unsustainable (as Airbnb has agreed to collect 
taxes in more and more cities, states, and foreign countries), the taking of 
such a “non-collection” position at the outset has given Airbnb and its 
 
 
 268. See supra Part II.C.2. 
 269. See, e.g., S.F., CAL., BUS. & TAX REGULATIONS CODE art. 7, § 1.504-1 (2003). 
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hosts and guests a material short-term advantage.
270
 Moreover, Airbnb is 
still not collecting occupancy taxes in many locations. Furthermore, 
Airbnb’s regulatory strategy has yielded an advantage in that many 
localities have not been able to obtain payment of back taxes from 
Airbnb.
271
 
As was the case with information reporting, the position taken by 
Airbnb with respect to occupancy taxes is an instance of tax opportunism. 
The nature of the Airbnb business model—connecting private hosts with 
potential renters via an Internet platform—supported Airbnb’s claim that it 
looks sufficiently unlike a traditional hotel that Airbnb itself is not liable 
for the local occupancy tax. Thus, this is not the same as outright defiance 
of the law. Rather, Airbnb took advantage of an ambiguity that arose out 
of its innovative business model. While elements of arbitrage may creep in 
as sharing businesses start to adjust their business models at the margins to 
capture regulatory benefits, this has not been the primary dynamic so far. 
In sum, tax opportunism most accurately characterizes the choices of 
Airbnb with respect to compliance with local occupancy taxes. 
3. Ridesharing and Taxicab Medallions 
One final example of tax opportunism in action can be found in the 
decision by ridesharing businesses not to operate within the taxicab 
medallion and licensing systems run by various localities. Taxicab 
companies have been among the most vocal objectors to the ridesharing 
economy, and among the strongest complaints is that taxicab drivers and 
companies must pay for expensive licenses, medallions, and other costs in 
order to operate their business and vehicles, whereas ridesharing 
competitors operate without such costs.
272
 While not a tax in the traditional 
 
 
 270. As noted in Part II.C.2 above, Airbnb has now entered into agreements with a number of 
cities and localities, providing that it will be responsible for withholding and paying over the 
occupancy taxes. See In What Areas Is Occupancy Tax Collection and Remittance by Airbnb 
Available?, supra note 177; see also supra Part II.C.2; sources cited supra note 176. 
 271. In 2015, Airbnb agreed to pay back taxes to San Francisco. See Badger, supra note 177 
(noting that, in negotiations with localities, Airbnb “has not put back taxes on the table anywhere”); 
Joyce E. Cutler, Airbnb Pays San Francisco Back Taxes While Opponents Plan Tighter Regulations, 
34 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) H-1, Feb. 20, 2015; Matier & Ross, supra note 176; Carolyn Said, Airbnb 
to Collect SF Hotel Tax Oct. 1, S.F. CHRON. (Sept. 17, 2014, 12:00 PM), http://blog.sfgate.com/ 
techchron/2014/09/17/airbnb-to-collect-sf-hotel-tax-oct-1/. 
 272. See, e.g., Luz Lazo, Cab Companies Unite Against Uber and Other Ride-Share Services, 
WASH. POST (Aug. 10, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/trafficandcommuting/cab-
companies-unite-against-uber-and-other-ride-share-services/2014/08/10/11b23d52-1e3f-11e4-82f9-2c 
d6fa8da5c4_story.html; Maya Rhodan, Taxi Drivers Protest Uber and Lyft, Stop DC Traffic, TIME 
(Oct. 8, 2014), http://time.com/3482420/taxis-uber-lyft-washington-dc/. 
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sense, taxicab medallion and permitting systems often involve taxes and 
fees paid directly or indirectly to the licensing governments and are a 
method of revenue raising in some localities.
273
 In addition, depending on 
the locality, taxicab operators may pay various other types of taxes, fees, 
and surcharges that are not borne by ridesharing companies. Thus, it is 
appropriate to include this discussion in our analysis of tax opportunism.
274
  
The taxicab industry is highly regulated by local government agencies, 
particularly by state and local transportation authorities.
275
 Depending on 
the local regulatory body in charge, taxicab drivers and companies may be 
subject to licensing or franchising requirements, more general business 
licensing requirements, permitting requirements, and other restrictions on 
entry.
276
 The industry may also be required to comply with certain 
insurance and safety regulations, rate schedules, and paperwork 
requirements.
277
  
The New York City taxicab medallion system is an example of a 
regulation system that generates revenue.
278
 NYC taxicabs are regulated 
by the New York Taxi & Limousine Commission (“TLC”), a city 
agency.
279
 TLC is responsible for fare and rate setting and for establishing 
 
 
 273. See generally Ron Sherman, Yellow Cabs vs. Uber: Tale of the Tax Tape, N.Y. DAILY NEWS 
(Aug. 27, 2015, 5:00 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/ron-sherman-yellow-cabs-uber-tale-
tax-tape-article-1.2338390 (comparing the contribution of New York City taxicabs to state and local 
tax revenue with Uber’s contribution). 
 274. The dynamic between ridesharing and taxis raises a wide range of other regulatory questions 
beyond the scope of this Article. See generally LISA RAYLE ET AL., UNIV. OF CAL. TRANSP. CTR., APP-
BASED, ON-DEMAND RIDE SERVICES: COMPARING TAXI AND RIDESOURCING TRIPS AND USER 
CHARACTERISTICS IN SAN FRANCISCO 1–2, 19–20 (2014), available at http://www.uctc.net/research/ 
papers/UCTC-FR-2014-08.pdf. 
 275. See generally Bruce Schaller, Entry Controls in Taxi Regulation: Implications of US and 
Canadian Experience for Taxi Regulation and Deregulation, 14 TRANSPORT POL’Y 490, 491 (2007) 
(analyzing taxicab regulation and deregulation in 43 US and Canadian cities and counties). 
 276. One commentator has grouped such “entry controls” into the taxicab sector into four 
prototype systems: (1) “open entry” systems that regulate at the individual taxicab driver level (i.e., 
individuals may satisfy the regulation requirements by meeting certain licensing and/or background 
check requirements); (2) “limited entry” systems that regulate at the individual driver level but that cap 
the number of licenses or medallions available to those individuals; (3) “open entry” systems that 
regulate at the entity or company level but that do not cap the number of entity licensees; and 
(4) “limited entry” systems that regulate at the entity-level but that also cap the number of franchises 
available to those entities. Schaller, supra note 275, at 3–5. In reality, of course, the actual regulatory 
architecture is likely to be a hybrid. Id. at 4–5 (noting that “[i]n practice, entry controls and 
qualifications for entry occupy a spectrum of policies rather than a set of binary choices”). 
 277. See generally RAYLE ET AL., supra note 274, at 2–3 (studying the role of ridesourcing and 
that of taxis in urban transportation, through rider surveys); see also 2014 TAXICAB FACTBOOK, supra 
note 236, at 1–2, 13 (noting TLC regulation of cab leases, fares, and vehicle inspections). 
 278. Cf. Schaller, supra note 275, at 6 (classifying the New York City taxicab industry as a 
limited-entry system that regulates on the individual level). 
 279. See generally 2014 TAXICAB FACTBOOK, supra note 236, at 1–2, 12–13; N.Y.C. TAXI & 
LIMOUSINE COMM’N, http://www.nyc.gov/html/tlc/html/home/home.shtml (last visited Feb. 11, 2016); 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1048 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 93:989 
 
 
 
 
vehicle safety and other rules that owners and drivers must follow.
280
 New 
York City currently has both yellow (medallion) taxicabs and boro 
taxicabs.
281
 This discussion focuses on regulation of the yellow taxicabs, 
which predominantly service Manhattan and NY airport pickups.
282
 The 
yellow taxicabs are regulated under a medallion system, which dates back 
to 1937.
283
 The medallion is essentially a license to operate the vehicle, 
and the medallion system was enacted to curb cab numbers and bolster 
driver incomes.
284
 There are two types of medallions—corporate (or 
“mini-fleet”) medallions and individual medallions.285 Individual 
medallion holders may not hold more than one medallion, and individual 
owners are subject to certain shift minimum and driving requirements.
286
 
 
 
see also TAXI 07: ROADS FORWARD, supra note 236, at 56–69 (describing function and role of the 
TLC). TLC also regulates other industries, including for-hire vehicles, street-hail liveries, commuter 
vans, paratransit vehicles, and certain limousines. See Licensing/Industry Information, N.Y.C. TAXI & 
LIMOUSINE COMM’N, http://www.nyc.gov/html/tlc/html/industry/industry.shtml (last visited Jan. 7, 
2016). 
 280. See 2014 TAXICAB FACTBOOK, supra note 236, at 1; TAXI 07: ROADS FORWARD, supra note 
236, at 57. TLC interventions include: setting standards for drivers, regulating and inspecting vehicles, 
imposing caps and restrictions on taxi medallions, auctioning off medallions, setting fares and rates, 
and coordinating with other agencies. See TAXI 07: ROADS FORWARD, supra note 236, at 57; see also 
Licensing/Industry Information, supra note 279. 
 281. See 2014 TAXICAB FACTBOOK, supra note 236, at 1–2; see also Your Guide to Boro Taxis, 
N.Y.C. TAXI & LIMOUSINE COMM’N, http://www.nyc.gov/html/tlc/html/passenger/shl_passenger.shtml 
(last visited Jan. 7, 2016) (describing boro taxis). 
 282. See 2014 TAXICAB FACTBOOK, supra note 236, at 5 (noting that 90.3% of yellow taxi 
pickups occur in Manhattan and that the next highest percentage of pickups (3.5%) happens at the 
airports). 
 283. See id. at 12; see also Lawrence Van Gelder, Medallion Limits Stem from the 30’s, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 11, 1996, http://www.nytimes.com/1996/05/11/nyregion/medallion-limits-stem-from-the-
30-s.html. In contrast, the boro taxis are regulated under a separate “street hail livery” permitting 
system. Street Hail Livery, N.Y.C. TAXI & LIMOUSINE COMM’N, http://www.nyc.gov/html/tlc/ 
html/industry/shl.shtml (last visited Jan. 7, 2016). Medallions are not the only regulatory requirement 
imposed by TLC and bodies like it. NYC drivers also need to obtain a NYC taxicab driver’s license 
(hack license), which in turn requires that the driver meet a number of requirements. See N.Y.C., N.Y., 
RULES tit. 35, § 54-04 (2016); see also Steps to Get a New York City Taxi Hack License, NY 
CITYCAB.COM, http://nycitycab.com/HackLicense.aspx (last visited Jan. 7, 2016). Taxicabs are also 
subject to numerous other TLC rules and regulations. See generally TLC Rules and Local Laws, 
N.Y.C. TAXI & LIMOUSINE COMM’N, http://www.nyc.gov/html/tlc/html/rules/rules.shtml (last visited 
Jan. 7, 2016) (listing TLC rules). For example, yellow cabs must undergo a “hack up” conversion 
(installation of roof light, meter, medallion, security cameras, partitions, etc.) in order to be driven as a 
taxicab. N.Y.C. TAXI & LIMOUSINE COMM’N, MEDALLION LICENSING INFORMATION GUIDE 8–9 
(2015), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/tlc/downloads/pdf/medallion_licensing_guide.pdf 
(describing hack-up process); TAXI 07: ROADS FORWARD, supra note 236, at 22–27 (same). 
 284. See 2014 TAXICAB FACTBOOK, supra note 236, at 12. 
 285. Id. 
 286. See N.Y.C., N.Y., RULES tit. 35, § 58-20 (2016); see also N.Y.C. TAXI & LIMOUSINE 
COMM’N, NOTICE OF PROMULGATION OF RULES 1–3 (2010), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/tlc/ 
downloads/pdf/owner_must_drive_version_10.pdf; 2014 TAXICAB FACTBOOK, supra note 236, at 12; 
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Corporate medallions may be owned by non-driver (nonfleet) owners and 
fleet owners.
287
 These tend to be consolidated in relatively few hands.
288
 
Taxi Licensing Commission rules mandate that corporate medallion 
vehicles must be operated for two shifts a day.
289
  
Medallions are originally auctioned off by the city, and the city raises 
revenue from medallion sales.
290
 Medallions can also be sold and 
transferred between private parties, and transfers are subject to a tax on 
5% of the purchase price.
291
 These revenues are paid into the city treasury 
and credited to the general fund.
292
 New York City also imposes a 50-cent 
tax on taxicab rides starting in New York City and ending in the city or in 
certain counties.
293
 Uber cars do not charge this tax,
294
 but Uber drivers in 
New York City (and their vehicles) must be licensed by the TLC.
295
 Like 
New York City, there are other local taxicab licensing systems that 
generate revenue through various fees and taxes.
296
 
 
 
Medallion Sale Information, N.Y.C. TAXI & LIMOUSINE COMM’N, http://www.nyc.gov/html/tlc/ 
medallion/html/background/types_owner.shtml (last visited Jan. 7, 2016). 
 287. See 2014 TAXICAB FACTBOOK, supra note 236, at 12; see also Medallion Sale Information, 
supra note 286. Non-fleet corporate medallion owners lease out their corporate medallions through 
TLC-licensed agents. See Medallion Sale Information, supra note 286. 
 288. See 2014 TAXICAB FACTBOOK, supra note 236, at 12. 
 289. N.Y.C., N.Y., RULES tit. 35, § 58-20; 2014 TAXICAB FACTBOOK, supra note 236, at 8; 
Medallion Sale Information, supra note 286. 
 290. See N.Y.C. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, FOUR YEAR FINANCIAL PLAN REVENUES AND 
EXPENDITURES (2014), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/omb/downloads/pdf/fp11_14.pdf 
(forecasting revenues from medallion sales); Medallion Auction Homepage, N.Y.C. TAXI & 
LIMOUSINE COMM’N, http://www.nyc.gov/html/tlc/html/industry/medallion_auction.shtml (last visited 
Jan. 7, 2016); see also Kristen Meriwether, Hailing Higher Tax Revenue, City Lowers Expected Taxi 
Haul, GOTHAM GAZETTE (Nov. 26, 2014), http://www.gothamgazette.com/index.php/government/ 
5449-hailing-higher-tax-revenue-city-lowers-expected-taxi-haul. 
 291. See N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE tit. 11, ch. 14, §§ 11-1401–11-1417 (New York Legal 
Publishing 2015); see also N.Y. TAX LAW § 1201(j) (McKinney 2015); N.Y.C., N.Y., RULES tit. 35, 
§ 58-43(b)(3). 
 292. N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE tit. 11, ch. 14, §§ 11-1417. 
 293. See N.Y. TAX LAW §§ 1280–1290; see also Information on the Taxicab and Hail Vehicle 
Trip Tax, N.Y. DEP’T OF TAXATION & FIN., http://www.tax.ny.gov/bus/mctmt/taxi.htm (last visited 
Jan. 7, 2016). 
 294. See Editorial, Tax Uber So Car Service Supports the MTA, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Jan. 20, 2015, 
4:10 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/editorial-tax-uber-article-1.2081971; Editorial, What 
Uber Owes Subways, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Feb. 24, 2015, 4:05 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/ 
opinion/editorial-uber-owes-subways-article-1.2126649; Sherman, supra note 273. 
 295. Get a TLC License, UBER, http://driveubernyc.com/#driving-with-uber (last visited May, 19, 
2016); For-Hire Vehicles, N.Y.C. TAXI & LIMOUSINE COMM’N, http://www.nyc.gov/html/tlc/html/ 
industry/for_hire.shtml (last visited May 19, 2016). The requirement that Uber driver vehicles be 
licensed with the TLC is not a medallion requirement. The TLC Process, UBER, 
http://driveubernyc.com/tlc-process/ (last visited May 19, 2016). 
 296. See, e.g., S.F., CAL., TRANSP. CODE § 1116 (Lexis 2016) (imposing transfer fee); SANTA 
MONICA, CAL., CODE § 6.49.040(i) (Quality Code Publishing 2016) (imposing franchise and 
permitting fees on taxicabs); see also OFFICE OF THE INDEP. BUDGET ANALYST REPORT, CITY OF SAN 
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The failure of ridesharing services to embrace and operate under 
medallion licensing systems at the outset has been subject to much 
critique.
297
 We argue that such failure is another instance of tax 
opportunism at work. In effect, the unique business model of ridesharing 
companies has enabled them to argue that, unlike taxicabs, they are not 
subject to medallion licensing and the other fees and taxes imposed on 
taxicabs. The argument, in essence, is that ridesharing businesses are 
simply middlemen who bring private riders and drivers together, or 
alternatively, that they are some sort of limousine company. Some might 
argue that the ridesharing services’ failure to secure a medallion is simply 
illegal. However, at least some localities have signed off on this 
practice.
298
 Furthermore, tax avoidance does not appear to be the 
motivation behind the ridesharing industry’s underlying structure. Thus, it 
is more appropriate to view the ridesharing sector’s position on the 
medallion and fee system as taking advantage of an ambiguity that arose, 
rather than a carefully crafted regulatory arbitrage strategy involving 
costly structuring and modification of a transaction. Once again, tax 
opportunism is the better lens. 
 
 
DIEGO, TAXICAB PERMITTING POLICY & REVENUE GENERATION 2–5 (2012), available at 
http://www.sandiego.gov/iba/pdf/12_10.pdf (discussing San Francisco, New York, and Chicago as 
examples of cities with revenue raising taxicab regulatory systems). 
 297. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 272; see also Gregory Wallace, Uber CEO Charged with 
Operating Illegal Taxi Service in South Korea, CNN MONEY (Dec. 24, 2014, 5:17 PM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2014/12/24/technology/uber-south-korea/. In Summer 2015, the mayor of New 
York City proposed a plan to temporarily cap the number of Uber cars in the city while studying the 
impact of Uber and other forces on traffic in the city. The proposal generated significant backlash and 
ultimately the mayor agreed to forgo caps for the moment while pursuing a four-month study of the 
impact of Uber and other ride-for hire businesses on New York City traffic. As part of this revised 
plan, Uber agreed to provide data that the city had been seeking. See Matt Flegenheimer, De Blasio 
Administration Dropping Plan for Uber Cap, for Now, N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/23/nyregion/de-blasio-administration-dropping-plan-for-uber-cap-
for-now.html?_r=1. The study, released in January 2016, noted that “E-dispatch” vehicles (such as 
Uber) contributed to overall congestion in Manhattan’s Central Business District, “but did not drive 
the recent increase in congestion.” OFFICE OF THE MAYOR, CITY OF NEW YORK, FOR-HIRE VEHICLE 
TRANSPORTATION STUDY 5 (2016), available at http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/operations/downloads/ 
pdf/For-Hire-Vehicle-Transportation-Study.pdf. 
 298. In January 2015, Massachusetts enacted regulations governing businesses such as Lyft and 
Uber (designated a “Transportation Network Company” in the regulations). See 540 MASS. CODE 
REGS. 2.05 (2015); see also 1278 MASS. REG. 101 (Jan. 16, 2015). In early 2015, the New Orleans 
City Council considered a proposal to allow ridesharing app-based transportation using personal 
vehicles. See Robert McClendon, Uber Legalization Ordinances Proposed by New Orleans City 
Council Members, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Jan. 24, 2015, 1:14 AM), http://www.nola.com/politics/ 
index.ssf/2015/01/uber-legalization_ordinance_pr.html. The ordinance was passed in April 2015. See 
Press Release, Mitchell J. Landrieu, Mayor, City of New Orleans, Mayor Signs Ordinance Permitting 
Ridesharing Operations in New Orleans (Apr. 15, 2015), available at http://www.nola.gov/mayor/ 
press-releases/2015/201504015-uber/?feed=8aebddb2-1189-4016-8192-75f1533b5229.  
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Regardless of whether the position taken by ridesharing businesses 
with respect to medallions and licensing is sustainable, the decision to 
operate outside the medallion system has yielded tremendous benefits for 
ridesharing. It has lowered entry costs for drivers and the ridesharing 
companies themselves, and has helped ridesharing put pressure on the 
taxicab sector.  
4. Caveats 
A few concluding caveats: We do not claim that tax opportunism is the 
only regulatory response available to and undertaken by sharing actors. 
We expect that, depending on context, sharing economy actors will exhibit 
a range of responses to regulation, including both arbitrage and intentional 
noncompliance with the law.
299
 We also anticipate that there may be 
mixed or ambiguous cases of tax opportunism: In some cases, it may be 
questionable whether the transaction should be viewed as arbitrage (i.e., 
one that has been deliberately structured, in a manner that incurs some 
transaction costs, to secure larger regulatory benefits) or opportunism (i.e., 
taking advantage of an existing gap in the law available due to inherent 
features of the new sharing model).
300
 Sometimes, more than one 
motivation may be in play.  
The possibility that arbitrage and illegal conduct may also be part of 
the equation does not undermine the power of the tax opportunism frame, 
because tax opportunism highlights a number of salient features of the 
sharing economy that are not captured by either arbitrage or illegality. 
With respect to information reporting opportunism, the rise of the sharing 
economy follows on the heels of predecessor transactions and services, 
such as PayPal and Amazon. The recently enacted Form 1099-K reporting 
regime for “third party settlement organizations” was designed with 
businesses like PayPal and Amazon in mind, but perhaps did not envision 
subsequent business innovations such as Uber and Airbnb. This has 
presented a unique opportunity for sharing businesses to piggyback on this 
information reporting regime. The irony, of course, is that at the time of its 
enactment, Form 1099-K reporting was generally viewed unfavorably by 
 
 
 299. Subsequent scholarship has begun to build off these insights regarding tax opportunism, 
exploring, for example, the strategies that sharing and related businesses have adopted to create 
desired legal and regulatory environments. See, e.g., Jordan M. Barry & Elizabeth Pollman, 
Regulatory Entrepreneurship, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017), available at http://papers.ssrn. 
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2741987. 
 300. See supra note 192 and accompanying text. 
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many businesses as an onerous imposition.
301
 In the context of sharing 
businesses like Lyft (and Sidecar, when it was in business), however, 
embracing the most favorable interpretation of that regime has given such 
sharing businesses an advantage over traditional industry competitors. 
Finally, it is important to highlight that there is inherent messiness in 
all analysis of business design and regulatory strategy in the sharing 
economy. The very heart of sharing—the commercialization of often 
small-scale excess capacity services—involves individuals not otherwise 
engaged in commerce entering industries that in some cases have 
traditionally been subject to significant regulation. If those sharing earners 
had to comply with a high degree of regulation, they might be unable and 
unwilling to enter into sharing. It is likely that the designers of sharing 
platforms and business models understood that the entry barriers for small-
scale, periodic earners would need to be low in order to attract 
participation. Thus, though arguably not the prime driver of the design, 
regulatory realities were presumably not absent entirely from initial 
business conversations either. It is possible, even likely, that such 
regulatory realities have affected various aspects of how sharing has been 
set up, albeit not to the extent associated with traditional regulatory 
arbitrage.  
C. The New Microbusiness Economy 
Tax opportunism aside, a second potential barrier to tax compliance in 
the sharing economy is the “microbusiness” nature of many sharing 
economy earners.
302
 There are several different aspects to the 
characterization of sharing workers as microbusinesses, and this 
characterization is intended to reflect a group of characteristics, rather than 
an analytically precise delineation. The sharing economy has attracted 
many individuals who previously were not “in business,” and who are now 
barely in business, but have to file tax returns as small-business operators. 
A study commissioned by Uber found, based on drivers surveyed, that 
52% of Uber drivers drive part-time for UberX for less than 30 hours a 
 
 
 301. See, e.g., Amy S. Elliott, Credit Card Reporting Rules Could Burden Chain Firms, 128 TAX 
NOTES 1028, 1029 (2010); Amy S. Elliott, Final Credit Card Reporting Regs Disappoint 
Practitioners, 128 TAX NOTES 820, 821 (2010). 
 302. More generally, almost 40% (or $179 billion) of the gross tax gap for 2006 (the latest year 
for which figures are available) was due to the business income and activities of individuals. U.S. 
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-651T, TAX GAP: SOURCES OF NONCOMPLIANCE AND 
STRATEGIES TO REDUCE IT 4–5 (2012). This 40% represented the estimated underreporting of business 
income and corresponding self-employment tax by individuals. Id. 
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week. Of this 52%, 44% drove for less than 12 hours a week, 35% drove 
for 12–19 hours a week, and 21% drove for 20–29 hours a week.303 Also 
of this 52%, 6 out of 10 started driving for Uber within the last three 
months leading up to the study.
304
 It seems likely that many, possibly even 
the majority, of Lyft drivers also drive part-time, and the part-time 
demographic is likely to be significant in other sharing sectors as well. 
1. New Microbusiness Earners  
These demographic characteristics give rise to unique compliance 
challenges. First, because many sharing workers may be relatively new to 
reporting business income and expenses, they may be unfamiliar with 
keeping track of such income and expenses and may ignore or understate 
income earned or track expenses inadequately. The risk of this occurring is 
especially great in the absence of corroborative information reporting. In 
large part, we think that the “confusion” that has been expressed about tax 
issues raised by sharing earners has to do with the fact that people who are 
unfamiliar with the process of accounting for business income and 
expenses on their personal tax returns are now engaging in sharing 
economy microbusiness activity. Even if they possess accurate 
information about the applicable tax rules, taxpayers engaged in sharing 
may nonetheless find it difficult to apply the rules and to maintain the 
required documentation.  
2. Part-Time Nature of the Work 
Relatedly, the fact that much of sharing economy work is part time 
raises unique compliance challenges. The part-time nature of the work 
means that dollar amounts of income are likely to be low. This raises three 
related risks. First, depending in part on the information reporting position 
taken by the sharing businesses, the income may escape reporting. For 
example, as discussed in Part III.A, the reporting positions taken by some 
sharing businesses mean than any worker earning amounts short of the 200 
 
 
 303. UBER DRIVER ROADMAP, supra note 108, at 3; see also generally Jonathan V. Hall & Alan 
B. Krueger, An Analysis of the Labor Market for Uber’s Driver-Partners in the United States 8 
(Princeton Univ., Working Paper No. 587, 2015), available at http://dataspace.princeton.edu/ 
jspui/bitstream/88435/dsp010z708z67d/5/587.pdf (providing a study drafted under contract with Uber 
but prepared independently, drawing upon the UberDriver Roadmap research and additional data to 
assess the labor market for Uber drivers). 
 304. UBER DRIVER ROADMAP, supra note 108, at 3–4. 
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transaction/$20,000 threshold will not be reported.
305
 Second, it is possible 
that the low dollar amounts may also cause sharing workers to pay less 
attention to accuracy than might otherwise be the case. Finally, it may not 
be worth the IRS’ effort to audit multiple, low dollar amount, individual 
returns of these microbusiness earners in order to determine compliance. 
Thus, traditional audit strategies may not be cost effective. 
Again, in some ways, these problems are not new. These concerns have 
been raised elsewhere in the small business sector and also in areas such as 
Earned Income Tax Credit compliance.
306
 In addition, these concerns may 
arise in traditional sectors with which the sharing sector competes. The 
taxicab industry, for example, arguably presents some of the same issues 
with respect to compliance and enforcement that we have discussed here, 
though there are some differences.
307
 The question of exactly how the 
sharing economy changes the tax compliance calculus as compared to its 
traditional-industry substitutes deserves further investigation. However, to 
the extent sharing is essentially the informal or small business sector writ 
widespread as a result of technological capabilities and the changing 
nature of work, and to the extent the new modes of production and 
consumption erode the traditional tax base, greater policy attention and 
new compliance solutions may be required.  
3. Mixed-Use, Excess-Capacity Property 
Another feature of the sharing sector that might raise compliance issues 
derives from the nature of the property used. One of the foundations of 
sharing, at least at its outset, was the excess capacity monetization of 
personal property, such as homes, cars, bicycles, driveways, toilets, or 
other assets. As such, a complexity that might be somewhat unique to this 
sector, at least in terms of intensity or frequency, is the extent to which the 
property used in the sharing activity is subject to substantial personal use. 
For example, it is likely that ridesharing drivers may make more extensive 
personal use of their cars than, say, taxicab drivers who rent a hacked up 
taxicab from a taxicab company. In the home sharing sector, too, there is 
 
 
 305. See supra Part III.A. 
 306. See, e.g., Anne L. Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitations of Tax-Based 
Welfare Reform, 108 HARV. L. REV. 533, 585–89 (1995); see also Leigh Osofsky, Concentrated 
Enforcement, 16 FLA. TAX REV. 325, 363–66, 380 (2014). 
 307. See, e.g., IRS AUDIT GUIDE, supra note 237, at 6–12 (discussing taxicab industry audit 
issues). 
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likely to be substantially more very short term rental of real property that 
might be used for personal purposes the rest of the time.
308
  
The excess-capacity use of such mixed-used property raises particular 
tax compliance challenges and may require more intensive policing of the 
business-personal borderline. As illustrated in Part II.B, the rules 
regarding part-time rentals of real estate are very complex and require 
extensive expense tracking by hosts. In the ridesharing sector, the standard 
mileage method may provide some relief; however, business mileage must 
still be tracked. As a matter of compliance and enforcement, verification 
of expense and depreciation amounts and application of expense 
limitations may prove difficult.  
Again, we do not claim that these issues occur only in the sharing 
sector. Mixed-use property is a feature of traditional businesses as well, 
with vacation homes, personal vehicles used for business, and home 
offices raising specific concerns.
309
 Our point is that in a sector largely 
premised on excess capacity use of personal property and skills, 
delineation of business versus personal expenses is likely to be a particular 
challenge, especially as such mixed usage becomes more widespread. 
4. The Role of Paid Preparers and Other Advising Platforms 
Another aspect of tax compliance in sharing that needs to be 
investigated is the role that paid preparers and other advisors are playing 
in the industry.
310
 For many sharing earners, the 2014 or 2015 tax year 
may be the first tax year in which they are filing returns reflecting income 
and expenses from sharing. The same issues of unfamiliarity with the 
rules, inability to procure documentation, and failure to investigate 
positions taken may also apply to paid preparers.  
In addition to traditional paid preparers, other sources of advice for 
sharing earners include websites such as 1099.is and the now defunct 
Zen99.com,
311
 as well as various forums and discussion threads that touch 
 
 
 308. See Press Release, Airbnb, supra note 131. 
 309. See, e.g., James Alm & Jay A. Soled, The Internal Revenue Code and Automobiles: A Case 
Study of Taxpayer Noncompliance, 14 FLA. TAX REV. 419, 424–38 (2013). 
 310. The impact of tax preparers on taxpayer attitude and compliance has been the subject of some 
inquiry outside the sharing economy. See, e.g., James Andreoni et al., Tax Compliance, 36 J. ECON. 
LITERATURE 818, 846–47 (1998) (reviewing studies of the influence of tax practitioners on 
compliance); Morse et al., supra note 17, at 42–43. 
 311. As noted earlier, Zen99.com announced that it was closing down on August 25, 2015. 
Kokalitcheva, supra note 13. 
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on how to comply with the tax laws.
312
 More investigation is needed to 
determine the accuracy of these sources of advice and their impacts on 
taxpayer reporting and compliance.  
5. Attitudes Towards Tax Compliance 
A final tax compliance issue that ought to be considered is the effect of 
sharing economy earner attitudes on tax compliance. Some commentators 
have noted that some sharing earners may feel or believe that their income 
from car or home sharing should not be taxed.
313
 This belief may stem, in 
part, from the idea that (1) the transactions are informal, based in “sharing 
or generosity,” and are not truly business transactions, or (2) a more 
generalized sensibility that the sharing economy should be exempt from 
traditional regulation. In any event, such attitudes and beliefs may prove to 
be a barrier to tax compliance and enforcement and should be closely 
monitored. 
IV. TAX ENFORCEMENT STRATEGIES FOR SHARING AND BEYOND 
We have argued in this Article that tax compliance and enforcement in 
the sharing sector may present unique challenges, due to two related 
features of the sector. First, the sharing businesses themselves engage in 
opportunistic regime selection in matters such as information reporting 
and worker classification. Second, many sharing workers are newly 
engaged in the sector at a microbusiness level; this presents challenges 
such as audit ineffectiveness, challenges associated with mixed-use 
property, and taxpayer unfamiliarity with independent contractor tax 
filing. The confluence of these two features means that sharing is likely to 
present unique and potentially serious tax compliance and enforcement 
complications. 
How should these tax compliance and enforcement challenges be 
handled? Are our current structures of compliance adequate, or will new 
approaches to compliance and enforcement become necessary going 
forward? If new compliance rules are needed, how can we be sure such 
reforms will be effective? In this Part, we explore the policy questions 
surrounding tax enforcement and compliance in the sharing economy and 
 
 
 312. For an investigation of the content and dynamics of such Internet discussion forums, see Oei 
& Ring, supra note 19 (manuscript at 21–64).  
 313. See, e.g., Dean Baker, Don't Buy the 'Sharing Economy' Hype: Airbnb and Uber Are 
Facilitating Rip-Offs, THE GUARDIAN (May 27, 2014, 7:30 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/ 
commentisfree/2014/may/27/airbnb-uber-taxes-regulation; Pender, supra note 7. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss4/7
  
 
 
 
 
2016] CAN SHARING BE TAXED? 1057 
 
 
 
 
suggest strategies that a taxing authority might use to manage the unique 
issues raised by sharing. In Part IV.A, we discuss some of the longer term 
and more theoretical policy issues that are raised and the broader 
takeaways that may be gleaned from the rise of sharing. In Parts IV.B and 
IV.C, we examine specific strategies that might be adopted in managing 
the challenges raised by the sharing economy, assuming that we are 
operating within the confines of current law. In Part IV.B, we consider 
short-term, concrete strategies that might be effective in enhancing federal 
income and employment tax compliance. In Part IV.C, we discuss 
medium- to long-term strategies and approaches that might be employed 
by federal, state, and local taxing authorities in confronting sharing’s 
challenges.  
A. Policy Issues Raised by Sharing 
Before probing the specific strategies that might be used to address 
sharing’s challenges within the confines of current law, the broader tax 
policy and tax compliance issues raised by sharing merit discussion. To 
reiterate, our position in this Article is that current substantive tax law 
contains the concepts and categories necessary to tax sharing. However, 
compliance and enforcement may present challenges and, moreover, 
current law is by no means perfect. Over the longer term, and depending 
on how markets and participant behaviors evolve, the sharing economy 
may raise broader tax policy questions that may need to be addressed. 
1. Tax Base Evolution and Changing Labor Markets 
First, some commentators have pointed out that sharing reflects a broad 
change in the ways in which labor markets are structured and operate.
314
 In 
this framing, the advent of sharing represents the independent contractor 
economy writ large, an economy in which we see a “parcelization” of 
labor and where there are fewer traditional full-time employees, a large 
number of part-time workers, and less permanence and job security 
overall.
315
 These changes have been driven, in part, by the changing role of 
 
 
 314. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, How the Future of Work May Make Many of Us Happier, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 23, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/annemarie-slaughter/future-of-
work-happier_b_6453594.html; Weber, supra note 168; Weber & Silverman, supra note 152. 
 315. See, e.g., Weber & Silverman, supra note 152; see also Mary Louise Fellows & Lily Kahng, 
Costly Mistakes: Undertaxed Business Owners and Overtaxed Workers, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 329, 
387–91 (2013) (arguing that disparate treatment of business owners and workers is particularly 
problematic given demands of the twenty-first century economy, in which business owners 
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technology in facilitating businesses and intermediary relationships. Such 
relationships and intermediaries are now possible on a scale and with a 
rapidity that was not possible in the past, and may signal a shift away from 
traditional employment arrangements. 
If sharing reflects a broader shift in market and industry structures and 
labor arrangements, we might eventually question our ability to effectively 
tax these new market relationships as a matter of tax administration and 
procedure. For example, will our current Form 1099 reporting rules be 
adequate to ensure compliance in this sector? Should the IRS test for 
distinguishing independent contractors from employees be revised? Will 
the diffuse, part-time, independent contractor economy adversely impact 
the IRS’s ability to effectively audit? Are there lessons from taxation of 
the informal sector and cash businesses that might be brought to bear in 
taxing these new economic arrangements? Relatedly, these developments 
raise potential tax base erosion issues. For example, will the rise of the 
independent contractor economy erode other sources of tax revenue (such 
as withheld-upon employee income)? Will there be base erosion caused by 
declining tax revenues from sectors with which sharing competes, such as 
the hotel and taxicab industries?
316
  
A full analysis of these issues is beyond the scope of this Article. 
Suffice it to say that the rise of sharing is not only about sharing. Rather, it 
also implicates changing economic relationships and structures and raises 
questions about how the tax system must adjust and adapt in order to 
continue to be effective. 
2. Unintended Applications of Newly Enacted Rules 
A second broad issue highlighted by sharing is the potential for tax 
rules adopted to facilitate tax administration and enforcement to be 
subsequently used in unexpected ways, and the importance of caution in 
enacting new rules. As discussed, one of the biggest potential challenges 
to the effective taxation of sharing has been the information reporting 
positions taken by sharing businesses that have adopted high reporting 
thresholds. These thresholds, enacted with intermediaries like Amazon and 
PayPal in mind, have now been embraced by some new sharing businesses 
as applicable to themselves. Relatedly, the rule providing that amounts 
subject to Form 1099-K reporting (irrespective of meeting the threshold) 
 
 
increasingly use independent contractors and temporary workers and business investment in workers is 
declining). 
 316. See, e.g., Zervas et al., supra note 5. 
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are no longer subject to Form 1099-MISC reporting has been used to 
justify not reporting at all. 
This experience with Form 1099-K reporting illustrates the impacts of 
evolving and shifting business models, changes in technology, and the 
strategic application of favorable existing legislation arguably intended for 
different types of payment entities. At the broadest level, the Form 1099-K 
experience suggests that regulatory regimes applicable to emerging 
industries should be closely considered and circumscribed with care. 
Legislators and regulators must act quickly to close loopholes as they 
arise. They should also be alert to the rise of new industries whose 
structure and design might create these types of opportunities. 
3. Designing Tax Policy for an Emerging Sector in a “First-Best” 
World 
Third, faced with a potentially evolving tax base, the possibility of a 
sea change in the nature of work relationships, and a host of interesting 
questions about the relationship between law and technology,
317
 it is worth 
considering how a “first-best” tax regime might be designed that would 
most effectively deal with this emerging sector.  
For example, some might argue that tax authorities should deliberately 
underenforce the tax obligations of sharing economy earners, or even tax 
them at differential (lower) rates, in order to facilitate the development of 
a new industry.
318
 Underenforcement might seem particularly warranted if 
one believes that the part-time, microbusiness nature of the sharing sector 
means that participation by workers is more elastic than in traditional 
industries. For example, if sharing workers are, in fact, quicker than other 
workers or business owners to substitute leisure over labor and exit the 
sector (as opposed to, say, driving more hours to compensate for higher 
tax and administrative costs), underenforcement may be advisable.
319
 
However, differential taxation would demand a threshold determination 
that facilitating development of sharing platforms is in fact a desirable 
goal. Moreover, such differential taxation has the potential to create 
inequities between sharing workers and other taxpayers, such as those 
working in more traditional sectors.  
 
 
 317. See Barry & Caron, supra note 12, at 70–75. 
 318. See, e.g., Leigh Osofsky, The Case for Categorical Nonenforcement, 69 TAX L. REV. 73, 74–
81 (2015) (exploring the legitimacy implications of categorical nonenforcement). 
 319. We are indebted to Daniel Shaviro for pointing out these policy issues. Note that it might also 
be argued that it is unfair, or at least ill-advised, to specifically target sharing economy micro-earners 
who may not be earning very much. 
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It might also be argued that one way to deal with the administrability 
issues raised by part-time microbusinesses with mixed use property is to 
implement a separate tax regime that is better tailored to enforcement and 
collection in this sector.
320
 For example, if one thinks that accurate 
tracking of expenses is likely to be an issue in tax reporting by sharing 
businesses, a possible solution might be implementation of a gross tax at 
lower rates, in order to obviate the expense-taking issue. Of course, such 
an approach would create line-drawing issues and possible accompanying 
distortions as between sharing workers and other taxpayers and business 
owners. It would also not necessarily be effective if one thinks that 
accurate reporting of gross income, rather than accurate tracking of 
expenses, is the problem. 
In sum, viewing things from a first-best perspective, some might argue 
that current tax rules should be overhauled to accommodate the rise of a 
new sector and to tax it more optimally. On the other hand, the notion that 
sharing might be treated differentially raises classic issues of tradeoffs 
between efficiency, equity, and administrability. 
A full treatment of “first best” tax policy for the sharing sector—that is, 
the ideal level of tax enforcement for this sector, or the mix of policy 
choices that would lead to an optimal tax regime for sharing—is beyond 
the scope of this Article.
321
 We do not take a position on those questions 
but simply point out the normative issues that may arise over the longer 
term. We now turn to the “second best” question of what can be done in 
response to the unique tax compliance issues raised by sharing. Our aim is 
simply to set forth the types of solutions and approaches that are likely to 
be effective in increasing compliance, given the tax laws that we currently 
have.  
 
 
 320. Our thanks to Daniel Shaviro and the participants of the NYU Tax Policy Colloquium for 
helping us develop this line of analysis. 
 321. See, e.g., James Alm, What Is an “Optimal” Tax System?, 49 NAT’L TAX J. 117, 124 (1996) 
(citation omitted) (“[O]ptimal enforcement should not eliminate all tax evasion.”); Frank A. Cowell, 
The Economic Analysis of Tax Evasion, 37 BULL. ECON. RES. 163, 183 (1985) (footnote omitted) 
(suggesting that the “utilitarian approach to evasion policy does not imply that it is socially beneficial 
to reduce tax evasion wherever this can be done without resource cost”); Louis Kaplow, Optimal 
Taxation with Costly Enforcement and Evasion, 43 J. PUB. ECON. 221, 222–23 (1990) (discussing 
raising tax rates versus increasing enforcement activity in determining optimal enforcement policy); 
Joram Mayshar, Taxation with Costly Administration, 93 SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 75, 77 (1991) 
(noting possibility that “the social costs of raising marginal tax revenue by expanding administrative 
effort may significantly exceed the social cost of raising marginal tax revenue by increasing the tax 
rate”); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment, 24 J. 
PUB. ECON. 89, 90 (1984) (noting that under some conditions, underdeterrence may be optimal). 
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B. Short-Term Strategies for Managing Sharing’s Challenges 
While Part IV.A touched on some “first-best” design issues and 
broader policy concerns raised by sharing going forward, we now discuss 
some strategies that may be pursued to strengthen tax compliance and 
enforcement in the sharing sector under current law.  
1. Clarify Worker Classification 
One threshold issue that needs to be clarified is whether sharing 
workers should be classified as independent contractors or as employees. 
As discussed in Parts II.C.1 and III.B.1, the sharing businesses have 
embraced independent contractor classification, but the issue is a quickly 
developing one before the courts. The question of classification needs to 
be decided as an initial matter, because if some sharing earners are more 
accurately classified as employees, this would significantly change the 
withholding, information reporting, and other substantive tax obligations 
of the sharing businesses.
322
 
2. Lower Information Reporting Thresholds  
Assuming that the independent contractor classification of sharing 
earners is determined to be correct, then other measures can be 
implemented. Most importantly, to the extent that the information 
reporting positions taken by some sharing businesses are leading to non-
reporting of sums earned below the 200 transaction/$20,000 threshold, a 
simple solution might be to lower the Form 1099-K information reporting 
threshold for third party settlement organizations or to clarify that the 200 
transactions/$20,000 rule does not apply to sharing businesses.
323
 Lower 
reporting thresholds could help ensure that micro-earners earning lower 
income amounts cannot avoid having such amounts reported to the IRS. 
As we discussed in Part III.A.2.d, the precise impact of more complete 
 
 
 322. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 323. See, e.g., Jeffrey H. Kahn & Gregg D. Polsky, The End of Cash, the Income Tax, and the 
Next 100 Years, 41 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 159, 160, 165 (2013) (arguing that it is possible that 
developments in payment systems technology may “fortify” the income tax by reducing the tax gap 
attributable to unreported cash income; arguing that “[t]he demise of cash should have positive 
ramifications for the income tax” because “[e]-payments automatically leave an electronic trail for 
every transaction, which decreases the risk of non-reporting of income”; and also arguing that 
§ 6050W has expanded third-party reporting by third party settlement organizations such as PayPal 
and that “[s]ection 6050W could easily be expanded to cover the information-reporting regime; the 
$20,000/200 transaction floor could be lowered to cover nearly all e-payment transactions”). 
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Form 1099-K reporting is somewhat open to question, given the newness 
of both Form 1099-K and of the sharing economy.
324
 However, there are 
reasons to think that clarifying that sharing businesses are not “third party 
settlement organizations” or simply lowering the reporting thresholds will 
improve tax reporting and compliance to some degree.  
Of course, lowering reporting thresholds would generate higher costs 
for sharing businesses required to report. We tend to think that such cost 
increases will be small. Given the technology-based nature of these 
businesses, it is likely that the businesses already have ready access to the 
information they would need. Lowering the information reporting 
thresholds will likely not drive up costs too significantly. 
3. Use of Safe Harbors and Advance Rulings 
While lower information reporting thresholds may help with 
information corroboration, this reporting only provides data regarding 
gross income receipts. It does not help in determining whether expenses 
have been accurately deducted and business and personal use of property 
correctly apportioned. There are reasons to think that excessive expense 
taking might detract from tax collection in this sector.
325
 In order to ensure 
the accuracy of expense taking, other measures might need to be adopted.  
One such group of measures is the enactment of safe harbors or 
advance rulings regarding what magnitude of expense taking is reasonable. 
This can be done within the confines of current law. We already see this 
type of approach, for example, in the use of the standard mileage method 
for vehicles.
326
 Although standard mileage still requires computation of 
miles driven, the relatively convenient cents-per-mile safe harbor may 
serve as a de facto cap on excessive expense taking, by signaling what is 
reasonable and by making it easy to opt for the standard mileage amount. 
Revenue Procedure 2013-13 offers a similar simplified method for 
calculating the home office deduction.
327
 
It is also worth considering what types of strategies would likely not be 
effective in this area. The opportunistic behaviors of the sharing 
businesses discussed here involve the choosing of a more favorable regime 
 
 
 324. See supra Part III.A.2.d. 
 325. See, e.g., Slemrod et al., supra note 17, at 2. 
 326. See supra Part II.A.2 (describing the standard mileage method). 
 327. Rev. Proc. 2013-13, 2013-1 C.B. 478. The optional safe harbor provided in Revenue 
Procedure 2013-13 allows a taxpayer to determine the permitted deduction for business use of the 
residence by “multiplying a prescribed rate by the square footage of the portion of the taxpayer’s 
residence that is used for business purposes.” Id. at 3. 
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over a less favorable one in situations where there is arguably a case to be 
made that either regime might apply. They do not, at least at the moment, 
involve deliberate structuring of the transactions and the industry in order 
to take advantage of a loophole in the law while retaining the substance of 
the activity regulated. Thus, doctrines that have traditionally applied to tax 
shelters and other deliberately constructed transactions—such as the 
economic substance, step transaction, substance over form, and sham 
transaction doctrines—are unlikely to prove effective in addressing the 
challenges raised by sharing.
328
 
4. Sector-based Crackdowns 
Another strategy that may be effective in managing sharing’s 
challenges to federal tax compliance is the focusing of enforcement 
resources on the sharing economy in order to incentivize compliance. As 
discussed, one of the enforcement realities for microbusinesses is that any 
individual audit is unlikely to yield a high dollar amount of collection. 
However, if enforcement resources were to be concentrated, at least for 
short bursts, on the sharing sector, this might encourage self-monitoring 
and voluntary compliance on the part of sharing earners.  
Leigh Osofsky has argued for just such an approach in contexts where 
enforcement resources are scarce.
329
 Osofsky has argued that such 
“project-based” or “concentrated enforcement” may yield higher levels of 
compliance by virtue of increasing marginal returns to enforcement and 
psychological benefits than traditional worst-first methods.
330
 This type of 
concentrated enforcement may be particularly beneficial in a sector like 
sharing, where dollar amounts per audit might be low, but where there are 
reasons to think that psychological effects of targeted enforcement might 
be particularly pronounced by virtue of Internet-based communication 
within the community of sharing earners. The IRS has used just such a 
concentrated enforcement strategy by disproportionately publicizing tax 
 
 
 328. For a further discussion of economic substance and related doctrines, see, e.g., Noël B. 
Cunningham & James R. Repetti, Textualism and Tax Shelters, 24 VA. TAX REV. 1, 23–32 (2004); 
Leandra Lederman, W(h)ither Economic Substance?, 95 IOWA L. REV. 389, 416–42 (2010); David A. 
Weisbach, An Economic Analysis of Anti-Tax Avoidance Doctrines, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 88, 88–91 
(2002). 
 329. Osofsky, supra note 306, at 326–29; Leigh Osofsky, Concentrated Enforcement in a Best-
Case Tax Enforcement Regime, 2014 IRS RES. BULL. 99, 101–05 (2014). 
 330. Osofsky, supra note 306, at 344–62; Osofsky, supra note 329, at 99, 101–05, 107–09. 
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criminal convictions and civil injunctions in the weeks preceding the April 
income tax filing deadline.
331
  
5. Taxpayer Education 
Finally, another strategy to enhance compliance is taxpayer education, 
particularly through the Internet. The sharing sector earners are, in general, 
an Internet-savvy population, since much of sharing is based on Internet 
and smartphone platforms. Thus, the concern that web-based outreach will 
not reach certain taxpayers (for example, elderly or less educated 
taxpayers)
332
 is less likely to be a concern here. To the extent some 
commentators contend that sharing earners are confused about their tax 
reporting obligations, targeted taxpayer education using Internet-based 
platforms might prove effective in this sector. 
C. Medium- to Long-Term Approaches 
Part IV.B discussed some relatively obvious strategies that might be 
employed to facilitate compliance in the sharing sector. These are 
strategies that are attainable and compatible with the structures of tax law 
and procedure as it currently exists. In addition to those relatively easy 
strategies and fixes, there are certain features of the sharing economy that 
the IRS and other state and local tax authorities might consider harnessing 
in the medium- to long-term.  
1. Harnessing Technology to Facilitate Compliance 
First, the tax law could evolve to make better use of the technologies 
upon which these new industries are based and to harness these 
technologies in assisting with tax compliance. The fact that sharing is so 
technology based yields benefits with respect to tax compliance, 
particularly as compared with traditional industries. For example, the 
mobile phone application used by ridesharing drivers tracks miles driven 
 
 
 331. Joshua D. Blank & Daniel Z. Levin, When Is Tax Enforcement Publicized?, 30 VA. TAX REV. 
1, 2–6 (2010) (studying IRS publicity releases and concluding that the disproportionately large number 
of releases in the weeks preceding April 15 is statistically significant). 
 332. See TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., LOW INCOME TAXPAYER CLINICS: PROGRAM REPORT 9 
(2015), available at https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p5066.pdf (citing Pew Study research of adults 
from 2000–2015); see also THOM FILE & CAMILLE RYAN, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, COMPUTER AND 
INTERNET USE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2013, at 3 (2014) (reporting household Internet use by income). 
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on each trip with a passenger. This tracking of mileage may be used by the 
IRS in verifying accurate mileage reporting.
333
  
The idea that technology may be better harnessed to facilitate tax 
compliance is not new. James Alm and Jay Soled have argued that GPS 
technology may be more effectively used in ensuring accuracy of 
automobile deductions.
334
 Indeed, many traditional businesses are relying 
increasingly on technology-based tools and tracking in running their 
operations. Thus, while the use of technology is more pronounced in the 
sharing sector, consideration of how growing technological capabilities 
might impact the way we do tax compliance is important in other 
industries as well. Of course, such uses of technology raise privacy 
concerns.
335
 In designing new ways to harness technology, privacy 
concerns must be carefully weighed against the interests of tax 
enforcement. 
2. Harnessing the Sharing Businesses Themselves 
Harnessing technological capabilities almost by definition means 
harnessing the sharing businesses themselves as information strongholds. 
While our suggested changes to the design and enforcement of Form 1099 
information reporting represent one aspect of harnessing the sharing 
businesses, this is not the only option. In addition to gross income receipts, 
the sharing businesses have access to a wide range of information, 
including miles driven with a passenger (in ridesharing), number of days a 
property is rented (in home sharing), what amenities are included in a 
home sharing rental (which gives some sense of expenses incurred), and 
number of days worked (for tasksharing, dogsitting, and related activities). 
These types of information can be sought in helping promote compliance 
in the sharing sector. Furthermore, the sharing businesses are few and 
centralized enough that they have the ability to help facilitate compliance 
for vast swaths of sharing economy workers.
336
  
 
 
 333. For example, if they are using the standard mileage method. Of course, this would not record 
and track miles driven while looking for customers, so this solution has its limitations. 
 334. Alm & Soled, supra note 309, at 456–57. 
 335. See, e.g., Michael Hatfield, Taxation and Surveillance: An Agenda, 17 YALE J.L. & TECH. 
319, 350–60 (2015). 
 336. However, just as in other sectors of the economy, some sharing economy workers may 
engage in unreported cash transactions. For example, an Uber driver might make initial contact with a 
rider through the Uber platform, but then attempt to negotiate future transactions directly with the 
rider, thereby eliminating Uber’s commission, as well as Uber’s ability to provide tax documentation.  
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This approach has already been taken, for example, with respect to 
hotel taxes, in the form of agreements designating Airbnb as responsible 
for collecting local occupancy taxes in certain locations.
337
 Such 
arrangements effectively capitalize on the centralized nature of sharing 
businesses and their ability to ensure compliance from a large number of 
sharing earners. Again, the collection and use of this information may 
raise privacy concerns, requiring a balancing of privacy against the 
enforcement gains that such information might generate. 
3. Utilizing Uniformity of the Sector 
The promise of harnessing both technology and the sharing businesses 
themselves as information strongholds in tax enforcement is bolstered by 
certain features of the sharing sector. We suggest that the IRS closely 
consider these industry characteristics in designing an approach to 
compliance and enforcement. 
First, at least as currently evolved, the sharing industry is relatively 
uniform and there are not that many major players. For example, with 
respect to ridesharing, Uber and Lyft (and Sidecar, when it was in 
business) operate on essentially the same model using similar 
technologies, and there are only a few major ridesharing companies.
338
 
The same is true for the home sharing sector and other sharing sectors. 
Securing cooperation from these businesses would facilitate compliance 
and enforcement for a large number of sharing economy workers. It would 
also be relatively easy to liaise with the limited number of sharing 
businesses in procuring information. This is in contrast to, say, the taxicab 
sector, where there are many different taxicab companies in many 
different localities.  
Second, within the sharing sector, the ownership and economic 
arrangements are relatively uniform. For example, in the case of 
ridesharing, Uber classifies all drivers the same way.
339
 Many own their 
own cars. Many home sharers own their homes and rent them on an excess 
capacity business. Thus, there is arguably less heterogeneity of economic 
arrangements for a taxing authority to accommodate, as compared perhaps 
with traditional sectors, such as the taxicab industry.  
 
 
 337. See In What Areas Is Occupancy Tax Collection and Remittance by Airbnb Available?, supra 
note 177. 
 338. See supra Part I.A. 
 339. Whether the classification is correct is a different question. See supra Part III.B.1. 
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In sum, the relative uniformity of economic relationships in the sharing 
sector may make it easier for tax authorities to design compliance and 
enforcement measures for the sector.  
4. Third-Party Partnerships and Providers 
Finally, an emerging feature of the sharing landscape is the role that 
parties other than the sharing businesses or sharing earners themselves are 
increasingly playing in promoting or facilitating tax compliance. As 
discussed, websites such as 1099.is and Zen99.com have been active in 
advising sharing earners on how to report income and expenses.
340
 Uber, 
for example, has partnered with Intuit to provide its drivers with help—in 
the form of access to QuickBooks Online with capability of TurboTax 
integration—in complying with their tax obligations.341 Furthermore, 
many sharing earners are technologically savvy enough to go online to 
discuss tax issues with peers and tax advising professionals on various 
discussion forums and websites.
342
 Such online forums may generate 
communities of compliance or non-compliance, depending on the 
prevailing norms in such forums.
343
 
These third-party initiatives and interactions are still in the early stages 
of development and evolution, and it is possible, even likely, that they may 
evolve as the sharing sector evolves. What is clear is that, like the sharing 
businesses themselves, these initiatives and actors may prove to be 
influential contributors to taxpayer compliance or noncompliance, and 
may also serve as information sources for tax enforcement. Taxing 
authorities should thus pay attention to the evolution of these initiatives 
and interactions to evaluate how they might be harnessed in the tax 
compliance context. 
 
 
 340. See About Us, ZEN99, https://web.archive.org/web/20150911102904/https://tryzen99.com/ 
about (last visited May 31, 2016) (“Zen99 provides the support services that contractors need in the 
growing 1099 economy”); About, 1099.IS, https://web.archive.org/web/20151009014215/ 
http://1099.is/about/ (describing itself as “a crowd-sourced repository of tax and accounting 
information for self-employed workers and folks getting side income”). 
 341. Press Release, Intuit, supra note 13. In January 2015, H&R Block, a nationwide tax 
preparation service, announced it was offering tax preparation discounts for Uber drivers. Press 
Release, H&R Block, H&R Block Offers Tax Preparation Discount to Drivers Who Partner with Uber 
(Jan. 28, 2015), available at http://newsroom.hrblock.com/hr-block-offers-tax-preparation-discount-to-
drivers-who-partner-with-uber. 
 342. See, e.g., TurboTax AnswerXchange, INTUIT.COM, https://ttlc.intuit.com/questions/2640713-
duplicate-today-i-rec-d-a-1099-k-from-uber-they-reported-to-the-irs-that-i-earned-approx-8k-more-than-i-
actually-rec-d-in-my-direct-deposit-should-i-contact-the-irs (last visited May 31, 2016). 
 343. For a study of the impact of online forums in establishing a culture of compliance among 
ride-share drivers, see Oei & Ring, supra note 19 (manuscript at 54–63). 
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CONCLUSION 
The advent of the sharing economy has raised questions about the 
adequacy and application of current legal regimes in regulating sharing. 
These questions have arisen with respect to tax laws and regulations as 
well. We anticipate that such questions will only become more salient as 
the sharing sector develops and grows. In this Article, we closely 
examined the question of whether existing tax laws are sufficient to 
regulate sharing. What we found was that the answer is complicated. 
Contrary to the claims of some commentators, the application of 
significant portions of substantive tax law to sharing is not actually 
unclear. While the law itself might be complex and imperfect, in many 
cases it is clear what rule applies. In a couple of respects—employment 
taxes and local occupancy taxes—the applicable substantive tax law is less 
clear, and such lack of clarity may result in tax compliance challenges. 
Even in these areas, however, we argue that the law has sufficient 
analytical categories to govern sharing transactions. What is needed is 
clarification of which regime applies, rather than completely new 
categories. 
On the other hand, even though the tax law is, for the most part, 
sufficiently developed to address the new wave of sharing transactions, tax 
compliance and enforcement in the sharing economy may prove 
problematic. Two features of the sharing economy are particularly likely 
to generate tax compliance and enforcement issues: First, the opportunism 
displayed by some sharing businesses in claiming the application of the 
more favorable regulatory regime where ambiguity exists puts the onus on 
the taxing authority to take corrective action. Opportunistic embracing of 
favorable regulatory regimes allows the sharing businesses to obtain first 
mover regulatory advantages, even though corrective action might 
subsequently occur. Second, the microbusiness character of sharing 
transactions raises tax compliance and enforcement difficulties for taxing 
authorities, particularly given scarce administrative resources. While we 
noted the types of tax compliance and enforcement issues that are 
expected to arise, we are aware that the sharing sector requires further 
study. We anticipate that this Article’s analysis will be a useful roadmap 
for such inquiry.  
In the face of the likely compliance and enforcement obstacles created 
by sharing, we recommended in this Article a number of steps and 
strategies that ought to be pursued in order to effectively confront these 
challenges. Some of our suggestions are medium- to long-term strategies. 
However, particularly with respect to federal tax compliance, even 
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incremental changes such as lowering and clarifying information reporting 
thresholds and adopting easy-to-apply safe harbors may go a long way 
toward managing this new wave of economic relationships.  
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